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In the post-Soviet period, U.S. policymakers have viewed China and Russia as the two 
great powers with the greatest inclination and capacity to challenge the international order. The 
two countries would pose especially significant challenges to the United States if they were to act 
in concert. In addition to this clear policy relevance, the China-Russia relationship poses a number 
of problems for international relations theory. 
During this period, China and Russia declined to form an alliance against the United States, 
as balance-of-power theory might have predicted. Over time, however, the two countries engaged 
in increasingly close cooperation to constrain U.S. power. These efforts fell short of traditional 
hard balancing, but they still held important implications for international politics. The actual 
forms of cooperation were therefore worthy of analysis using concepts from international relations 
theory, a task that this dissertation attempts. An additional problem concerned Russia’s response 
to China’s rise. Given the potential threat that it faced, Russia might have been expected to improve 
relations with the West as a hedge against China’s growing power. Instead, Russia increased its 
level of diplomatic cooperation with China as its relations with the West deteriorated. 
This dissertation addresses these problems through a detailed empirical study of the 
evolution of China-Russia relations from 1991 to 2016, using the within-case method of process 
tracing. The dissertation uses a modified neoclassical realist framework, which views the structure 
of the international system as the independent variable and domestic factors as intervening 
variables. At the level of the international system, unipolarity gave China and Russia incentives to 
cooperate in order to restrain U.S. power but also limited their ability to balance against U.S. power 
effectively. Eventually, as both countries’ positions of relative power improved, they sought 
spheres of influence in their own regions, gaining some room for maneuver from strong relations 
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with the other. At the domestic level, a convergence of national identities played a crucial role. 
The two countries’ shared antipathy toward the concept of a Western-led liberal international order 
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For much of the period since the breakup of the Soviet Union, U.S. policymakers have 
viewed China and Russia as the two great powers with the greatest inclination and capacity to 
challenge the international order that emerged in the wake of the Cold War. The two countries 
were on different trajectories. China was emerging as a potential peer competitor to the United 
States, while a weakened Russia sought to recover its great-power status. Both countries resisted 
U.S. efforts to spread democracy and liberal norms throughout the world. Individually, both 
countries increasingly challenged U.S. interests in their respective regions. In combination, they 
could pose the most serious potential challenge to U.S. global leadership. 
No such combination emerged, as China and Russia refrained from forming an alliance 
throughout this period. By the middle of the second decade of the twenty-first century, however, 
U.S. relations with both countries were increasingly fraught. The broad outlines of a potential 
great-power clash between the United States and a rising China grew increasingly apparent each 
year. Against this backdrop, a series of maritime disputes between China and its neighbors, 
including U.S. allies, threatened regional stability in Asia. U.S.-Russia relations, meanwhile, 
suffered greatly from the Ukraine crisis, plunging to their lowest level since the end of the Cold 
War. Under these circumstances, the possibility of an anti-Western, China-Russia geopolitical 
alignment, or even potentially an alliance, reemerged with new urgency. 
The China-Russia relationship not only presents policy challenges for world leaders, but 
also holds intriguing implications for international relations theory. Most studies of China-Russia 
relations focus on policy implications, making little or no reference to theory. International 
relations theorists frequently draw upon this relationship for examples and insights but rarely make 




policy could also prove fruitful. Insights from theory may help to explain various aspects of this 
relationship. The empirical study of China-Russia relations, in turn, may help to inform theory. 
This study attempts both tasks, focusing on the period from the breakup of the Soviet Union in late 
1991 to the end of 2016. 
In an effort to explain the evolution of China-Russia relations during this period, this study 
borrows a general framework from the school of foreign policy analysis known as neoclassical 
realism. In this approach, the structure of the international system is the main independent variable, 
domestic factors are intervening variables, and foreign policy decisions are the dependent variable. 
Neoclassical realism is a paradigm for studying foreign policy decisions rather than a theory. It 
therefore offers some flexibility in application. While employing a neoclassical realist framework, 
this study makes some important modifications to the framework compared to the way in which 
previous studies have employed it. 
In its conception of systemic factors, this study looks beyond the relatively static view of 
structure inherent in structural realism. It considers the impact of changes in relative power, which 
are crucial for understanding the relationship’s evolution during this period. When considering 
domestic factors, this study focuses on the important role of national identity in conditioning states’ 
responses to systemic influences. In contrast with pure constructivist approaches, which discount 
the importance of the structure of the international system, this study conceives of national identity 
as an intervening variable that mediates structural effects in shaping foreign policy outcomes. Both 
domestic factors and interactions with other states drive the formation of national identity. The 
resulting national identity, in turn, shapes the state’s reaction to the incentives and constraints that 




Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, the new unipolar structure of the international 
system imposed significant incentives and constraints upon China and Russia. The leaderships of 
both countries eventually decided that they should cultivate relations with the other in order to 
provide at least a partial counterweight to U.S. power. At the same time, the United States enjoyed 
such a preponderance of power that even a potential alliance between China and Russia would 
have been incapable of balancing U.S. power effectively. The structure of the international system 
therefore set broad parameters for the China-Russia relationship, encouraging leaders in both 
countries to pursue cooperation with the other, but to limit the extent of such cooperation in order 
to avoid provoking a major confrontation with the United States and its allies. 
Although these broad parameters remained constant throughout the period under study, 
changes in relative power were crucial. These changes help to explain fluctuations in both 
countries’ relations with the United States, which in turn produced changes in China-Russia 
relations. The changing balance of power between China and Russia, which tilted sharply in 
China’s favor, also affected the China-Russia relationship directly, though not as much as might 
have been expected. China and Russia set aside their own potentially diverging interests in order 
to focus on their shared antipathy to U.S. dominance. In general, as both countries’ relative power 
grew, they asserted their interests with growing confidence, especially in their own regions. To a 
considerable degree, however, the manner in which they asserted themselves was a result of 
domestic factors in both countries, particularly the formation of national identity. The two 
countries’ convergent national identities caused them to increase their bilateral coordination more 
than purely structural factors would have dictated. 
At the international level, China and Russia sought to establish the ideological groundwork 




shared a distaste for Western democracy promotion and human rights advocacy. Both countries 
feared that the United States posed a threat to their governing regimes. Rather than viewing the 
United States as a threat to their national security, the leadership in both countries viewed U.S. and 
Western influence primarily as a threat to their regimes’ stability. The ruling Chinese Communist 
Party viewed the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the breakup of the Soviet Union 
as a stark lesson in the risks of democratic political reform. Chinese leaders feared that Western 
influence could drive similar “peaceful evolution” in China. Russian President Vladimir Putin 
drew similar conclusions, viewing the breakup of the Soviet Union as the “greatest geopolitical 
catastrophe of the twentieth century.” Both countries viewed the “color revolutions” and the Arab 
Spring warily, fearing that similar upheaval eventually could threaten their own governing regimes. 
In a series of joint declarations throughout this period, therefore, China and Russia affirmed their 
support for the principle of state sovereignty and the right of states to pursue their own 
development paths. In practice, they believed that such prerogatives belonged to great powers, 
including themselves, and not necessarily to weaker states. 
China and Russia also found common ground in their advocacy of multipolarity. The two 
countries asserted repeatedly that a multipolar world was in the process of formation. Moreover, 
they argued that this trend was positive and would contribute to global stability. Their conception 
of multipolarity, however, reflected their own national identities. As became increasingly clear 
over time, their view of multipolarity envisioned a world in which they, as great powers, would 
establish spheres of influence in their own regions. The concept of spheres of influence was 
incompatible with notions of a liberal international order. China and Russia also made clear their 
intention to exert growing influence on the international stage as circumstances permitted. As their 




through the tactic of probing. Both countries mounted calibrated challenges to neighboring 
countries, designed to test U.S. power and commitment at a low level, without risking a forceful 
U.S. response. Neither country fully supported the other’s regional ambitions, nor did either 
country wish to be drawn into potential conflicts in the other’s region. Their close bilateral 
relationship, however, ensured that both countries enjoyed a stable “strategic rear” and had no 
reason to fear that the other would join the West in seeking to thwart its regional ambitions. 
Although neither country wished to see the other become embroiled in a deep crisis in relations 
with the United States and its allies, both perceived that a modicum of tension in the other’s 
relations with the West could offer some strategic room for maneuver. 
The convergence of national identities also conditioned the way that both countries viewed 
their strategic options. For China, cultivating relations with Russia, a country with which it shared 
common views on many international issues, was a means of avoiding diplomatic isolation during 
the period of its anticipated rise to superpower status. National identity was especially important 
in Russia’s consideration of its strategic options. With China’s advantage in relative power over 
Russia growing rapidly, Russia might have been tempted to improve relations with the West in 
order to strengthen its position in the face of China’s rise. Instead, Russia moved steadily closer to 
China strategically, calculating that its disagreements with the West were its most pressing 
concerns for the moment. The Russian leadership eventually viewed China as a kindred spirit in 
its rejection of U.S. dominance and liberal values. Russia, especially under Putin, calculated that 
it could improve relations with China in order to strengthen its own bargaining position in its 
difficult relations with the West, while leaving concerns about China’s rise for the future. 
Eventually, the rise of China could force Russia to reconsider this policy. As the second decade of 
the twenty-first century neared its end, however, Russia’s policy showed no signs of reversal. 
 
Chapter 1 
International Relations Theory and China-Russia Relations 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it serves as a kind of literature review of 
international relations theory’s possible applications to China-Russia relations during the post-
Soviet period. Second, in drawing upon this body of theory, it attempts to build a theoretical 
framework for the present study that is based on neoclassical realism. Before delving into the 




 A study of China-Russia relations during this period poses several methodological 
challenges. It is, by necessity, a single case study, with all of the well-known methodological 
problems associated with this approach.1 A single case study might be subject to selection bias, it 
might be insufficient for testing alternative explanations, it might yield an erroneous result because 
of measurement error, or it might be unable to capture the effects of randomness.2 The over-
generalization of results is another potential pitfall.3 In many instances, researchers gain interest 
in a theoretical question, formulate hypotheses and theories, and then select appropriate case 
studies for purposes of testing. This study follows the opposite approach. Inspired by a 
longstanding interest in China-Russia relations, it draws upon the literature in international 
                                                          
1 Gary King, Robert O. Kehonane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 208-212. 
2 Ibid, 117, 210-211. 
3 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 




relations theory for concepts and theoretical approaches that might prove useful in explaining the 
evolution of the relationship during this period. 
This study makes no claim to broader generalization beyond the case at hand. Indeed, it is 
not clear which other “cases” would fit into the same category as China-Russia relations during 
this period. This study could provide useful material for a future study of the dynamics of unipolar 
international systems, but such systems have been rare historically. During the period of U.S. 
primacy and unipolarity that followed the end of the Cold War, China and Russia were in a class 
by themselves as dissatisfied great powers. Other dissatisfied powers, including Iran, Iraq, and 
North Korea, were significantly less powerful than China and Russia. Other countries with the 
potential to gain great-power status, including India and Brazil, did not match China and Russia, 
their partners in the original BRIC grouping, in the level of their dissatisfaction with the existing 
international order. The unfolding of China-Russia relations in the coming years could also yield 
theoretical insights. For example, it could demonstrate how a rising state such as China might seek 
to cooperate with another dissatisfied state such as Russia, or the way in which a dissatisfied state 
such as Russia might seek to balance its opposition to an established superpower, on the one hand, 
with its concerns about a potentially threatening power such as China, on the other. However, these 
processes are in their early stages and await further developments before firm conclusions are 
possible. 
Rather than seeking broad generalization, therefore, this study attempts a detailed 
description and explanation of the evolution of China-Russia relations during the period under 
study. In the terminology used in the literature on social science research methods, the study aims, 
at a minimum, to meet the standards of “atheoretical/configurative idiographic” case studies, 




ambitious aim is to conduct a “disciplined configurative” case study using established theories to 
explain a case. 4  This study seeks to mitigate the problems with the single-case design by 
maximizing the number of observations within the single case. It therefore employs the within-
case method of process-tracing. The goal is to examine the process of change in China-Russia 
relations in order to identify turning points and to analyze the causal role that different variables 
played at various stages.5 This approach entails an analysis of how changes in U.S.-China relations 
and U.S.-Russia relations affected relations between China and Russia. In general, the dependent 
variable is the extent of China-Russia cooperation at the global level to resist U.S. foreign policy, 
though the study also examines other facets of the two countries’ relationship at the global, regional, 
and bilateral levels. The study considers several independent variables that potentially affect the 
relationship, including both systemic and domestic factors. 
This approach inevitably encounters the problem that Kenneth Waltz raised when he drew 
a distinction between theories of international politics and theories of foreign policy. 6  Waltz 
stressed that he formulated his structural realist theory, commonly known as neorealism, to explain 
patterns in outcomes at the level of the international system, not to predict the foreign policy 
decisions of particular states.7 Several systemic theories, including Waltz’s own, yield insights that 
are useful in analyzing China-Russia relations during this period. In particular, they help to explain 
                                                          
4 Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review 65, no. 3 
(September 1971): 682-693; and Harry Eckstein, “Case Studies and Theory in Political Science,” in Handbook of 
Political Science, Vol. 7, edited by Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 
79-138. Cited in George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 205-232. 
5 For a discussion of process-tracing, see George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, 205-232. 
6 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 39, 48-49, 58-59, 72, 78, 87, 
121-123; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics,” in Robert 
O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 328, 339-340, 343. 
7 For a debate on this issue, see Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why Not Theories of Foreign Policy?” Security 
Studies 6, no. 1 (Autumn 1996): 7-53; Kenneth N. Waltz, “International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy,” Security 
Studies 6:1 (Autumn 1996): 54-57; and Colin Elman, “Cause, Effect, and Consistency: A Response to Kenneth 




the constraints that the international environment imposed on these two countries. However, for a 
full analysis of the foreign policy decisions that have shaped China-Russia relations, it is necessary 
to analyze factors from all three of Waltz’s “images,” namely the levels of the individual, the state, 
and the international system. 8  Although this study addresses the first image, noting some 
adjustments in foreign policy resulting from changes in the two countries’ leadership, the focus is 
primarily on the second and third images. The second-image analysis focuses on domestic politics, 
state preferences, and national identities. The third-image analysis distinguishes between static 
theories that focus on established international systems and dynamic theories that address the 
transformation of international systems. The analysis in this chapter begins with structural effects 




When considering the effects of structural factors on China-Russia relations since the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, both static and dynamic structural theories are potentially useful. 
Among static theories, Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist theory is the archetype. Static theories focus on 
a given structure of the international system, analyze the nature of that system, and largely refrain 
from addressing the issue of how that system might change. These theories focus on the relative 
stability of various power configurations, as well as dynamics within them, including the 
likelihood that a stable balance of power will form. In the period under study, unipolarity was the 
defining characteristic of the structure of the international system. Dynamic theories, by contrast, 
focus on change in the international system, including both change within an existing structure and 
                                                          





change from one structure to another.9 These theories pay special attention to the question of 
whether such change is likely to occur peacefully or through major war. According to several of 
these theories, differential rates of growth in power among leading states are a crucial driver of 
change in the international system. Some of these theories focus on potential clashes between the 
leading state in the system and a single challenger, devoting little attention to other powerful states 
in the system or to the operation of the balance of power. 
Static theories are useful in analyzing contemporary China-Russia relations because the 
structure of the international system, arguably, remained unchanged for the entirety of the period 
under study. Unipolarity was the defining characteristic of the international system during this 
period. The breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in the demise of the bipolar order of the Cold 
War, yielding a new unipolar order with the United States as the sole superpower. Unipolarity 
imposed constraints on the foreign policy options of China and Russia that were relatively constant 
throughout this period. For example, the preponderance of U.S. power exerted pressure on China 
and Russia to strengthen their own relationship as a partial counterbalance, but also precluded the 
possibility of forming an alliance with the capability to balance effectively against the United 
States. Static theories focusing on unipolarity, therefore, primarily draw attention to the issue of 
U.S. primacy and the way that other states respond to it. 
To be sure, the view that the international system remained unipolar throughout the period 
under study is controversial. Even before the financial crisis erupted in 2008, various analysts 
argued that the period of U.S. dominance was ending. 10  The financial crisis heightened the 
perception in some quarters that unipolarity was yielding to a new international order. Soon after 
the outbreak of the crisis, the U.S. National Intelligence Council forecast the emergence of a 
                                                          
9 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 39-43. 




multipolar world by 2025.11 Some analysts predicted that unipolarity would give way to a new 
international order with no clear leader, or perhaps to eventual Chinese domination.12 More recent 
events, including Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union, the election of Donald Trump as 
president of the United States, and a seeming decline in Western support for globalization and a 
liberal international order, led a former vice foreign minister of China to declare that the “American 
century” and the era of unipolarity had ended.13 International relations theorists who previously 
stressed the significance and durability of unipolarity conceded that the concept failed to capture 
important dynamics of international politics in view of China’s emergence as an emerging 
potential superpower. Nevertheless, they argued that the world remained unipolar because the 
United States continued to enjoy a wide margin of superiority over China in economic, military, 
and technological measures of power.14 
 This study accepts the argument that the international system remained unipolar throughout 
the period 1991-2016. An exclusive focus on a static conception of unipolarity, however, would 
miss important dynamics of international politics. Although unipolarity imposed important 
constraints, changes in relative power were a crucial driver of the strategies that China and Russia 
pursued during this period. This factor shaped the evolution of both countries’ relations with the 
                                                          
11 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2008). 
12 For the view that the emerging international order would lack a power or group of powers that would be willing 
and able to exercise global leadership, see Charles A. Kupchan, No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the 
Coming Global Turn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). For the view that China would soon enjoy global 
dominance, see Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New 
Global Order (London: Penguin, 2009). 
13 何亚非：《“后美国时代”来临是历史必然》，《环球时报》，2017 年 8 月 15 日 [He Yafei, “The Approach 
of the ‘Post-American Era’ is Historically Inevitable,” Huanqiu Shibao, Aug. 15, 2017]; He Yafei, “The ‘American 
century’ has come to its end,” Global Times, Aug. 20, 2017. 
14 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-first 
Century: China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global Position,” International Security 40, no. 3 (Winter 
2015/16): 7-53. For an argument that the United States is likely to maintain its advantage over China for a long 
period, see Michael Beckley, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” International Security 36, no. 




United States, as well as their relations with each other. In order to assess China-Russia relations 
during this period, therefore, analysts should also consider insights from dynamic theories of 
structural change in the international system. 
 
Structural realism: Unipolarity, U.S. primacy, and China-Russia relations 
 
The structural realist theory that Kenneth Waltz set forth in his 1979 book Theory of 
International Politics, which became known as neorealism, provides a natural starting point for a 
discussion of structural effects.15 Waltz defined the structure of the international system according 
to its ordering principles, most importantly anarchy and polarity. Anarchy, the system’s essential 
feature, creates a self-help security system and forces states to engage in power politics to ensure 
their own security. As long as the system is anarchic and the existing states wish to survive, then 
two outcomes at the level of the system will recur: states will emulate the successful practices of 
other states, and balances of power will form. Waltz explained the logic that would compel states 
to balance: “Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the 
stronger state that threatens them. On the weaker side, they are both more appreciated and safer, 
provided, of course, that the coalition they join achieves enough defensive or deterrent strength to 
dissuade adversaries from attacking.”16 
As mentioned above, Waltz emphasized that he was proposing a theory of international 
politics, not a theory of foreign policy. He intended to explain and predict outcomes at the level of 
the international system, not the behavior of particular states. According to one typology, the form 
of balancing that Waltz describes was automatic balancing, as opposed to manual or dyadic 
                                                          
15 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 




balancing. In automatic balancing, the system tends toward balance regardless of whether states 
consciously seek that outcome. Manual balancing occurs when states act intentionally to create 
equilibrium in the system. Dyadic balancing describes balancing actions that states take because 
they seek to resist threats posed by other states, not because they consciously seek the formation 
of a stable international balance of power.17 If China and Russia were to form an alliance against 
the United States, this would be an example of dyadic balancing, which is outside the scope of 
Waltz’s theory. 
Theory of International Politics also analyzed the effects of polarity. However, Waltz’s 
analysis focused on multipolarity and bipolarity, not unipolarity. After the end of the Cold War, 
Waltz argued that his theory retained its explanatory value in the new unipolar era.18 Waltz had 
argued previously that bipolarity was more stable than multipolarity. He now asserted that 
unipolarity was the least stable structure of all, both because the most powerful state tends to 
overstretch itself and because other states worry about the leader’s power no matter how it behaves. 
Other states, fearing the heavy concentration of power in one state, eventually engage in power 
balancing. The theory predicted what would happen, but not when. Waltz insisted, however, that 
balancing tendencies were already apparent.19 Although he made no specific prediction that China 
and Russia would join forces to balance against the United States, he asserted that the United States, 
by expanding NATO and criticizing China and Russia for human rights abuses, had pushed the 
two countries closer together.20 In the end, unipolarity would prove short-lived and a new balance 
                                                          
17 Colin Elman, “Introduction: Appraising Balance of Power Theory,” in Realism and the Balancing of Power: A 
New Debate, ed. John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 10-11. 
18 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of the International System,” International Security 18, no. 2 (1993): 
44-79; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 5-41; 
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” in G. John Ikenberry, America Unrivaled: The Future 
of the Balance of Power (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002), 29-67. 
19 Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” 27-28. 




of power would form over time. “Those who refer to the unipolar moment are right,” Waltz wrote. 
“In our perspective, the new balance is emerging slowly; in historical perspectives, it will come in 
the blink of an eye.”21 Other analysts made similar predictions.22 
During the quarter-century that followed the breakup of the Soviet Union, however, the 
type of anti-American political and military combinations that balance-of-power theory might have 
predicted were absent. Nor did any such coalitions appear to be in the early stages of formation.23 
The two main indicators of balancing, namely substantial increases in defense spending that could 
change the global balance of power, or the formation of new alliances, were both absent. To the 
case at hand, China, Russia, and other major powers such as India did not seek to join with each 
other, or with other countries such as France and Germany, to balance U.S. power. True balancing 
of this sort would have entailed serious disruptions in relations with the United States. Despite 
frictions in their relations with the United States, neither China nor Russia allowed this relationship 
to deteriorate to such an extent.24 
A competing theoretical viewpoint, also based on structural realism, reached conclusions 
about the nature of unipolarity and U.S. primacy that were starkly different from those of Waltz. 
William C. Wohlforth, drawing upon hegemonic stability theory, argued that unipolarity would be 
both peaceful and durable. He wrote that the United States, in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s 
demise, held a concentration of power that was unprecedented in world history.25 The United States 
                                                          
21 Ibid, 30. 
22 Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise,” International Security 17, no. 4 
(Spring 1993): 5-51; Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States’ 
Unipolar Moment.” International Security 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 7-41. 
23 Michael Mandelbaum, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World’s Government in the 21st Century 
(New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 159. 
24 Robert J. Lieber, The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 200-201. 





was the first leading state in modern international history that was dominant in all aspects of power: 
economic, military, technological, and geopolitical. 26  Because of its global preeminence, the 
United States did not face two problems that had plagued international leaders throughout history: 
hegemonic rivalry and balance-of-power politics among the major powers. The United States did 
not face the possibility of hegemonic rivalry because no contender for superpower status was likely 
to take actions that would invite the “focused enmity” of the United States.27 In Wohlforth’s view, 
the rise of China was a distant prospect, perhaps at least three decades away at the time that he 
published his seminal article on unipolarity in 1999.28 For the same reason, power balancing was 
also unlikely to occur. Other states were more likely to bandwagon with the United States, or at 
least seek to avoid its focused enmity, than to balance against it.29 
Other great powers, including China and Russia, lacked the advantages that the United 
States enjoyed. If they were to attempt to balance U.S. power through military buildups and 
alliances, they would spark counterbalancing actions by other countries in their regions before they 
could mount an effective challenge to U.S. primacy.30 In a unipolar system, Wohflorth argued, any 
states that attempted to balance against the United States would quickly realize that their efforts 
were futile. This is precisely what occurred, he argued, when China and Russia made tentative 
efforts to balance against the United States. Former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov’s 
“multilateral diplomacy” of the late 1990s, including efforts to construct a bloc of Russia, China, 
and India to resist U.S. foreign policy, made little headway. Russia’s economic weakness, in turn, 
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made the country an ineffective partner for China in the attempt to build a counterweight to the 
United States.31 
Waltz and Wohlforth offered contrasting assessments of the nature of unipolarity, but both 
used structural realist theory to underpin their arguments. Stephen Walt’s balance-of-threat theory, 
which incorporates factors outside of the structural level, offers a competing realist explanation 
for the lack of balancing in the unipolar order. In a refinement of Waltz’s theory, Walt argued that 
states balance not against power itself, but against power that they perceive as threatening. Four 
variables shape threat perceptions: aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive 
capabilities, and offensive intentions.32 Walt introduced his balance-of-threat theory prior to the 
demise of bipolarity, but he later argued that the theory explained the lack of balancing against the 
United States in the new unipolar era. Wohlforth’s analysis of unipolarity contained important 
insights, Walt argued, but balance-of-threat theory subsumed it and offered a more complete 
explanation for the lack of balancing.33 For a full explanation, Walt argued, analysts should look 
beyond power and consider threat perceptions as well. 
Regarding aggregate power, Walt’s first variable, Walt conceded Wohlforth’s point that 
the U.S. advantage in power made it dangerous for other states to contemplate open opposition to 
the United States. In this sense, Walt’s balance-of-threat theory and the theory of hegemonic 
stability that underpins Wohlforth’s argument were in accord. Nevertheless, Walt argued, other 
states retained the ability to employ a wide range of strategies aiming to complicate the exercise 
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of U.S. power in various ways. The extent to which they employ these strategies, he argued, 
depends on their perception of threat.34 
In Walt’s analysis, a consideration of the other three variables offers a more complete 
understanding of the lack of balancing by China and Russia against the United States. For China 
and Russia, geography discourages balancing. Because the United States is geographically distant 
from both countries, the heavy concentration of power that it possesses is less threatening than it 
would be if its physical location were closer to China and Russia. The location of China and Russia 
on the Eurasian landmass, meanwhile, ensures that neighboring countries perceive their power as 
a threat. Geography therefore helps to explain why an alliance including China, Russia, and India 
is unlikely. With respect to offensive capabilities, Walt argued that China and Russia strongly 
resisted the U.S. establishment of missile defense systems because these countries perceived such 
systems as increasing U.S. offensive military power. Such views increased the likelihood that 
China and Russia would balance against the United States.35 As for offensive intentions, other 
states worried that the United States would take actions that harmed their interests, but they 
recognized that the United States had no intention of invading or conquering them. Walt wrote that 
the United States posed no threat to the vital interests of other states, though he added that China 
and Russia might be partial exceptions to this rule.36 Wang Jisi, a prominent Chinese analyst, 
agreed with Walt’s balance-of-threat logic, arguing that China could accept the United States’ 
status as a hegemon as long as U.S. foreign policy refrained from “hegemonistic” actions that 
threatened China and other countries.37 
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Either condition described above, namely an inability by China and Russia to balance the 
United States, or a disinclination on their part to balance because they perceived no threat of 
aggression by the United States, would be sufficient to explain the failure to balance. In practice, 
both conditions held. During the period since 1991, China and Russia have not possessed sufficient 
aggregate capability to balance the United States by forming an alliance. Even if they could form 
an alliance, the inherent difficulties of alliance politics, compounded by historical memory of 
previous tensions and awareness of competing interests at present, would hinder the effective 
functioning of such an alliance. At the same time, China and Russia have not perceived a direct 
threat to their security from the United States. If either country had perceived such a threat, 
undoubtedly it would have taken measures to defend itself, if necessary by relying on nuclear 
deterrence. Because such a situation did not arise during this period, the question of how much 
support China or Russia would have provided to the other in such circumstances must remain a 
hypothetical one. At a minimum, no treaty obligation bound them to guarantee the other’s security. 
On those occasions during the period under study when China and Russia engaged in 
cooperation to oppose the United States, they refrained from traditional power balancing, which 
would have been futile and detrimental to their interests. Nor was their cooperation driven by fear 
of invasion, given that neither country perceived such a risk. Rather, they cooperated in order to 
improve their bargaining position and to obtain more favorable outcomes in the international 
system. Behind their frequent calls for the establishment of a multipolar world lay the recognition 
that only long-term national development, rather than short-term foreign policy, could bring such 
a world into being. 
Additional factors contributed to the calculation that the costs for China and Russia of 




alliances is a difficult task. Allies are inefficient at aggregating power. Members of alliances are 
tempted to free ride, pass the buck, or bandwagon with the hegemon.38 Members of an alliance 
must constantly be concerned about the two main risks of alliance politics, namely abandonment 
and entrapment. That is, they must worry about allies either failing to come to their aid when 
needed or drawing them into unwanted conflicts.39 Both concerns would be acute in the case of 
China and Russia, both of which would be reluctant to be drawn into the other’s regional 
conflicts.40 Although coalitions of balancers have prevented potential hegemons from arising in 
several historical cases, no precedent exists for a group of subordinate powers joining to topple an 
already existing hegemon.41 
In addition to these factors, economic interdependence provided a strong incentive for both 
countries to minimize confrontation with the United States and other Western countries. China’s 
economic growth, and consequently its rise to power, depended on its tight integration in the world 
economy, including rapidly growing economic ties with the United States and the European Union. 
Russia’s economic ties with the United States were modest, but those with the EU were crucial to 
its modernization and the recovery of its great-power status. 
Some scholars, observing the absence of traditional power balancing, sought to fill the void 
by employing the concept of “soft balancing.”42 In contrast to hard balancing, in which states form 
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alliances to check the political and military power of the dominant state, soft balancing does not 
signify an effort to change the overall distribution of capabilities. Instead, states use soft balancing 
in an effort to obtain more favorable outcomes within the existing balance of power than would be 
possible otherwise. In Walt’s definition, soft balancing against the United States is “the conscious 
coordination of diplomatic action in order to obtain outcomes contrary to U.S. preferences—
outcomes that could not be gained if the balancers did not give each other some degree of mutual 
support.”43 Robert Pape defines soft balancing as “actions that do not directly challenge U.S. 
military preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive 
unilateral U.S. military policies.”44 
The notion of soft balancing, however, seems to be a clear example of what Giovanni 
Sartori calls “concept stretching.”45 As critics have rightly noted, soft balancing is simply normal 
diplomatic negotiation.46 Such diplomatic negotiation is distinct from balancing and therefore 
provides inadequate support for balance of power theory. Nevertheless, despite the conceptual and 
theoretical problems associated with soft balancing, diplomatic coordination that falls short of 
traditional balancing can still be significant for policymakers and is therefore worthy of analysis.47 
This study will attempt to analyze the ways, short of traditional balancing, in which China and 
Russia seek to constrain U.S. power. A subsequent section in this chapter addresses concrete 
examples of alleged soft balancing and other forms of strategic cooperation between China and 
Russia. 
 
                                                          
43 Walt, Taming American Power, 141-143. 
44 Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” 9-10. 
45 Giovanni Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” American Political Science Review 64 
(December 1970): 1034-1035. 
46 Richard Little, The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 265. 




Structural change: U.S. primacy, the rise of China, and China-Russia relations 
 
The previous section offered an essentially static analysis of the unipolar structure of the 
international system and its effects on China-Russia relations. This approach is useful because it 
isolates one factor, the preponderance of U.S. power, which has been a constant throughout the 
period under study, imposing both incentives and constraints on the foreign policy options of China 
and Russia. This constant helps to explain some outcomes that have also been largely constant 
throughout this period. These include a general desire by China and Russia to cooperate with each 
other to form at least a partial counterweight to U.S. power, but also a reluctance to form an alliance 
or otherwise challenge U.S. power too directly because of the high risk and likely costs of such an 
approach. 
A static analysis also suffers from limitations, however. It fails to draw attention to changes 
in foreign policy outcomes that result from changes in relative power within an existing structure. 
Such an analysis also leaves aside issues such as future change in the structure of the international 
system, the likely features of the new structure, and the effects of structural change on foreign 
policy outcomes. Amid uncertainty about the durability of unipolarity and U.S. primacy, as well 
as anticipation of China’s possible rise to superpower status, concerns about systems 
transformation are especially pressing. The role of systemic transformation is an essential factor 
in understanding major developments in international relations since the end of the Cold War, 
including the evolution of the China-Russia relationship. In order to understand variation in China-
Russia relations, it is necessary to analyze independent variables that changed during this period. 
Changes in relative power were an especially important factor. 
Dynamic theories that address change in the international system are therefore also crucial 




U.S. primacy, theories of systems transformation draw attention to the rise of China, the potential 
decline of U.S. power, and other possible changes in relative power throughout the international 
system. Some of the big questions that these theories address, including the potential for a U.S.-
China superpower confrontation, still lie in the future. Therefore, it is too early to draw anything 
more than preliminary conclusions about the effect that such a U.S.-China rivalry would have on 
China-Russia relations. Nevertheless, dynamic theories shed light on the early stages of this 
process and offer frameworks for evaluating future trends. For both China and Russia, anticipated 
changes in relative power are a crucial consideration in the formulation of national strategies. Two 
well-known dynamic theories, power transition theory and hegemonic theory, offer similar 
analyses of the rise and fall of great powers.  
Power transition theory, devised by A.F.K. Organski and elaborated by Jacek Kugler and 
others, contends that one great power usually dominates the system but eventually faces a threat 
from a rising, dissatisfied challenger. According to this theory, major war is especially likely 
during periods in which the distribution of power in the international system is roughly equal. 
When two states have roughly equal power, each may believe that it can win a war. By contrast, 
when one state enjoys a dominant position, other states know that they lack the power to challenge 
it. This promotes peace and stability. According to this theory, the dissatisfied challenger initiates 
a war against the hegemon in order to overturn the existing international order. This tends to be a 
strategic mistake, for at least two reasons. First, the challenger tends to strike before its power has 
matched that of the hegemon. Second, the dominant state usually leads an alliance of satisfied 
states that is stronger than any alliance that the challenger is able to muster.48 The latter point 
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underscores the importance that Russia could play in a potential great-power confrontation 
between China and the United States. Russia qualifies as a dissatisfied power with revisionist aims, 
but it remains far from certain that this would entice Russia to side with a rising China in a potential 
future confrontation with the United States. 
 Hegemonic stability theory and the hegemonic theory of war are similar in many respects 
to power transition theory. Robert Gilpin argues that one power’s hegemonic leadership helps to 
create and maintain global stability. Using a rational choice model, Gilpin contends that a hegemon 
will attempt to increase its power as long as the marginal benefits of doing so exceed the costs. 
Likewise, a challenger will attempt to increase its power relative to that of the hegemon as long as 
the benefits outweigh the costs. In the end, this process leads to major war that causes a 
transformation of the international system.49 One recent analysis of U.S.-China relations that draws 
implicitly on hegemonic theory argues that, in a potential U.S.-China confrontation, Russia would 
be the most valued ally that either side could secure. To date, Russia has chosen to ignore the 
potential threat to its interests from a rising China. Instead, it has opted for securing China’s 
diplomatic support in Russia’s disputes with the West, as well as China’s markets for its arms and 
energy sales.50 
 Power transition theory and the hegemonic theory of war are dyadic because they focus 
primarily on the competition between the leading power and the challenger, paying little attention 
to other actors in the system. These theories offer pessimistic assessments of the future of U.S.-
China relations, suggesting that a superpower rivalry is virtually inevitable and that major war, if 
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not inevitable, is at least highly likely.51 They may shed light on the dynamics of China’s rise and 
the likelihood of conflict with the United States, but they have less to say about the role of other 
actors in the system. They make no clear predictions, therefore, about how China’s rise is likely to 
affect China-Russia relations. Moreover, a series of historical and statistical tests have failed to 
provide empirical support for these theories.52 
 Another dynamic theory, Charles Doran’s power cycle theory, focuses on all of the great 
powers in the central system. Doran argues that each great power passes through a cycle of relative 
power, measured as a percentage share of total power in the system. The cycle includes a lower 
turning point signaling entry into the central system of great powers, an initial phase of accelerating 
growth, an inflection point followed by slowing growth, a peak followed by accelerating decline, 
another inflection point followed by slowing decline, and eventually, potential exit from the ranks 
of great powers. As a state’s relative power increases, it tends to seek a greater foreign policy role. 
Doran’s empirical research has shown that states are more likely to become involved in major war 
at “critical points” such as the lower turning point, inflection points, and peak than they are in 
other, “normal” periods of history. The critical intervals, which are a period immediately around 
the critical point, are times of great stress and uncertainty for countries. When countries reach their 
first inflection point, they sense that their relative power growth is slowing. Their projected 
trajectories of future power growth, which had previously reflected straight-line projections from 
their earlier growth rates, suddenly become unattainable. In this situation, countries are prone to 
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panic, based on the fear that they will never be able to achieve their long-cherished expectations 
for power and foreign policy role.53 
Power cycle theory disputes structural realism’s contention that bipolarity is more stable 
than multipolarity. In fact, according to power cycle theory, no correlation exists between the 
structure of the international system as Waltz defined it and international stability. Changes in 
relative power, which lead to systems transformation, are the drivers of major war, according to 
power cycle theory. A forthcoming study by Doran and one of his former students presents 
empirical findings in support of these arguments.54 
 The economic reforms that Deng Xiaoping introduced in the late 1970s launched China 
onto a path of sustained economic growth. As a result, China entered a period of accelerating 
growth in relative power. However, China may soon reach, or perhaps may already have reached 
as of this writing, its first inflection point. Doran argues that India’s growth has taken relative 
power share away from a rising China, causing China to enter a phase of slowing growth preceding 
its eventual peak in relative power. According to the theory, China will suddenly face a gap 
between its expectations about future power, based upon straight-line projections of prior growth, 
and the reality of its slowing growth in relative power. This experience will be traumatic for China, 
as it has been for previous rising powers, Doran argues. Managing China-India relations will 
therefore pose a daunting challenge during this century.55 This prospect would pose interesting 
challenges for Russia, which has maintained friendly relations with India for many years and sees 
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it as a potential counterweight to China. Russia has sold some weapons systems to India that were 
of a higher technological level than those sold to China, and it welcomes India’s role alongside 
China in multilateral organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS. 
 Some of China’s recent foreign policy assertiveness may reflect the pressures that the 
country’s leaders feel as they approach the first inflection point on their power cycle. According 
to this view, their perception of U.S. decline offers a window of opportunity to act. This may 
explain, for example, China’s recent efforts to strengthen its claims in the South China Sea. China’s 
leaders may have sensed that they should act quickly, rather than waiting, for at least two reasons. 
First, as China’s economic growth rates fall, the country’s growth in relative power may slow. 
This would leave China in a weaker position than at present to act. Second, acting soon might be 
more advantageous than waiting until the United States, India, Japan, and Australia had 
strengthened their coordination with the goal of resisting China’s encroachments.56 
 Russia, meanwhile, is attempting to pass through the lower turning point on its power cycle, 
Doran writes. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia suffered a precipitous decline on its 
power cycle that was historically unprecedented. Throughout the 1990s, Russia remained weak 
and largely unable to resist U.S. foreign policy decisions that it opposed, most notably NATO 
expansion, or to assert the foreign policy role of a great power. In the first decade of the twenty-
first century, however, Russia began to recover. Fueled by rising energy prices, Russia experienced 
sustained economic growth between 2000 and 2008. In 2008, Russia initiated a campaign of 
military modernization, with military spending growing by as much as 18 percent per year. Popular 
perceptions that Russia is still a declining power, or that it is merely a regional power, are incorrect, 
                                                          




in Doran’s view. Although Russia remains weak, and in terms of power cycle theory remains at 
the bottom of its cycle, it is slowly attempting to traverse the lower turning point.57 
 Consistent with power cycle theory, as with realism generally, both China and Russia have 
sought to enlarge their foreign policy roles as their relative power has grown. What makes their 
actions especially challenging for Western leaders, however, is that they have done so in ways that 
are incompatible with conceptions of the liberal international order. In particular, both China and 
Russia have sought to establish spheres of influence around their peripheries. This effort, Doran 
writes, is an outgrowth of the two countries’ authoritarian domestic political structures. Their 
leaders, largely unconstrained by internal checks and balances, seek to subordinate neighboring 
states and sever those states’ security relationships with other states.58 “Russia and China are 
stirring politically on the edges of the world in uncoordinated but ominous ways,” Doran writes.59 
 With both China and Russia potentially reaching critical points on their power cycles, the 
coming years could be turbulent. Structural change in the international system does not lead 
inevitably to the outbreak of major war, but peaceful management of such change requires skilled 
diplomacy. Power cycle theory also raises the possibility that China and Russia might not refrain 
indefinitely from coordination of their challenges to the international system. Research on power 
cycle theory has shown that states are more likely to form alliances while passing through critical 
intervals on their power cycles than during normal periods of history.60 One recent article by a 
Chinese analyst noted this finding from power cycle theory. Although he argued that the formation 
of a China-Russia alliance remained unlikely, he acknowledged that structural change in the 
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international system could create pressures that might cause policymakers in both countries to 
consider this option.61 
 
 
Domestic Politics, State Preferences, and National Identities 
 
 The structure of the international systems imposes constraints on states’ actions but does 
not fully determine them. In order to explain states’ foreign policy decisions, it is necessary to 
analyze domestic factors. Several different theoretical perspectives emphasize the importance of 
the domestic level in analyzing foreign policy outcomes. 
Within the realist school, one theoretical approach that incorporates domestic factors in an 
attempt to explain foreign policy decisions is neoclassical realism. 62  This approach seeks to 
preserve neorealism’s emphasis on the constraints imposed by the structure of the international 
system while also incorporating classical realism’s insights on the relationship between state and 
society. Neoclassical realism, like neorealism, views the distribution of relative power within the 
international system as the main independent variable. Unlike neorealism, which seeks to explain 
recurring outcomes at the level of the international system, neoclassical realism aims to explain 
foreign policy outcomes. It therefore adds domestic constraints and elite perceptions as intervening 
variables. 63  In addition to neoclassical realism’s utility in explaining states’ foreign policy 
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decisions, it is also conducive to a theoretically informed narrative, which is this study’s chosen 
methodology.64 
This section uses a modified neoclassical realist framework to analyze China-Russia 
relations during the period 1991-2016. The analysis of structural effects encompasses not only 
static conceptions of structure, but also changes in relative power, while viewing the formation of 
national identity as a crucial intervening variable at the domestic level. Before introducing the 
neoclassical realist framework, it is useful to assess some other theories of foreign policy to 
compare the ways in which they incorporate systemic and domestic factors. This will help to clarify 
the distinctive features of neoclassical realism. 
 
Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy 
 
Some liberal theories of international relations, known as Innenpolitik theories, argue that 
domestic factors are the crucial independent variables that determine foreign policy outcomes.65 
In contrast with neoclassical realism’s continued focus on the primacy of structural factors, some 
liberal theories of international relations offer “inside-out” frameworks that stress the primacy of 
domestic factors, including societal actors. The literature on democratic peace theory is one 
example. One proponent of Innenpolitik explanations, Andrew Moravcsik, argues that state 
preferences are a crucial determinant of foreign policy decisions. He views the formation of state 
preferences as a domestic process featuring bargaining among the state and societal actors. In any 
analysis that accepts the premise that both structural constraints and state preferences affect states’ 
foreign policy decisions, he argues, liberal theory focusing on domestic processes should enjoy 
causal priority. If the preferences of a group of states form in such a way that they have no cause 
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for the outbreak of conflict among themselves, then the structure of the system will lack 
explanatory value in assessing the outcome of their interactions. Therefore, scholars should first 
examine state preferences to determine whether a conflict of interests exists, and only then proceed 
to an analysis of structure.66 
This approach has potential value in assessing China-Russia relations. For example, the 
pro-Western liberals who composed Russia’s government in the early period following the 
breakup of the Soviet Union sought to integrate their country into the West. One influential foreign 
policy document from this period that reflected the views of the country’s liberal leadership, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, downplayed the importance of the new unipolar structure of the 
international system. One could argue that if this group of leaders had succeeded in setting their 
country on a path of successful democratic and free-market reform, then no basis would have 
existed for the deep disputes between Russia and the West in the period that followed. This might 
have prevented Russia and China from improving their relations to the extent that later occurred, 
or it might even have caused estrangement in their relationship. 
To be sure, the failure of liberal reform was partly a result of domestic processes within 
Russia, including the economic distress of the 1990s. However, international factors also played a 
role. When making foreign policy decisions, leaders must play a “two-level game” in which both 
domestic and international factors interact with each other.67 In the new unipolar order, the United 
States faced fewer constraints on its freedom of action in foreign policy than it had during the Cold 
War. 68  As a result, the United States was free to pursue policies that Russia opposed, most 
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importantly NATO expansion, which the Russian liberal reformers’ domestic opponents seized 
upon for domestic political advantage. The formation of Russian state preferences, therefore, was 
not purely a domestic process. The unipolar structure of the international system also exerted 
influence. This is an example of how Innenpolitik theories can miss crucial systemic factors. 
 Within the paradigm of structural realism, scholars have introduced two theories of foreign 
policy, known as offensive and defensive realism.69 Defensive realists take a relatively benign 
view of international anarchy. They believe that states usually can afford to be relaxed about their 
security, arousing themselves to action only on the rare occasions when genuine external threats 
arise. 70  If a state seeks to maximize power, it is likely to provoke reactions by other states, 
including arms buildups and the formation of alliances, which could make that state less secure 
than if it had adopted a more restrained approach.71 The main concern of defensive realists is the 
outbreak of avoidable international conflict through the operation of the security dilemma, the 
spiral model of conflict, and other crisis dynamics that occur in the absence of a real 
incompatibility of interests.72 In the view of defensive realists, the structure of the international 
system provides clear incentives for states to pursue restrained foreign policies and to refrain from 
aggression or overexpansion. When states fail to heed these incentives, domestic factors are often 
to blame.73 Therefore, defensive realists view either systemic incentives or domestic factors as the 
independent variable driving foreign policy decisions.74 
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 Defensive realism offers a plausible explanation of the evolution of China-Russia relations 
since 1991. In this view, the strategic partnership between China and Russia is essentially 
defensive in character.75 Although both China and Russia developed concerns about the unipolar 
distribution of power in the international system, they did not perceive direct threats to the security 
of their territory from the United States. Therefore, an alliance was unnecessary to provide for 
their security. Moreover, the formation of an alliance might have provoked a confrontation with 
the United States that would have made both states less secure than otherwise. Both states remained 
dissatisfied with the international order and sought opportunities to improve their positions, 
especially as their relative power grew. They were careful, however, not to push these efforts so 
far as to provoke a backlash. The relatively restrained foreign policy strategy that China pursued 
between 1996 and 2008 aimed to prevent the formation of a counterbalancing coalition among the 
United States and its allies in Asia that could have threatened China’s rise to superpower status.76 
Since 2008, both China and Russia have asserted their regional interests more intensely, perceiving 
a decline in U.S. power and commitment in Asia and Europe. They have done so with care, 
however, employing the tactic of “probing” to test U.S. commitment in low-level ways that are 
designed to avoid a strong reaction by the United States.77 Defensive realism also calls attention to 
the risks in such strategies, however. For example, in the view of some scholars, the budding 
competition between China and the United States in the South China Sea could be more prone to 
crisis instability in the near term than is commonly recognized.78 The pattern of China-Russia 
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relations during this period generally conforms to the expectations of defensive realism. As 
discussed below, however, the formation of national identity has also influenced the two countries’ 
interactions in important ways, especially in their joint efforts to resist the spread of liberal Western 
norms. 
Offensive realism presents a starkly contrasting view of state action. The writings of John 
Mearsheimer, a prominent offensive realist, suggest that dynamics within the U.S.-China-Russia 
triangle could be much more volatile in the coming years than defensive realism would expect. In 
an anarchic international system, states’ primary goal is survival. Because states can never be sure 
of other states’ intentions, they must base their strategies upon those other states’ capabilities. The 
most reliable way for states to assure their own security is to maximize their power. Because global 
hegemony is an unattainable goal, states aim to achieve regional hegemony. 79  In offensive 
realism’s conceptualization, the structure of the international system is the crucial independent 
variable, and domestic factors are relatively unimportant.80 
According to Mearsheimer’s argument, if China maintains high-speed economic growth, 
then it will seek to achieve hegemony in Asia, just as the United States has achieved hegemony in 
the Western Hemisphere. The United States, however, is likely to pursue its traditional goal of 
preventing another great power from gaining hegemony in either Europe or Asia. This will 
inevitably produce a clash between the United States and China.81 
Mearsheimer makes a further specific prediction about the future of China-Russia relations. 
Because China’s neighbors will fear its growing power, they will join a U.S.-led balancing 
coalition against it. These neighbors will include not only countries such as Japan, India, South 
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Korea, and Vietnam, but also Russia. The Asian regional order will be multipolar, with Russia 
maintaining its great-power status and Japan and India eventually attaining such status as well, but 
the system will exhibit unbalanced multipolarity because China will be far stronger than the other 
Asian powers. Unbalanced multipolarity, in Mearsheimer’s view, is an especially dangerous 
structure because it generates the most fear among members of the system.82 Thus, Mearsheimer’s 
theory emphasizes the likelihood of future conflict between China and Russia rather than joint 
China-Russia balancing against the United States. This possibility lies in the future and cannot yet 
be subjected to empirical analysis. Elsewhere, however, Mearsheimer has argued that U.S. foreign 
policy, including NATO expansion and what he considers to be the West’s mishandling of the 
Ukraine crisis that began in late 2013, has pushed Russia toward China. This is a mistake, he 
argues, because in the future the United States will need Russia’s help in countering China, the 
only state in the system that poses a genuine challenge to the U.S. position.83 
In contrast with these structural realist viewpoints, which assert a direct link between 
systemic constraints and the foreign policy decisions of states, constructivism dismisses the 
importance of the structure of the international system. Alexander Wendt, in his seminal article on 
the constructivist approach to international relations, argued that “anarchy is what states make of 
it.”84 In contrast with liberal theories that conceptualize the formation of state preferences as a 
purely domestic process involving bargaining among the state and societal actors, constructivism 
views the formation of national identity as a process that results from ongoing interactions among 
states in the international system. In Wendt’s conception, the pattern of national identities should 
be understood as part of the structure of the international system itself. Waltz famously offered a 
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three-part definition of the structure, including its ordering principle, the functional differentiation 
of units, and the distribution of capabilities across units.85 Wendt proposed adding a fourth: “the 
intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests in the system.” 86  A pure 
constructivist approach, therefore, discounts the importance of the structure of the international 
system, at least when conceptualized in purely material terms. 
Neoclassical realism occupies a middle ground between structural theories and 
constructivism. Like structural realists, neoclassical realists accept that the international system 
features a distribution of relative power among states that is something approaching an objective 
reality. Like constructivists, however, they recognize that systemic factors do not always determine 
states’ foreign policy decisions directly. “The world states end up inhabiting, therefore, is indeed 
partly of their own making,” writes Gideon Rose in an article describing the neoclassical realist 
approach to the study of foreign policy.87 
In studies that employ the neoclassical realist framework, two domestic factors that may 
distort states’ responses to systemic incentives have received special attention, namely leaders’ 
perceptions and misperceptions of the international balance of power, on the one hand, and the 
strength of a country’s state apparatus, on the other.88 This study argues that neither factor has 
influenced China-Russia relations significantly during this period. Although uncertainty about 
relative power is often present in international relations, Chinese and Russian leaders during this 
period appeared to maintain reasonably accurate perceptions of the international balance of power. 
When they became aware that they had miscalculated, as China appears to have done following 
the March 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, they adjusted their foreign policy expeditiously. Neither 
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country committed a grave error in foreign policy resulting from a clear misperception of the 
balance of power. Nor did either country fail to respond to structural incentives because of a weak 
state apparatus. During the 1990s, Russia’s state apparatus was weak, but its relative power in the 
international system was also weak. The strengthening of the Russian state since Putin’s rise to the 
presidency at the turn of the century coincided with a partial recovery of Russian power. The 
Chinese Communist Party also maintains its firm grip on power, enabling the leadership to 
implement its foreign policy decisions without significant resistance at the domestic level. 
This study, therefore, focuses on a different intervening variable, namely the formation of 
national identity in China and Russia. The structure of the international system, including changes 
in relative power, has strongly influenced both countries’ foreign policy decisions since the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, including decisions about the China-Russia relationship. At the same 
time, the two countries’ particular attributes, many of which fall under the framework of national 
identity, have conditioned the two countries’ responses to their international environment. The 
convergence of the two countries’ national identities has caused them to increase bilateral 
coordination beyond the level that an assessment of national interests derived purely from 




 Gilbert Rozman offers a framework for assessing national identity and the role that it has 
played in China-Russia relations. 89  He analyzes national identity along six dimensions: an 
ideological dimension; a temporal dimension encompassing views of history; a sectoral dimension 
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combining political, economic, and cultural identity; a vertical dimension for the state’s internal 
organization; a horizontal dimension centering on international relations; and a measure of the 
intensity of national identity. 90  Although the traditional conception of national interests is 
important for understanding the evolution of China-Russia relations since the breakup of the Soviet 
Union, national identity has been the crucial driver of the relationship during this period, Rozman 
argues. 
 Since the mid-1990s, the two countries have drawn closer together based on an affinity 
between their national identities.91 Their national identities overlap because the governing regimes 
in both countries share the legacy of traditional communism, antipathy toward the values that the 
U.S.-led international community promotes, and the goal of changing the rules of the international 
system.92 The problem, in the view of Chinese and Russian leaders, is not merely a divergence of 
interests with those of the United States, but incompatible views of the international system. In 
joint declarations and other pronouncements, China and Russia have repeatedly accused the United 
States of not just safeguarding its national interests, but of pursuing messianic goals in a way that 
could aggravate a clash of civilizations. They demonize the West, led by the United States, as a 
civilization with dangerous ambitions, and they insist that their assertiveness in foreign policy is 
merely a response to U.S. provocations. This critique not only represents a misunderstanding of 
U.S. objectives, Rozman argues, but also projects the two countries’ own view of a clash of 
civilizations onto the United States.93 This analysis, particularly its emphasis on the important role 
that the United States plays in the horizontal dimension of identity for both China and Russia, is 
consistent with power cycle theory’s expectation that states will seek greater foreign policy roles 
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as their relative power increases. If gaps open between expectations and reality, then this could be 
a source of international tension, especially as both China and Russia enter critical intervals on 
their power cycles. 
 Rozman notes a divergence of views on how national identity gaps form and widen.94 In 
one view, such gaps form through the process of interactions among states.95 In another view, 
fundamental civilizational differences cause clashes to deepen.96 In some cases, however, political 
elites demonize rival countries for their own domestic and foreign policy reasons.97 Beginning in 
the mid-1990s, when both countries were experiencing tension in relations with the United States, 
China and Russia consciously decided to downplay their differences in order to narrow the identity 
gap between their two countries. Their objective was to achieve greater solidarity in resisting U.S. 
pressure.98 As of this writing, this consensus remained in place. The result was that China and 
Russia grew closer together, even as the growing power imbalance in China’s favor caused their 
national interests to diverge.99 
 The principal dynamic in China-Russia relations since the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
Rozman argues, is that China has appealed to Russia for greater solidarity, and Russia has turned 
to China to express its anger at the West.100 In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet breakup, the 
prospects for China-Russia relations hardly seemed promising. In 1992, the identity gap between 
China and Russia briefly peaked. China’s ruling Communist Party, which had supported the 
August 1991 coup attempt in the Soviet Union, viewed the new Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, 
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as an enemy of socialism and feared that Russia would tilt toward the West. Russia’s liberal leaders, 
in turn, were critical of the Chinese leadership for its 1989 crackdown in Tiananmen Square and 
believed that China had little to offer Russia diplomatically or economically. This period of 
estrangement quickly passed, however, as the two countries improved relations throughout 1992, 
culminating in Yeltsin’s visit to Beijing in December of that year.101 
 Since then, a series of developments have pushed China and Russia closer together. 
Between 1994 and 1996, Russia turned toward China in response to NATO expansion and Western 
criticism of the war in Chechnya. China, which was upset by perceived U.S. support for Taiwan’s 
attempt during this period to gain de jure independence, welcomed Russia’s diplomatic outreach. 
In 1999, the Kosovo War stimulated cooperation between China and Russia, both of which 
opposed the emerging doctrine of humanitarian intervention. In 2004-2006, the outbreak of “color 
revolutions,” which occurred in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and promotion of the 
“freedom agenda,” aroused concern in both countries. In 2011-2013, the turbulence of the Arab 
Spring caused a similar reaction.102 Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012 and Xi Jinping’s 
assumption of power later that same year also created momentum in China-Russia relations, as 
both leaders adopted an assertive approach in foreign policy.103  
 In most of these episodes, the threat that China and Russia perceived was primarily to their 
own forms of domestic governance. Rather than similar national interests, a strong correspondence 
in regime interests, closely connected to national identity, was the major driving force in China-
Russia relations during this period, Rozman argues. Therefore, China and Russia have grown 
closer together despite an emerging clash of national interests. For the sake of maintaining 
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solidarity in opposition to the United States, China and Russia have set aside diverging interests 
that are most apparent in sub-regions of Asia. For example, China and Russia have sought to reach 
an accommodation regarding their respective interests in Central Asia. China has also taken an 
understanding view toward Russia’s cultivation of relations with some of China’s rivals in Asia, 
including India, Japan, and Vietnam. These potential sources of tension, Rozman argues, are 
among the reasons that China and Russia are unlikely to develop close ties similar to those that 
exist between the United States and its allies. The national identity gap between China and Russia 
could eventually widen, but it would be wise, in Rozman’s view, to assume that a close China-
Russia relationship based on convergent national identities will be an important force in world 
affairs for some time to come.104 
 
A neoclassical realist framework 
 
Drawing upon insights from the theoretical perspectives discussed above, this section 
outlines a neoclassical realist framework for analyzing China-Russia relations during the period 
between 1991 and 2016. As discussed above, neoclassical realism views the structure of the 
international system as the independent variable, domestic factors as intervening variables, and 
foreign policy decisions as the dependent variable. The analysis here slightly modifies this 
framework to focus on changing relative power as a crucial feature of the structure of the 
international system, as well as on national identity, which has a strong domestic component, as 
an important factor in foreign policy outcomes. 
The structural change resulting from the breakup of the Soviet Union provided the context 
for the subsequent development of China-Russia relations. The new unipolar structure of the 
                                                          




international system offered incentives for China and Russia to cooperate in order to form at least 
a partial counterweight to U.S. power. At the same time, unipolarity imposed constraints that 
limited the extent of the China-Russia relationship. Because the United States held a 
preponderance of power, even a China-Russia alliance would have been insufficient to provide 
balance. China and Russia therefore limited their cooperation to diplomacy and rhetoric that would 
signal their dissatisfaction with the existing order, but not prompt a forceful response by the United 
States. 
Changes in relative power were an important determinant of dynamics within the U.S.-
Russia-China triangle during this period. Power cycle theory, like realism generally, predicts that 
states will act increasingly assertively and seek a greater foreign policy role as their relative power 
increases. 105  This was true for both Russia and China during this period. In both cases, the 
perception of U.S. decline made a difference. During the decade that followed the breakup of the 
Soviet Union, Russia endured a period of weakness that limited its ability to respond to U.S. 
foreign policy decisions that it opposed, including NATO expansion. As Russia partially recovered 
its power during the first decade of the twenty-first century, it became increasingly assertive in 
foreign policy. By the time of the August 2008 war in Georgia, Russia sensed that it could take a 
forceful stand against the further expansion of Euro-Atlantic institutions into former Soviet 
territory. Russia correctly concluded that the United States, having suffered setbacks during years 
of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, would not come to Georgia’s defense. In 2014, perceiving a U.S. 
foreign policy retrenchment, Russia drew a similar conclusion about Ukraine. Between 1996 and 
2008, with some exceptions, China pursued a relatively reassuring foreign policy toward its 
neighbors, aiming to create a favorable external environment for its continued rise. In the wake of 
                                                          





the global financial crisis, China perceived that the United States, though still the world’s most 
powerful country by a wide margin, had suffered a decline in relative power. Since then, China 
has pursued an increasingly assertive foreign policy. 
The particular way in which China and Russia have asserted themselves, including the role 
that each country plays in the other’s strategy, results not only from structural factors, but also 
from national identity. For reasons discussed above, Rozman’s vertical and horizontal dimensions 
of identity, focusing on domestic governance and international relations respectively, have been 
crucial factors in the development of China-Russia relations. As China and Russia have sought a 
greater foreign policy role for themselves, they have inevitably confronted the reality of U.S. 
power. They have also confronted Western ideas that they find troubling, including the desire to 
spread democracy and human rights norms throughout the world. Limited in their ability to engage 
in traditional great-power balancing, and in any case not perceiving a direct threat to their security, 
China and Russia have nevertheless provided each other with diplomatic support for their 
international ambitions. This support includes several elements. The two countries have supported 
each other in their opposition to an international community dominated by liberal Western values. 
They have joined each other in defiance of Western criticism of their domestic governance, as both 
countries feared U.S. efforts to promote democratic change in their own societies. 
While professing support for the principle of state sovereignty, both China and Russia 
attempted to establish spheres of influence in their own regions. These efforts also grew out of the 
two countries’ national identities, as spheres of influence were a logical extension of authoritarian 
domestic rule into adjacent regions. The primary means by which the two countries attempted to 
establish their spheres of influence was through probing. Using this tactic, both countries mounted 




the goal of testing U.S. power and commitment.106 Neither China nor Russia fully supported the 
other’s regional ambitions. However, they maintained neutrality in these disputes, refused to serve 
as an obstacle to the other’s ambitions, and in some cases provided modest diplomatic support for 
the other’s position. 
While attempting to establish regional spheres of influence, the two countries also laid the 
groundwork for attempts to play larger roles on the international stage. To promote these efforts, 
both countries declared their support for multipolarity. In their conception of multipolarity, both 
countries would establish spheres of influence in their own regions. These declarations obscured 
differences in the two countries’ objectives, however. Russia sought multipolarity in order to 
recover its great-power status and to avoid marginalization. China, by contrast, despite its rhetoric 
about multipolarity, was increasingly oriented toward the prospect of bipolarity. Nevertheless, 
China’s leaders perceived utility in promoting multipolarity, with Russia as one of the great powers, 
because this would allow China to avoid being the focus of all U.S. pressure.107 In this way, Russia 
could serve as a sort of release valve. China and Russia obscured their differences over 
multipolarity in order to express their shared desire for a world order in which the United States 
would be less dominant than it was in the period following the Soviet collapse. These shared views, 
which resulted from both structural factors and national identity, formed the ideational foundation 
of the China-Russia strategic partnership. The next section looks more closely at the substantive 
details of China-Russia cooperation. 
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The Substance of the China-Russia Strategic Partnership 
 
 One way to conceptualize the substance of China-Russia cooperation in the post-Soviet 
period is to think of a “ladder of cooperation” rising from minimum to maximum levels of bilateral 
cooperation. At the bottom of the ladder, one would find the minimal demands of cooperation that 
two partners would make of each other, including non-aggression and the agreement not to join an 
alliance directed against the other. At the top of the ladder would be a comprehensive military-
political alliance. Along the way, the steps of the ladder would include various forms of 
cooperation at intermediate levels. This section will start at the bottom of the ladder and work its 
way up. Some of the categories below may overlap one another, but the analysis here generally 
flows from limited to more highly developed forms of cooperation. 
 
Non-aggression and diplomatic support 
 
 The minimal demand that China and Russia placed on each other during the period under 
study was to avoid a repeat of the Sino-Soviet tensions from the Cold War era. This process began 
during the 1980s, when the Soviet Union achieved normalization of relations with China, and 
continued during the post-Soviet period. In order to meet one of China’s three conditions for 
normalizing relations, Mikhail Gorbachev drastically reduced the Soviet military presence along 
China’s border.108 China and the Soviet Union reached an initial agreement on their disputed 
border in May 1991. Subsequent agreements between China and Russia in 1994, 2004, and 2008 
achieved, for the first time in the two countries’ history, the full delimitation and demarcation of 
their border. In 1996 and 1997, China reached agreements with Russia and three Central Asian 
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countries on demilitarization and military confidence-building measures along their borders. All 
of these steps contributed significantly to the national security of both China and Russia. 
The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation, which China and Russia 
signed in July 2001, formalized the minimal demands of cooperation. This document included a 
mutual non-aggression clause, an agreement not to join alliances directed against the other, and a 
commitment by both countries not to allow a third country to use their own territory for the purpose 
of threatening the other. Although this document did not include a mutual security guarantee, and 
therefore fell short of signifying the formation of an alliance, it did include a provision calling for 
the two states to consult with each other in the event that either country faced a threat to its security. 
Factors intrinsic to the bilateral relationship between China and Russia gave both countries strong 
incentives to adopt all of these measures, which were vital for both countries’ security and 
economic development. The United States was also an important factor, however, as such 
understandings were necessary preconditions for attempts by China and Russia to check U.S. 
power. 
 In addition to these formal commitments to non-aggression and non-participation in any 
alliance directed against the other, both countries sought, more generally, to ensure that the other 
would not drift too far in other diplomatic directions. Immediately following the breakup of the 
Soviet Union, China feared that Russia’s new liberal, pro-Western leaders would tilt toward the 
West, leaving China diplomatically isolated. China responded by remaining patient and carefully 
cultivating Russia’s leadership, efforts that soon achieved results. By the end of 1992, Russia had 
already readjusted its foreign policy, making overtures in China’s direction. China’s concerns 
resurfaced in the period following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when Russia again 




again, Russia turned back toward China. Russian leaders at times harbored their own concerns 
about U.S.-China relations. Their concern was that efforts by the United States and China to 
manage an increasingly bipolar world would leave Russia marginalized. For this reason, Russian 
leaders and analysts reacted negatively to the proposal for a U.S.-China G-2 arrangement that 
emerged in late 2008 and early 2009 in the wake of the global financial crisis. This concern may 
have been a factor in Russia’s receptiveness to the Obama administration’s proposed “reset.” The 
reset, in turn, may have caused some consternation in China, once again, about overly close U.S.-
Russia relations. The China-Russia strategic partnership that emerged in the 1990s helped to 
ensure that neither country moved too close to the United States for the other’s comfort in any 
lasting way. 
 
Economics, arms sales, and energy cooperation 
 
 Having secured the minimal demands of non-aggression and friendly relations, China and 
Russia also sought material benefits from their bilateral relationship. Throughout this period, 
economic ties grew significantly yet remained modest. China’s economic relations with Russia 
remained insignificant compared to those with the United States and the European Union. 
Although China eventually became Russia’s largest single trading partner, Russia’s economic 
relationship with China lagged significantly behind its economic ties with the European Union, 
even after the imposition of sanctions in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. Although the two countries’ 
overall economic ties remained modest, their cooperation in two important sectors, weapons sales 
and energy, reached high levels and carried strategic significance. 
A confluence of events in both countries led to Russia’s becoming the largest supplier of 




1989, Western countries imposed an arms embargo on China. In order to continue its program of 
military modernization, China had to look elsewhere for foreign suppliers. After the breakup of 
the Soviet Union, Russia’s domestic defense industry, which had already seen its sales to members 
of the Warsaw Pact dry up, now faced a collapse of domestic orders as well. In order to preserve 
its domestic defense industry, which was necessary both for economic and security reasons, Russia 
had to find alternative foreign markets. It soon turned to China, delivering its first shipment of Su-
27 fighter jets in 1992. Russian arms sales to China grew steadily before peaking during the middle 
of the first decade of the twenty-first century. These sales then fell sharply for several years as 
China increasingly relied upon its own domestic production. In recent years, Russian arms sales 
to China have once again approached their earlier peak levels, featuring deliveries of major 
weapons systems such as S-400 air defense systems and Su-35 fighter jets.109 Between 1992 and 
2016, China imported an estimated $33.2 billion worth of weapons from Russia, which accounted 
for more than 79 percent of China’s total weapons imports during this period.110 
 Although economic factors were the primary consideration driving Russian arms sales to 
China, these sales had clear strategic implications. Most obviously, they made a material 
contribution to China’s growing military power, complicating U.S. efforts to prepare for possible 
scenarios of military conflict with China. In making decisions about arms sales to China, Russian 
leaders also paid attention to strategic considerations. Russia sold weapons to China that would be 
particularly useful in potential military conflict at sea against the United States and its Asian allies, 
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rather than in a hypothetical land invasion of Russia. One recent analysis by Russian experts 
concluded that such arms sales served Russia’s interests by forcing the United States to reorient 
its forces toward Asia and away from Europe.111 
The energy sector was another sphere in which the interests of Russia and China appeared 
to be complementary, though relations were slow to develop. For years, Russia debated whether 
to build an oil pipeline to China or to its own Pacific coast to serve markets throughout Asia. The 
first option would have been cheaper than the second and would have allowed Russia to tap into 
China’s booming demand for energy, but it risked dependence on a single market. The second 
option offered Russia greater flexibility, but it would have been more expensive and risked 
alienating China and losing share in that crucial market. These deliberations reflected Russia’s 
desire to maximize profits from oil sales in Asia, as well as its desire to maintain geopolitical 
flexibility in the region. In the wake of the financial crisis and the resulting collapse in oil prices, 
Russia agreed to the construction of an oil pipeline spur to China in return for Chinese loans to its 
state oil and pipeline companies. This pipeline, which was a spur from the East Siberia-Pacific 
Ocean (ESPO) pipeline that would eventually reach Russia’s Pacific coast, went into operation in 
2011. In 2016, Russia accounted for nearly 14 percent of China’s oil imports.112 
 China and Russia also reached a breakthrough in the natural gas sector. After long 
deliberations, Russia agreed in May 2014 to the construction of a gas pipeline to China’s 
northeastern region, one of two possible gas pipelines that the two countries had long discussed. 
Once again, Russia made this decision under pressure. On this occasion, it faced new sanctions 
that the West imposed following Russia’s annexation of Crimea two months earlier. Under this 
                                                          
111 Барабанов, Кашин, Макиенко. Оборонная Промышленность и Торговля Вооружениями КНР [Barabanov, 
Kashin, Makienko, The Defense Industry and Arms Trade of the PRC, 155-156]; author’s interview with Vasily 
Kashin, Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technology, Moscow, April 24, 2014. 




agreement, Russia would supply China with 38 billion cubic meters of gas per year, instantly 
surpassing Turkmenistan to become China’s largest supplier of natural gas. The pipeline was still 
under construction as of this writing.113 
Although economic considerations and factors intrinsic to the China-Russia bilateral 
relationship were the main driver of energy relations, the results had important implications for 
international politics. China’s purchases of oil and gas from Russia, as well as from Central Asia, 
were strategically significant because they reduced the share of China’s imported energy resources 
that must pass through the Strait of Malacca. These energy deliveries therefore give China an 
added measure of energy security that would be useful if, during a potential armed conflict with 
the United States, the U.S. Navy were to block energy deliveries to China through the strait. 
Therefore, as in military-technical cooperation, Russia-China energy ties make a material 
contribution to China’s growing power. Nevertheless, the course of energy relations has depended 
not primarily on the vicissitudes of both countries’ relations with the West, but rather on the 
condition of Russia’s economy, which relies heavily on exports of hydrocarbons. At times of low 
energy prices and resulting economic distress, Russia’s interest in energy deals with China 
increased. The terms of Russia-China energy deals increasingly favor China, threatening Russia 
with excessive dependence on its strategic partner. 
 
Strategic room for maneuver 
 
 A previous section of this chapter described ways in which China and Russia provide each 
other with diplomatic support on issues of world order. As mentioned, they maintain solidarity in 
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their calls for the right of every country to determine its own form of domestic governance, without 
foreign criticism or interference. They resist the dominance of a U.S.-led international community 
promoting liberal values, arguing that other civilizations should have the freedom to uphold their 
own values and to pursue their own development paths. They resist U.S. dominance and 
unipolarity, calling for the formation of a multipolar world. In their attempt to uphold these shared 
views, both countries set aside the divergence of their interests that results from the growing power 
imbalance in China’s favor. In all of these respects, national identity shapes the particular way in 
which China and Russia respond to the international environment. 
 In their vision of multipolarity, China and Russia would play increasingly large roles in 
international politics. They would start by strengthening their positions in their own regions, where 
they would establish spheres of influence. This process has already been underway for several 
years. For both China and Russia, the chosen method for establishing spheres of influence is the 
tactic of “probing.”114 According to one definition, probing is “a low-intensity and low-risk test 
aimed at gauging the opposing states’ power and will to maintain security and influence over a 
region,” but which also “studiously avoids a direct military confrontation with the leading power 
by targeting the outer limits of its commitments and interests.”115 
 Power cycle theory helps to explain why probing has occurred with increasing frequency 
and intensity in recent years. At moments of great structural change, great powers experience 
tremendous uncertainty about their relative power and their standing in the international hierarchy. 
As a result, they are uncertain as to how far their power extends and how rival states might react 
if they seek to expand their influence.116 With China and Russia either passing through critical 
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points on their power cycle, or on the verge of doing so as of this writing, such uncertainty has 
been present in the international system in recent years, especially since around 2008. Uncertainty 
about relative power is dangerous because war, in one famous analysis, can break out as a result 
of a “dispute about the measurement of power.”117 
 Because war is risky and dangerous, states have an incentive to avoid war unless they feel 
confident of victory. The resilience of U.S. power means that challenging the United States directly 
is perilous for revisionist states such as China and Russia. Therefore, they seek less risky strategies 
for expanding their power and influence. Although the United States maintains a strong advantage 
in terms of comprehensive power, leaders in both China and Russia perceived that U.S. power had 
declined and that their own countries’ relative power had increased. As a result, they were 
emboldened to seek ways to assert their power and interests while avoiding a direct confrontation 
with the United States. The logical place for these states to engage in probing was in their own 
regions, where the interests of the United States were marginal and its commitment was most 
questionable. In these regions, both countries surmised, the U.S. response was likely to be most 
restrained, and their own prospects for success were highest. The goal of these probes was not 
merely to register disapproval of the international order, but to test U.S. resolve and, ultimately, to 
begin revising the international order gradually.118 
 Russia engaged in probing through its war in Georgia in 2008, its annexation of Crimea in 
2014, its support for insurgents in eastern Ukraine beginning that same year, and its threats against 
vulnerable NATO members around the Baltic Sea. The threats to countries in Eastern Europe, by 
casting doubt upon U.S. commitment to these countries’ defense, threatened to drive a wedge 
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between the United States and its allies in that region. For its part, China ratcheted up its pressure 
on carefully selected geographical fixtures, including shoals and reefs in the Spratly and Paracel 
Islands, which are of vital concern to U.S. allies but of little intrinsic importance to the United 
States. The U.S. reluctance to go to war over such minor points on the map heightens concerns 
among its allies in Asia about its commitment to the region’s security. Like Russia’s probes in 
Eastern Europe, therefore, China’s actions in the South China Sea threaten to drive a wedge 
between the United States and its allies.119 
 As China and Russia engage in probing, with the goal of establishing spheres of influence 
in their own regions, they act largely in parallel, rather than in concert. Neither side fully supports 
the other’s regional ambitions. As discussed in subsequent chapters, China offered Russia a 
measure of diplomatic support during the 2008 war in Georgia but declined to join Russia in 
recognizing the sovereignty of two breakaway regions. China responded similarly to events in 
Ukraine six years later. Although Chinese leaders agreed with Russia that the United States and 
the European Union had provoked the conflict in Ukraine, they failed to provide Russia with 
unequivocal diplomatic support. China abstained from, but declined to join Russia in vetoing, a 
UN Security Council resolution condemning the impending referendum in Crimea on the 
peninsula’s annexation by Russia, as well as a UN General Assembly resolution condemning the 
annexation. Russia, for its part, maintained neutrality on China’s disputes in the South China Sea 
and the East China Sea. Although Russia and China both had ongoing territorial disputes with 
Japan, Russia declined China’s invitation to form a common front on these disputes. Instead, 
Russia entertained diplomatic overtures from Japan, which sought to improve relations with Russia 
as a hedge against China’s rise. Russia also cultivated relations with other countries embroiled in 
                                                          




territorial disputes with China, including Vietnam, which purchased Russian submarines. Given 
both sides’ unwillingness to become involved in the other’s regional disputes, the risks posed by 
the familiar problems of entrapment and abandonment are acute and serve as a further reason that 
the formation of a China-Russia alliance is unlikely. 
 Central Asia was one region in which the two countries’ regional ambitions threatened to 
collide. Despite predictions of an eventual clash of interests in this region, however, China-Russia 
relations developed smoothly during the period under study. To be sure, in the face of China’s 
growing inroads in this region, Russia attempted to consolidate its own influence. The Eurasian 
Economic Union, a project that Putin promoted while preparing his return to the presidency in the 
fall of 2011, was partly an effort to resist China’s growing influence. China’s Belt and Road 
initiative, which Xi Jinping introduced during the fall of 2013, seemed likely to consolidate 
China’s influence further. Whatever misgivings Russian officials had about this initiative, however, 
they did not express them publicly. Instead, they embarked on a diplomatic effort to reach an 
understanding with China, which culminated in the two countries’ announcement in May 2015 
that they would attempt to link the Silk Road Economic Belt, the continental component of the 
Belt and Road, with the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia appeared to have concluded that the 
potential damage from a major effort to resist China’s advances in the region would exceed the 
likely benefits. 
 Although the China-Russia strategic partnership does not entail full support for each 
other’s regional objectives, it nevertheless enhances both countries’ ability to pursue these 
ambitions. Neither country wishes to see the other become embroiled in a major conflict with the 
United States. Such a conflict would place the other one in an awkward and risky diplomatic 




in the other’s relations with the United States affords some strategic room for maneuver. A shift 
of U.S. strategic focus toward Asia casts further doubt upon U.S. commitments in Europe, possibly 
offering strategic opportunities for Russia. As discussed previously, this factor offers Russia an 
additional reason to sell advanced weapons systems to China. From China’s perspective, ongoing 
tensions between the United States and Russia complicate U.S. efforts to focus strategic attention 
on Asia. The Ukraine crisis also strengthened China’s position in the U.S.-Russia-China triangle. 
Russia’s diplomatic and economic isolation forced it to turn to China, enhancing China’s ability 
to secure benefits from its relationship with Russia, including contracts for advanced weapons, 
increased oil and gas shipments, and opportunities to invest in Russia’s energy industry. China and 
Russia also enjoy opportunities to learn from the other’s success in its efforts at probing. 
The simultaneous deterioration of relations with Russia and the intensification of great-
power competition with China stretches U.S. resources and weakens the country’s diplomatic 
bargaining position. The possibility that the United States could simultaneously face crises in 
Europe and Asia complicates its task of exercising global leadership. As long as these processes 
remain under control, they enhance the ability of both China and Russia to engage in probing in 
their own regions. The resulting strategic room for maneuver, which enhances both countries’ 
ability to pursue their regional ambitions in parallel, is one of the most useful benefits of their 
strategic partnership. Efforts to act in concert, discussed next, have been less successful in 








 The previous sections discussed ways in which China and Russia, despite acting largely in 
parallel rather than in concert, nevertheless benefit from their close diplomatic relationship. 
Moving up the ladder of cooperation, the following sections discuss ways in which the two 
countries cooperate to promote common objectives in international relations, albeit in a restrained 
way. The next two sections discuss triangular diplomacy and soft balancing, respectively. The 
actual extent of China-Russia cooperation, at least in its intent, lies somewhere along these rungs 
of the ladder of cooperation. These two concepts overlap with each other, and it is debatable which 
one should be considered higher on the ladder of cooperation. The answer depends on the precise 
goals of the leaders pursuing these strategies, as well as on the outcomes they achieve. One Chinese 
scholar’s assessment of the role of the United States in the China-Russia relationship helps to 
illustrate this point. In assessing the impact of the U.S. factor, Wu Xinbo, a scholar whose specialty 
is the United States, offered a three-part typology. In some cases, China and Russia join hands to 
offset pressure from the United States. In other cases, they engage in diplomatic outreach to the 
other in order to gain leverage in relations with the United States. Finally, at times they also 
compete with each other for closer ties to the United States.120 
The first approach, in which China and Russia cooperate to oppose the United States, is 
equivalent to soft balancing, whether or not this effort achieves results. If it fails to achieve results, 
then it fails to qualify as triangular diplomacy, for reasons discussed below. In this sense, triangular 
diplomacy would rank higher on the ladder of cooperation than soft balancing. In the latter two 
approaches, the common element is that China and Russia use their relationship with the other 
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primarily as a “card” to play in relations with the United States. This constitutes a lesser form of 
cooperation than standing in solidarity to oppose the United States, as seen in soft balancing. In 
this sense, triangular diplomacy stands lower on the ladder of cooperation than soft balancing. 
Because triangular diplomacy usually focuses on the latter two types of engagement, this section 
places triangular diplomacy below soft balancing on the ladder of cooperation. 
The concept of the strategic triangle was in vogue in the early to mid-1970s, when the 
United States pursued rapprochement with China and used the resulting “China card” to obtain 
concessions from the Soviet Union during the course of détente. 121  Donald Zagoria, during 
congressional testimony in 1965, defined the triangle as a pattern in which “change in the 
relationship of any two of the powers unavoidably affects the third.”122 Further developing the 
concept, Lowell Dittmer wrote that the existence of a strategic triangle requires that two conditions 
must be in effect. First, all three participants in the triangle must recognize each other’s strategic 
salience. Second, though the three participants need not be of equal strategic weight, each of them 
must be recognized by the other two as a legitimate, autonomous player. If these conditions are 
present, then the relationship between any two actors in the triangle will be influenced by their 
relationships with the third actor. This condition demonstrates why two states’ interactions must 
influence the behavior of the third in order to qualify as triangular diplomacy, as opposed to mere 
rhetorical opposition to the third state’s policies, which is sometimes the extent of alleged instances 
of soft balancing. The conditions that Dittmer describes were not always present during the Cold 
War, and the configuration of the triangle took different forms at different times.123  
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 Using Dittmer’s terms, a pattern of ménage à trois involves amity among all three players, 
a romantic triangle entails amity between one “pivot” player and two “wing” players and enmity 
between each of the wings, and a stable marriage forms when two of the players share amity with 
each other and enmity with the third.124 During Richard Nixon’s presidency, the heyday of the 
triangle, the United States enjoyed the pivot position in a romantic triangle.125 The U.S. objective 
was not to form an alliance with China against the Soviet Union. Rather, as Henry Kissinger 
explained, the goal was to maximize U.S. bargaining leverage by ensuring that its options toward 
both were greater than their options toward each other.126 “The hostility between China and the 
Soviet Union served our purposes best if we maintained closer relations with each side than they 
did with each other,” Kissinger wrote.127 
 After the demise of détente, the United States and China entered a “stable marriage” that 
lasted from 1976 to 1981. Deng Xiaoping’s announcement that China would pursue an 
independent foreign policy signaled the loosening of U.S.-China relations and steps toward 
improvement of Sino-Soviet relations, resulting in the formation of a romantic triangle from 1981 
to 1985, with China in the pivot. Gorbachev’s simultaneous improvement of relations with the 
United States and China produced a ménage à trois lasting from 1986 to 1990. The end of the Cold 
War and collapse of the Soviet Union left the future of the triangle uncertain.128 
Initially, the days of the strategic triangle appeared to be over. Although U.S.-China 
relations soured following the crackdown in Tiananmen Square, the prospects for U.S.-Russia 
relations appeared bright, as Yeltsin’s government pursued integration with the West. U.S.-Russia 
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relations soon deteriorated, however, and the possibility of a revived triangle reemerged. In this 
conception of the triangle, Russia, which still possessed nuclear parity with the United States, 
would join with China, a rising potential superpower, to balance the United States. Instead of 
forming an alliance, however, both countries would use their partnership to increase their own 
influence in relations with the United States, with which they would remain closely engaged.129 
An initial attempt to revive the triangle occurred in the 1990s. After first shunning China, 
Russia soon resumed efforts to cultivate relations with its large eastern neighbor. Some of its 
motivations were purely bilateral, including its desire to resolve border issues, control Chinese 
immigration, and sell weapons to China in order to sustain its domestic defense industry. Another 
motivation, however, was to play the “China card” as a counterweight against U.S. power.130 
Yeltsin expressed this desire clearly in 1995: “We can lean on the shoulder of China in relations 
with the United States. Then the West will start to treat Russia more respectfully.”131 Yeltsin sought 
not only to create a counterweight to U.S. power, but also to establish Russia as a bridge between 
China and the United States.132 China, which also sought ways to counterbalance U.S. power, was 
receptive to Russia’s diplomatic outreach. Nevertheless, neither Russia nor China was able to 
exploit their strategic partnership to force changes in U.S. policy on issues such as NATO 
expansion, arms sales to Taiwan, missile defense, or the campaign in Kosovo. Meanwhile, U.S.-
China economic ties expanded rapidly. 
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Despite the failure of triangular diplomacy in the 1990s, new opportunities for the triangle 
seemed apparent starting around 2007 and 2008. Owing to several factors, the gap in power among 
the three countries appeared to narrow. After years of inconclusive fighting in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the United States appeared weaker than it had earlier in the decade. The war in Iraq had 
stimulated anti-Americanism in Europe and created a rift between the United States and several of 
its NATO allies. Russia had enjoyed several years of economic growth fueled by high oil and 
commodity prices. China’s sustained economic growth continued to augment its power.133 The 
financial crisis heightened perceptions of U.S. decline, but it also struck Russia harder than any 
other major world economy. China emerged from the financial crisis in relatively strong condition 
and began to pursue an increasingly assertive foreign policy. Once again, however, the triangle 
failed to emerge. The United States and Russia pursued a “reset” of relations, while prominent 
voices in the United States called for the formation of a “G-2” with China. The foreign policies of 
China and Russia revealed that relations with the United States remained both countries’ priority. 
 Within the triangle, Russia and China pursued slightly different objectives. Russia 
appeared to seek the pivot position, which would allow it to seek advantage by maneuvering 
between the United States and China, whereas China often sought Russia’s solidarity in opposing 
the United States.134 The issue of missile defense was an example. China sought to maintain a 
united front with Russia against U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Putin’s muted acceptance 
of the eventual U.S. withdrawal, which occurred during the U.S.-Russia rapprochement that 
followed the 2001 terrorist attacks, appeared to indicate that relations with the West remained 
Russia’s priority. 
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The two countries’ contrasting approaches to the triangle were largely a result of 
differences in their power trajectories. Throughout the post-Cold War period, Russia’s weakness 
was the principal reason for the failure of triangular diplomacy to reemerge.135 In a time of Russian 
weakness, Yeltsin sought to play the China card to gain leverage in relations with the United States, 
as his quotation above suggests, but achieved little success. Putin’s main goal in foreign policy has 
been to avoid marginalization and to reestablish Russia as a great power. This implies that Russia 
would be a third “pole,” along with the United States and China, in a tripolar world order. In 
cultivating ties with China, Putin aimed not only to counterbalance U.S. power and strengthen 
Russia’s diplomatic bargaining position, but also to influence the way in which China wielded its 
growing power, which was potentially threatening to Russia.136 
China, meanwhile, focused on its rise to superpower status. Despite their country’s rapid 
rise, Chinese leaders believed that this process would take decades. During this period, the 
imperative was to avoid serious international conflict that might threaten the country’s 
accumulation of national power. Therefore, although Chinese leaders sought Russia’s diplomatic 
support on missile defense and other issues, they were not interested in increasing coordination 
with Russia to an extent that would cause a serious deterioration in relations with the United States. 
In any case, Chinese leaders recognized that Russia played a marginal role in their country’s 
economic development and was unlikely to provide them with more than minimal support in a 
potential U.S.-China confrontation.137 Chinese leaders joined Russia’s calls for multipolarity, but 
they, along with leading Chinese analysts, recognized the increasing likelihood that the emerging 
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world order would be not multipolar, but bipolar.138 In a tight bipolar environment, triangular 
diplomacy could not function effectively because of the third actor’s marginal position. 
The Ukraine crisis stimulated a further strategic convergence of China and Russia, but it 
tilted the relationship still further to China’s advantage. Facing diplomatic isolation and Western 
sanctions, Russia needed China’s support more than the reverse. This situation hindered Russia’s 
ability to exploit the triangle to its benefit. The growing power imbalance in China’s favor was 
merely a continuation of a trend that had been underway for several years. In the words of Chinese 
Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying, the U.S.-China-Russia triangle had become scalene—that is, 
having no congruent sides. 139  The U.S.-Russia leg of the triangle featured ruptured political 
relations and minimal economic ties. Russia maintained strong economic ties with U.S. allies in 
Europe, but these ties now suffered under sanctions. The United States and China seemed poised 
for intensified political competition, but their economies were heavily intertwined. China and 
Russia enjoyed increasingly close political relations, but their economic ties remained modest, 
except in sectors such as arms sales and energy. 
The net result was that the United States had lost the advantage that Kissinger sought and 
achieved during the period of détente, namely the attainment of closer relations with both of the 
other two countries than they enjoyed with each other.140 China now occupied the pivot in the 
triangle. This position allowed China to reap certain benefits, enumerated in this section, without 
causing deep antagonism in relations with the United States or threatening its own rise to power. 
This did not represent a return to full-fledged triangular diplomacy, but it demonstrated that China 
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could achieve tangible results from its management of relations within the triangle. Russia was 
much less successful. As the second decade of the twenty-first century neared its end, Russia 




 An earlier section of this chapter discussed soft balancing, ongoing debates about its 
validity as a concept, and its potential applicability to China-Russia relations during this period. 
As mentioned, some scholars use the concept of soft balancing to describe efforts by a group of 
states that aim not to change the international balance of power, but to obtain better outcomes 
within the existing balance of power than they could achieve in the absence of such cooperation. 
This section discusses some of the examples of alleged soft balancing by China and Russia that 
proponents of this concept have identified. 
 The U.S. pursuit of national missile defense, in the view of some scholars, was an 
especially important issue that prompted soft balancing by China and Russia. U.S. aspirations to 
build national missile defense systems, Robert Pape argued, created a classic security dilemma, 
especially in relations with China and Russia. Both countries feared that a U.S. national missile 
defense project, though initially a limited system designed to intercept missiles from rogue states, 
eventually could expand and give the United States nuclear superiority.141 Despite the defensive 
purpose of such systems, the possibility that they could render the United States invulnerable to 
nuclear attack threatened to increase the U.S. capacity to take offensive action. Both China and 
Russia therefore viewed missile defense systems as enhancements to U.S. offensive power, which 
is one of the four variables in Walt’s balance-of-threat theory. Both countries therefore viewed 
                                                          




U.S. national missile defense plans as a potential threat to their deterrent capabilities. 142  As 
described in a later chapter, China and Russia issued a series of joint declarations and sponsored 
several UN resolutions denouncing U.S. missile defense plans. This issue also caused some tension 
in China-Russia relations, however. China was disappointed when Putin accepted U.S. withdrawal 
from the ABM Treaty, which President George W. Bush announced in late 2001, with little protest. 
The national interests of China and Russia also diverged on this issue because China was primarily 
concerned about theater missile defense, whereas Russia worried more about national missile 
defense. However, when South Korea agreed in 2016 to the installation of the Terminal High-
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system, provided by the United States, China 
and Russia opposed this decision in unison. 
The Kosovo crisis of 1999, which occurred simultaneously with the pursuit of U.S. missile 
defense plans, also prompted cooperation by China and Russia. In the view of some scholars, these 
efforts constituted soft balancing. As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, both countries opposed 
NATO’s intervention because it threatened to erode the principle of sovereignty and to offer 
support to secessionist movements. Both countries had their own problems with separatism, 
including Russia’s difficulties in Chechnya and China’s concerns about Taiwan, Tibet, and 
Xinjiang.143 Other factors prompted more visceral reactions, including Russia’s affinity for its 
fellow Slavs in Serbia and China’s outrage over NATO’s accidental bombing of the embassy in 
Belgrade. Their opposition to the Kosovo campaign, therefore, was based on a combination of 
national interests, as they perceived them, and national identities. 
China and Russia used their veto power to prevent UN Security Council authorization for 
NATO’s actions, but they failed to stop the bombing campaign, which enjoyed strong support 
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among NATO’s European member-states. Russia also expressed its opposition by suspending 
participation in the Russia-NATO Founding Act and the Partnership for Peace, among other 
actions that severed some diplomatic relations with the West. However, Russia soon reengaged 
diplomatically and played in a role in ending the conflict by successfully persuading Yugoslav 
President Slobodan Milosevic to accept NATO’s terms. China joined Russia in calls for an end to 
the bombing campaign. After the embassy bombing, China suspended military exchanges and 
human rights dialogues with the United States. Although these instances of soft balancing failed 
to prevent the NATO intervention, they may have influenced the postwar settlement. Russian 
forces participated in the postwar peacekeeping operation, and Kosovo initially remained part of 
Yugoslavia.144 
 Scholars have identified other actions by China and Russia that allegedly constituted soft 
balancing against the United States. In the late 1990s, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov 
called for increased coordination among China, Russia, and India, though his attempts were 
unsuccessful. In 2001, China and Russia signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, 
and Cooperation, which called for joint efforts to resist U.S. “hegemonism.” That same year, along 
with four Central Asian countries, China and Russia formed the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, a regional organization aiming to address security issues and promote economic 
development in Central Asia.145 Participation by China and Russia in the Six-Party Talks on North 
Korea and the P5+1 negotiations on Iran put pressure on the United States to pursue less 
confrontational policies toward those countries over their nuclear weapons programs that it might 
have done otherwise.146 In the view of some scholars, Russian arms sales to China were also a form 
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of balancing. Even if Russia’s motivations were primarily economic, these sales had the effect of 
strengthening China’s military capabilities and therefore influenced the global balance of power.147 
Other examples of soft balancing might include the SCO’s 2005 call for the United States to 
establish a timetable for the withdrawal from its military bases in Central Asia, an ongoing series 
of joint military exercises, and diplomatic support on issues such as the THAAD deployment. 
 Despite its potential usefulness for analyzing foreign policy behaviors that fall short of 
traditional great-power balancing, analyses that employ the concept of soft balancing suffer from 
at least two defects, one analytical, the other conceptual. The analytical defect concerns the factors 
that allegedly stimulate soft balancing. Both Pape and Walt argued that unilateralism in U.S. 
foreign policy, rather than unipolarity itself, was the primary driver of soft balancing by China and 
Russia.148 Yet following the departure from office of the George W. Bush administration, known 
for its unilateralism, and the transition to office of Barack Obama, who pursued multilateralism, 
the foreign policies of both China and Russia became increasingly assertive. Rather than U.S. 
unilateralism, therefore, it appeared that changes in relative power, including an improvement in 
Russia’s position, the rise of China, and the perception of U.S. decline following the financial 
crisis, were the main spurs to the increased foreign policy assertiveness by China and Russia. 
Moreover, the failure of the U.S.-Russia reset, as well as China’s increasing assertiveness in 
response to gestures of goodwill from the new Obama administration, suggest that national identity 
gaps severely complicated efforts to improve relations through adjustments in U.S. foreign 
policy.149 
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 The second problem with soft balancing is conceptual. If soft balancing is defined as 
cooperative efforts by states to achieve more favorable outcomes in the existing structure of the 
international system than they could achieve in the absence of such cooperation, then the actions 
by China and Russia described above meet this description. China and Russia engage in various 
forms of cooperation to resist U.S. foreign policy objectives, and analysts need concepts and 
frameworks with which to analyze these efforts. However, the inclusion of the term “balancing” 
in this conceptual formulation suggests that the behavior in question differs in degree, not in kind, 
from traditional hard balancing. If this is true, then the term “soft balancing” should apply only to 
cases in which other countries act to increase constraints on, or shift power against, the United 
States. In reality, alleged examples of soft balancing are often indistinguishable from mere policy 
disputes.150 
In the cases described above, China and Russia pursued the limited objective of seeking to 
improve a diplomatic outcome, rather than trying to balance the United States. Moreover, they 
often failed to achieve even this limited objective. On a series of issues, China and Russia failed 
to block or dissuade the United States from taking actions that they opposed.151 The China-Russia 
strategic partnership consists largely of efforts by the two countries to engage in either triangular 
diplomacy or soft balancing, but their record of success is limited. 
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 Reaching the top of the ladder, a military-political alliance would be the highest form of 
collaboration. For reasons discussed above at length, China and Russia refrained from forming an 
alliance during this period. The writings of Russian and Chinese scholars reflect many of the 
theoretical arguments discussed above. Alexander Lukin, a leading China specialist in Russia, 
argued that both countries recognized the importance of cooperation with the West for their own 
internal development and for raising their international profiles.152 For this reason, China and 
Russia would form an alliance against the United States only if they came to perceive the threat 
from the United States as greater than the cost of refusing to cooperate with the United States.153 
One of China’s leading international relations theorists, Yan Xuetong, called for China and Russia 
to form an alliance, but his argument garnered little support within China’s government or foreign 
policy circles.154 Yan argued that the structure of the international system was gradually becoming 
bipolar as China gained superpower status. Under these circumstances, China needed allies, and it 
had no better option than Russia.155 Most Chinese experts on Russia disagreed, arguing that an 
alliance with Russia would be unnecessary, unfeasible, and detrimental to China’s interests.156 
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Outline of the Empirical Study 
 
The following chapters constitute an empirical study of China-Russia relations, arranged 
in chronological order. For the most part, the relationship has developed steadily, with few sharp 
turning points or moments of discontinuity. Dividing the relationship into phases is therefore a 
subjective process. The chapters in this study cover periods that were bookended by major events 
in world politics that led to progress, or at least changes, in the China-Russia relationship. Three 
of the chapters begin with points (1991, 2001, 2009) at which Russia sought to improve relations 
with the United States, causing some consternation in China, before a renewed downturn in U.S.-
Russia relations led Russia to turn once again to China. 
Chapter 2 covers the period from the breakup of the Soviet Union until the formation of 
the China-Russia strategic partnership (1991-1996). At the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse, 
U.S.-China relations still suffered from the effects of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. In the 
early post-Soviet period, Russia initially charted a pro-Western course but eventually grew 
disillusioned, largely because of the failure of economic reform and Russian opposition to NATO 
expansion. Partly because of these trends, China and Russia grew closer to each other, declaring 
that they were “friendly countries” by December 1992, forming a “constructive partnership” by 
1994, and forging a “strategic partnership” by 1996. 
Chapter 3 covers developments through the signing of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, 
Friendship, and Cooperation (1996-2001). During this stage, despite some initial hesitation, China-
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Russia relations continued to advance. In their joint declarations, the two countries continually 
expressed their support for the formation of a multipolar world. The two countries shared similar 
views on a host of international issues, including opposition to NATO expansion, U.S. missile 
defense programs, and U.S. criticism of other countries’ human rights records. The 1999 Kosovo 
crisis gave considerable impetus to China-Russia relations.157 This stage culminated in the 2001 
signing of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation between China and 
Russia and the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). 
Chapter 4 covers the period between the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis in the fall of 2008. Following the terrorist attacks, Russia 
once again sought improved relations with the United States. Russia accepted the establishment of 
U.S. military bases in Central Asia to support operations in Afghanistan and acquiesced in the U.S. 
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Both decisions caused discomfort in China, especially because 
China’s leaders believed that Russian leaders had failed to consult them adequately. However, the 
Iraq war and especially the “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet region helped to end the U.S.-
Russia honeymoon and drove China and Russia closer together. This trend culminated in July 2005 
with the SCO’s declaration that foreign countries maintaining military bases in Central Asia should 
establish a timetable for their withdrawal. That same summer, China and Russia held their first 
joint military exercises, Peace Mission 2005. 
In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin harshly criticized U.S. foreign policy during a 
speech in Munich. China was somewhat hesitant in responding to Putin’s calls for greater solidarity 
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in opposing the West, largely because U.S.-China relations were developing on a satisfactory path 
during this period. U.S.-Russia relations reached a new low in August 2008, when Russia defeated 
Georgia in a brief war. This episode revealed differences in Russian and Chinese perspectives, 
however, as China declined to support Russia’s recognition of the sovereignty of two breakaway 
republics in Georgia. 
Chapter 5 covers developments from the financial crisis through the end of 2016. Shortly 
after the war in Georgia ended, the global financial crisis erupted. Because China emerged from 
the crisis relatively unscathed while Western economies, as well as Russia’s, were hard-hit, China 
appeared to draw the conclusion that it could take more risks in challenging U.S. foreign policy 
than it had previously. Over the next few years, China appeared to adopt an increasingly assertive 
posture in its territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, leading to 
increased tensions with the United States and with other Asian countries, including some U.S. 
allies. For at least the third time since the end of the Cold War, Russia made a concerted effort to 
improve relations with the United States, though in this case the initiative came from the United 
States. Despite some significant accomplishments as part of the “reset” in U.S.-Russian relations, 
a series of issues contributed to yet another downturn in U.S-Russia relations—most dramatically, 
the crisis in Ukraine that began to build in 2013 and erupted early the following year. In the wake 
of this crisis, Russia tacked in the direction of China. 
 China partially shared Russia’s assessment of the Ukraine crisis, blaming the West for 
assisting the destabilization of Ukraine’s government. However, China declined to endorse 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Russia’s policy could not fail to cause concern for China, which 
had to worry about the implications for Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet. Less than three months after 




negotiations. Many analysts attributed this agreement to the diplomatic isolation and economic 
pressure that Russia experienced as a result of the Ukraine crisis. The terms of the deal reportedly 
were heavily in China’s favor, suggesting that the China-Russia relationship had become 
increasingly imbalanced. By the end of 2016, China-Russia relations were closer and healthier 
than ever before, but China’s growth in relative power raised questions about the durability of the 
strategic partnership. Chapter 4 also features a detailed analysis of debates in both China and 




From the Breakup of the Soviet Union to Strategic Partnership: 1991-1996 
 
 The breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991 produced an almost entirely peaceful 
change in the structure of the international system, a rare event in world history. The change, 
however, was no less momentous for being peaceful. Almost in an instant, the bipolar international 
order that had existed for more than four decades gave way to a new era of unipolarity and U.S. 
primacy. Commentators around the world debated how long this new unipolar structure would last, 
but world leaders had to face the new reality immediately. The new structure of the international 
system was certain to have profound implications for the world’s major powers, including not only 
the former superpower antagonists—the United States and the Russian Federation, the Soviet 
Union’s successor state—but also China. Unipolarity promised to alter the dynamics of relations 
within the Washington-Moscow-Beijing triangle, which had been a notable feature of the Cold 
War. 
 
The Legacy of the Cold War and the Transformation of the International System 
 
 The U.S.-Soviet confrontation had defined the Cold War, but China’s alignment provided 
an important subtext.1 In 1950, united by communist ideology and a shared perception of U.S. 
hostility, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China forged a security alliance, which 
grew stronger after the Korean War erupted later that year. As the 1950s progressed, however, 
disputes arose over ideological leadership of the Communist bloc and the Soviet Union’s 
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unwillingness to support China in crises over Taiwan. The Soviet Union considered Chinese leader 
Mao Zedong’s behavior in these crises to be reckless, and it feared being drawn into a 
confrontation with the United States that risked nuclear escalation. The Sino-Soviet split grew 
deeper throughout the 1960s, but lingering hostility in U.S.-China relations delayed a 
rapprochement between Washington and Beijing until the end of the decade. In 1969, the eruption 
of Sino-Soviet border clashes, followed by Soviet nuclear threats against China, finally provided 
an opportunity for President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, to 
seek an opening to China.2 
During the subsequent period, which was the apex of Cold War triangular diplomacy, the 
United States sought to achieve closer relations with both the Soviet Union and China than they 
maintained with each other.3 The United States also used its improved relations with China to exert 
pressure on the Soviet Union to make concessions. The period of U.S.-Soviet détente, which was 
partly a product of this triangular diplomacy, lasted until the mid-1970s, after which China, 
perceiving a heightened military threat from the Soviet Union, entered into a quasi-alliance with 
the United States. In May 1982, shortly before his death, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev called 
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for improved relations with China. In September of that same year, during his report to the 12th 
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Deng Xiaoping announced that his country 
would distance itself from the United States and pursue an independent foreign policy. Deng 
perceived that the Soviet military threat had receded, and he was disappointed that the 
normalization of U.S.-China relations had not reduced U.S. support for Taiwan. 
After assuming power in 1985, the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, introduced “new 
thinking” in foreign policy and ended the Cold War confrontation with the United States. By 1989, 
he also achieved normalization of relations with China by addressing China’s “three obstacles” to 
improved relations. China had demanded that the Soviet Union withdraw forces from Afghanistan, 
insist on Vietnam’s withdrawal of forces from Cambodia, and achieve demilitarization along 
China’s borders. Sino-Soviet rapprochement became official during Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing 
in May 1989. This visit coincided with the rise of pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen 
Square, which the Chinese authorities suppressed in a bloody crackdown on the night of June 3-4, 
1989. By the end of that year, the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet satellite states in Central and 
Eastern Europe crumbled. Two years later, the Soviet Union itself dissolved.4 These events, which 
occurred so soon after China had laid to rest three decades of hostility with its former communist 
ally, caused profound concern among Chinese leaders, who now feared international isolation.5 
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In a bipolar world, according to Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist theory, only the two 
superpowers have a significant impact on the international balance of power. Third parties cannot 
change this balance by abandoning an ally or switching allegiances. Therefore, although each 
superpower in turn “lost” China during the Cold War, the effect of China’s shifting alignments on 
the balance of power was minimal, or so Waltz argued in 1979.6 Other analysts agreed with this 
assessment, arguing that triangular diplomacy exerted a meaningful impact on the Cold War for 
only a few years after Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, and that its influence even during this period 
was limited.7 
By contrast, Henry Kissinger, the architect of triangular diplomacy in the early 1970s, 
writing after the end of the Cold War, argued that the U.S. opening to China contributed to the 
“difficult, perhaps insurmountable, set of problems” that Gorbachev faced upon assuming power. 
At that time, the Soviet Union’s only remaining allies were its satellite states in Central and Eastern 
Europe, which were mostly a burden requiring coercive control. Meanwhile, nearly all of the 
world’s industrialized countries were aligned against the Soviet Union, and its “erstwhile ally, 
China, had for all practical purposes joined the opposing camp.”8 U.S.-China cooperation helped 
to thwart Soviet objectives in Afghanistan and Indochina, which meant that China and the United 
States were “chopping off” Soviet fingers, as Deng had described the strategy to President Jimmy 
Carter a few years earlier.9 In this view, the U.S.-China rapprochement added to the mounting 
strains on the Soviet Union during its final decade, thus contributing to the end of the Cold War. 
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Whatever the significance of China’s role during the Cold War, the bipolar order imposed 
important constraints on the major powers. This was certainly true of the United States and the 
Soviet Union, for which the superpower rivalry was the defining factor in foreign policy. 
Bipolarity’s constraints were especially tight for China, which was far less powerful than either 
the United States or the Soviet Union and at various times perceived both as security threats. 
Structural realism therefore offers part of the explanation for China’s foreign policy during the 
Cold War.10 
The emergence of unipolarity drastically altered the structural constraints that the United 
States, Russia, and China faced. The United States, having successfully achieved containment of 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War, now emerged in the wake of the Soviet collapse as the 
world’s only superpower, with all of the opportunities and burdens that its new primacy entailed. 
To be sure, the advent of unipolarity resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union, not from an 
increase in the absolute power that the United States possessed. From the perspective of power 
cycle theory, the relative power of the United States had peaked sometime in the second half of 
the 1960s and entered a period of relative decline. Despite its relative decline, which seemed likely 
to unfold over a period of several decades, the United States remained in a strong position.11 For 
some time to come, the United States would remain, by a significant margin, the strongest country 
in the world. Commentators debated how the United States should respond to its “unipolar 
moment.”12 
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The newly independent Russian Federation had experienced the threefold collapse of 
single-party communist rule, the command economy, and the empire. The loss of the non-Russian 
Soviet republics meant that Russia’s territory was now smaller than at any time since the 
seventeenth century. In the wake of its loss of superpower status, Russia now engaged in renewed 
debate about its national identity and its proper position between West and East. From the 
perspective of power cycle theory, Russia’s decline in relative power was precipitous to an extent 
that was historically unprecedented.13 
China, meanwhile, which only a few years earlier had charted an independent course in 
foreign policy and had recently enjoyed good relations with both the United States and the Soviet 
Union, now faced renewed uncertainty. The improvement of China’s relations with the Soviet 
Union during the 1980s had removed some of the rationale for close relations with the United 
States, and now the Soviet Union had disappeared entirely. Disagreements over Taiwan remained 
a constant source of irritation in relations with the United States, and the relationship had 
deteriorated sharply following the Tiananmen Square crackdown. Now China faced the additional 
challenge of a U.S.-dominated, unipolar international order. The Chinese Communist Party, 
having observed the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and its former satellite states, 
feared that the United States sought communism’s demise in China as well. At the same time, the 
high rates of economic growth that China had enjoyed for more than a decade, inaugurated by 
Deng’s reforms in the late 1970s, launched China on an impressive rise. According to power cycle 
theory, China entered a period in which its relative power was growing at an accelerating rate. 
This process was likely to last for decades, but observers began to discern the prospect of China’s 
eventual emergence as a peer competitor to the United States. 
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These momentous changes promised a reconfiguration of the U.S.-Russia-China triangle. 
Both Russia and China would have to adjust their relations with the United States in the new 
unipolar order. These adjustments, in turn, would have a significant impact on the new relationship 
that China and Russia would forge with each other. 
This chapter examines the first period in the development of China-Russia relations in the 
post-Soviet era, from the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 to the forging of a 
“strategic partnership” in 1996. During this initial stage, China and Russia adjusted to the new 
unipolar structure of the international system. As throughout the period that is the focus of this 
study, unipolarity imposed constraints on both China and Russia from late 1991 to 1996 and 
therefore explains some aspects of their relationship during this period. In particular, the U.S. 
preponderance of power encouraged China and Russia to strengthen their relationship in order to 
offset U.S. primacy at least partially. It also rendered traditional balance of power politics 
ineffective, however, because a China-Russia alliance could not match the power of the United 
States. The unipolar structure of the international system therefore set the broad parameters for 
China-Russia relations during the post-Soviet era. 
In order to analyze the ebb and flow of this relationship, however, analysts should examine 
a variety of other factors as well, including changes in relative power and the formation of national 
identities. Despite the system’s unipolarity during this period, changes in relative power occurred 
constantly. Leaders in both China and Russia viewed power in dynamic terms, attempting to 
anticipate trends in relative power that would allow them, eventually, to exert increased influence 
in international affairs. The United States undoubtedly played an important role during this period 
in the evolution of Russia-China relations. Russia’s foreign policy, however, was not purely a 




debates over national identity. For China, driving factors included not only specific issues that 
caused tension in relations with the United States, but also China’s evolving grand strategy for 
pursuing its rise to power and its own conceptions of national identity. This chapter analyzes such 
factors in detail. 
China consistently sought to strengthen relations with Russia throughout the period from 
1991 to 1996. Part of its motivation lay at the bilateral level. After decades of hostile relations with 
the Soviet Union, which ended only during Gorbachev’s tenure, Chinese leaders welcomed the 
security and economic benefits of a stable, secure northern border. The new structure of the 
international system, however, was also an important consideration. China’s interest in improved 
relations with Russia grew throughout this period as tensions in U.S.-China relations mounted, 
especially over Taiwan and the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. China invested 
in its own military capabilities and sought to improve relations with other countries, including 
Russia, that potentially shared China’s concerns about U.S. power.14 
For a variety of reasons, China did not seek an alliance with Russia. Simply put, the costs 
would have exceeded the benefits. Such an alliance would have pitted China against the military 
dominance of the United States while risking China’s access to the global markets upon which its 
economic growth, and thus its growth in national power, depended. Moreover, the formation of an 
alliance with Russia would have been insufficient to match the power of the United States. 
Nevertheless, China sought to strengthen relations with Russia in order to provide at least a modest 
counterweight to U.S. power. At a minimum, China sought to avoid an outcome in which Russia 
would join the West and act contrary to China’s interests. Cultivating relations with Russia served 
as insurance against such an outcome, which would have left China isolated on the international 
                                                          




stage. It also provided other benefits that contributed to China’s growing power, including 
imported Russian weapons. After 1992, confident that their regime had survived the upheavals of 
the communist world, China’s leaders grew more assertive over Taiwan and South China Sea 
disputes. This assertiveness lasted until 1996, when China adopted a strategy of greater 
international restraint that lasted for more than a decade. 
Russia’s policies toward China evolved in stages during this initial period. During the first 
several months following the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Russia emphasized 
relations with the West and viewed China warily. By mid-1992, recognizing the importance of 
friendly bilateral relations with its large neighbor, Russia invigorated its diplomacy toward China. 
At this stage, bilateral issues were its main consideration. Domestic politics also played an 
important role, as the government’s liberal reforms and pro-Western foreign policy came under 
attack from domestic critics. Russia’s domestic politics during this period featured a sharp dispute 
over the country’s post-Soviet identity. 15  By the end of 1992, China and Russia declared 
themselves “friendly countries.” 
During 1993 and 1994, as the United States first contemplated and then actively embraced 
the policy of NATO expansion, Russia sought deeper relations with China, including cooperation 
on international issues. China and Russia upgraded their relations to a “constructive partnership” 
in September 1994. During 1995 and 1996, Russia pursued further strengthening of relations with 
China. By this stage, NATO expansion was inevitable. As the 1996 Russian presidential election 
approached, domestic politics continued to exert influence. Facing a tough re-election campaign 
and continued criticism of his foreign policy, Russian President Boris Yeltsin sought to improve 
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relations with China in order to bring greater balance to his foreign policy. Yeltsin declined to seek 
an alliance with China. Like China, Russia needed to maintain access to Western capital and 
technology in order to achieve modernization. Rather, Yeltsin sought to improve relations with 
China in order to increase Russia’s leverage in relations with the West and to enhance the country’s 
capacity to act independently on the world stage. At his suggestion, China and Russia formed a 
“strategic partnership” in April 1996. For Russia, therefore, concerns about the U.S. preponderance 
of power in the new unipolar structure of the international system were not major considerations 
immediately after the Soviet Union’s collapse, but they became more prominent as the 1990s 
progressed. 
 
Laying the Foundation for Friendly Relations (1991-1992) 
 
The new Russia’s turn to the West 
 
 Under Yeltsin’s leadership, the newly independent Russian Federation initially pursued a 
staunchly pro-Western foreign policy. The goal was to integrate Russia fully into the West and its 
institutions.16 The early Russian democrats believed that close relations with China could hinder 
the pursuit of Russia’s true interests, which lay in integration with the Western democracies. They 
also suspected that communist rule in China might not last much longer. 17  By mid-1992, 
recognizing the importance of stable, friendly relations with its large neighbor, Russia adjusted its 
policy. During the second half of that year, China and Russia laid the groundwork for their 
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relationship in the post-Soviet era. These efforts culminated in Yeltsin’s first official visit to 
Beijing in December, when China and Russia declared themselves “friendly countries.”  
Yeltsin, who was elected president of the Russian Republic in June 1991, continued to hold 
the presidency of the Russian Federation. He filled his government with pro-Western liberals who 
sought to enact market reforms, which would ease Russia’s Western integration. These reformers 
also hoped that the West would provide large-scale economic assistance to support Russia’s 
economic transformation.18 In the fall of 1991, Yeltsin appointed Yegor Gaidar as deputy prime 
minister in charge of economic reform. Earlier, in the summer of 1990, Yeltsin had named Andrei 
Kozyrev, a mid-level diplomat in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as Russian foreign 
minister. Both Gaidar and Kozyrev continued to hold these positions in the Russian Federation 
following independence in December 1991. 
 For the Yeltsin administration and its intellectual supporters, Russia’s vulnerability to U.S. 
power in the new unipolar order was not a major concern. In January 1992, Yeltsin declared that 
he saw the United States as an ally.19 An article published in 1992 by four scholars at the Moscow 
State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), which the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
administers, sought to provide intellectual foundations for Yeltsin’s early tilt toward the West.20 
The authors recognized that the bipolar world had ended, but they rejected the notion that the world 
had become unipolar or that multipolarity was emerging. Instead, the division between an 
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advanced, interconnected core and a lagging periphery would define the new structure of the 
international system.21 As the article stated: “We see the fundamental foreign policy interest of 
Russia in the creation of favorable external conditions for its gradual shift from the periphery to 
the center of world development, which presupposes the priority development of interaction and 
cooperation with the leading states of the world, above all with the USA, the EU, and Japan, and 
in the long term, entry into the ‘Group of Seven’ most developed countries.”22 In these authors’ 
view, China was irrelevant to this process or possibly even a hindrance. China’s future 
development, they asserted, was difficult to predict and might lead to instability. Either a 
cooperative China or an expansionist China could emerge.23 Meanwhile, the notion that Russia 
could play a special role as a cultural and economic “bridge” between Europe and Asia, they 
argued, was an “illusion.”24 
 This article closely reflected the foreign policy views of Kozyrev, Gaidar, and other 
Russian liberals. In August 1991, at a rally to celebrate the victory over that month’s attempted 
hardline Communist coup, Kozyrev declared that the Western democracies were the natural allies 
of democratic Russia.25 Gaidar not only agreed that Russia should pursue a pro-Western foreign 
policy, but also viewed China as a potential threat. In 1995, several years after leaving office, 
Gaidar argued that China was unlikely to become a stable, prosperous market democracy. As a 
“poor, undemocratic” country in the East, China was more likely to threaten Russia, especially 
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given the demographic imbalance in China’s favor along the eastern China-Russia border. Gaidar 
favored closer relations with Japan, even if this required the return of the disputed Kuril Islands, 
and a military buildup in Siberia and the Russian Far East to counter a potential threat from 
China.26 Other Russian liberals held similar views. Alexei Arbatov, a security expert and member 
of the liberal Yabloko party who won election to the Russian Duma in 1993, argued that China 
could pose a threat to Russia in the future. Large-scale deliveries of advanced weapons and military 
technologies to China, he argued, were “naive” and “dangerous.”27 Given the prevalence of such 
views toward China among Russia’s leadership, as well as Chinese leaders’ inclination to blame 
Yeltsin for the collapse of the Soviet Union and to criticize his pro-Western orientation, the gap 
between the two countries’ national identities reached a peak in 1992.28 
 Soon, however, competing voices in Russian politics pushed for a Eurasianist alternative 
to the Yeltsin administration’s Westernizing foreign policy. Some of this disagreement, including 
dissenting views on relations with China, existed within the Russian liberal camp itself. This divide 
was apparent in contrasting English-language articles written for Western audiences, one by 
Kozyrev and another by Vladimir Lukin, who served as the Russian Federation’s first ambassador 
to the United States in 1992-1993 before becoming a founding member of Yabloko and winning 
election to the Duma.29 Although Kozyrev wrote that he saw prospects for good relations with 
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China, his article reiterated that integration into the West was Russia’s priority.30 Lukin agreed 
that a democratic Russia should join the “civilized democratic community,” but he also argued 
that Russia’s geographical location in both Europe and Asia largely determined its national 
interests. He issued a stark warning: “Any attempts to force Russia solely into either Asia or 
Europe are ultimately futile and dangerous. Not only would they cause a serious geopolitical 
imbalance, but they would also undermine the historically established social and political 
equilibrium within Russia.”31 
 Such arguments stressing the need for East-West balance in Russia’s foreign policy gained 
traction during 1992. This was a result of both domestic political factors and of Yeltsin’s 
adjustment of his own views. The economic recession that Russia endured during this period 
weakened Yeltsin and the democratic forces politically, as critics faulted their pro-Western foreign 
policy and adherence to Western economic advice. Moreover, after an initial period of 
overwhelming focus on the West, Yeltsin by mid-1992 recognized the need to place Russia’s 
relations with China on a firm foundation. At this stage, bilateral issues were the main driving 
force in the relationship. Yeltsin recognized, especially in light of the damage that the Sino-Soviet 
split had inflicted, that Russia’s national interests required friendly relations with China. By 
comparison, the structure of the international system and concerns about the U.S. preponderance 
of power were less important factors for Yeltsin at this stage, though they affected the thinking of 
those espousing alternative foreign policy approaches, including Eurasianism. During this period, 
even as Yeltsin moved to bolster the eastern vector of Russia’s foreign policy, he remained 
interested in building strong relations with the United States and its Western allies. 
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 The first year of the Russian Federation’s existence coincided with the final year of George 
H.W. Bush’s presidency. Bush and his top advisers were pragmatic realists who were primarily 
interested in maintaining international stability and security following the breakup of the Soviet 
Union. They were less interested in shaping Russia’s domestic transformation through large-scale 
assistance for democratic and market reforms.32 During 1992, the Bush administration’s foreign 
policy toward Russia focused on security issues, especially nuclear weapons and strategic stability. 
The administration secured agreement on the removal of all nuclear weapons from post-Soviet 
states other than Russia, signed into law the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to secure 
nuclear weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union, and signed the START II arms control 
treaty, though this never went into effect and was superseded by later treaties.33 
 The Bush administration declined to play a major role in supporting Russia’s market 
reforms. Gaidar and his team initiated their reforms while hoping for, but not expecting, large-
scale U.S. economic assistance. Anticipating that their window of opportunity for reform would 
be short, they initiated a rapid, comprehensive program of price liberalization and macroeconomic 
stabilization that earned the derisive moniker of “shock therapy.”34 These policies proved highly 
controversial, and a long-running debate about their efficacy ensued. Supporters argued that these 
policies achieved impressive initial results, including the reduction of inflation and budget deficits, 
and would have continued to be effective if the Russian government had steadfastly adhered to 
them.35 Critics blamed the policies for deepening a recession that caused tremendous hardship for 
                                                          
32 James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia After the 
Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 9, 84. 
33 Ibid, 50-58; Angela E. Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 9-10. 
34 Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, 65-66. 




the Russian people.36 One clear result, however, was that the popularity of Yeltsin and the liberal 
reformers plummeted during 1992. As a result, Yeltsin changed course in domestic economic 
policy. This process also coincided with the beginning of Russia’s shift to a foreign policy that 
featured greater balance between the West and China.37 
In April 1992, under pressure from Bill Clinton, his emerging Democratic rival for the 
presidency, Bush proposed a $24 billion international assistance package for Russia, to which the 
United States would contribute $5 billion. However, this package primarily consisted of previously 
committed funds, rather than new money, and ultimately much of this aid never arrived. By the 
time the International Monetary Fund made its first $1 billion loan to Russia in August 1992, 
Yeltsin had already changed the composition of his government in response to domestic political 
pressures, reducing Gaidar’s influence over policymaking. In December 1992, Yeltsin removed 
Gaidar from office.38 Whether or not major Western assistance would have made a difference is 
debatable, but Russian liberals were disappointed. Anatoly Chubais, who at the time was a top 
liberal adviser to Yeltsin, later said that major U.S. assistance at this stage could have helped the 
cause of economic reform and led to improved U.S.-Russia relations over the long term. “This is 
a sad story,” he said. “The United States missed a chance.”39 
 Despite Russia’s disappointment over U.S. unwillingness to offer large-scale economic 
assistance in 1992, the United States and Russia maintained good overall relations during that year. 
Yeltsin continued to pursue a pro-Western foreign policy, while the United States retained its 
positive view of his leadership. At this stage, NATO expansion and other issues that later caused 
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tension in U.S.-Russia relations still lay in the future. Russian domestic politics and issues in the 
China-Russia bilateral relationship itself, rather than a Russian desire to balance the overwhelming 
power of the United States in the post-Soviet era, pushed Yeltsin to improve Russia’s relations 
with China during the second half of 1992. In his outreach to China, he found a willing partner. 
 
China’s concerns about Russia’s pro-Western foreign policy 
 
 China’s leaders reacted warily to the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe 
and the breakup of the Soviet Union. They were especially concerned by Russia’s new pro-
Western orientation, which threatened to leave China isolated in the face of U.S. power. The 
prospect of Russia’s aligning itself with Western values was also alarming to China. In response, 
starting in 1992, China pursued a deliberate strategy aimed at strengthening ties with Russia. China 
urged Russia to remain wary of the United States, which allegedly sought to weaken Russia.40 
China’s move to embrace Yeltsin and cultivate good relations with Russia was an important 
landmark in the post-Cold War development of China-Russia relations.41 China’s leaders engaged 
in patient diplomacy, seeking to build upon the foundation of normalized relations that their 
country had achieved with the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Consistent with the approach that it 
would follow in the ensuing decades, China did not seek a formal alliance with Russia. Its initial 
concern, in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse, was to discourage Russia from 
pursuing ties to the West in ways that would come at China’s expense. After an initial period of 
uncertainty, Russia by mid-1992 became increasingly receptive to China’s overtures. 
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 For China, which now faced a drastically changed international environment, the new 
structure of the international system was a major concern. Chinese leaders initially hoped that 
unipolarity would quickly give way to multipolarity.42 For the immediate future, however, they 
faced a unipolar world. The concentration of capabilities in U.S. hands was worrisome for China, 
especially because U.S.-China relations had already deteriorated sharply following the Tiananmen 
Square crackdown. To be sure, China did not face a direct and immediate military threat to the 
mainland, as it had during the Cold War.43 China’s communist leaders feared, rather, that the 
United States would seek to change the Chinese domestic system.44 In the extreme case, they 
worried that the United States might seek to induce the collapse of their regime, either through 
containment policies or through economic and social influence. 45  They also recognized the 
potential for military conflicts over territorial claims in peripheral areas, for example in the South 
and East China seas.46 If Russia were to integrate with the West, possibly even joining NATO, 
then China’s problems would only grow. In this case, Chinese strategists feared, China would find 
itself isolated and vulnerable to the full force of U.S. strategic pressure. 
 In 1992, the lingering effects of the bloodshed in Tiananmen Square continued to exert a 
profound influence on U.S.-China relations. During the final year of his presidency, Bush remained 
steadfast in his attempts to limit Tiananmen’s damage to the relationship, largely in recognition of 
China’s continued geopolitical importance. From the time of his first meeting with Deng Xiaoping 
and other Chinese leaders as president in February 1989, Bush focused on the geopolitics of the 
Washington-Moscow-Beijing triangle. Upon hearing the announcement that Gorbachev would 
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visit China later that year, Bush began to contemplate his own trip. Bush and his national security 
adviser, Brent Scowcroft, wanted to ensure that any Sino-Soviet rapprochement achieved during 
Gorbachev’s visit would not come at the expense of the United States.47 During Bush’s visit to 
China, which followed his attendance at the funeral for Japanese Emperor Hirohito, he noted 
Deng’s pessimism about the prospects for improved Sino-Soviet relations. Deng complained about 
the Soviet Union’s insistence on Mongolia’s independence from China after World War II and the 
Soviet “encirclement” of China throughout the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras.48 
 The Tiananmen Square crackdown shocked the American public, prompting immediate 
calls for U.S. sanctions and other measures to punish China. Bush immediately imposed sanctions 
in an effort to preempt overreaction by Congress, but he sought from the outset to prevent the 
incident from causing excessive damage to U.S.-China relations. He recognized that U.S. interests 
required cooperation with China on a variety of issues, and he sought to avoid a rupture of U.S.-
China relations that would push China to realign itself with the Soviet Union.49 In July, just one 
month after Tiananmen, Bush sent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger 
to meet with China’s leaders, a visit that did not become public until the pair made another trip to 
Beijing in December of that year.50 For the rest of his presidency, Bush was unable to push the 
relationship forward, but instead had to be content with resisting public and congressional calls for 
further punitive measures against China.51 Deng, meanwhile, faced a renewed domestic challenge 
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to his authority by opponents of his reform measures.52 During this period, as Secretary of State 
James Baker wrote, the U.S.-China relationship “treaded water.”53 
 Beyond the fallout from Tiananmen, other issues caused tension in U.S.-China relations in 
the early 1990s. Disagreements over Taiwan persisted. As the collapse of communism unfolded, 
first in Central and Eastern Europe and then in the Soviet Union itself, China grew concerned that 
the United States would seek to engineer the demise of the Chinese Communist Party through 
“peaceful evolution.”54 In 1990-1991, China declined to use its veto power in the UN Security 
Council to obstruct the U.S. prosecution of the Gulf War, opting instead to keep a low profile.55 
During this period, Deng proposed a formula for China’s foreign policy, taoguang yanghui, which 
is often translated as “bide one’s time and hide one’s capabilities.” The U.S.-led coalition’s 
impressive demonstration of military force and rapid victory over Iraq, however, underscored 
China’s potential vulnerability.56 In the background of these particular issues lay China’s larger 
concerns with the new unipolar structure of the international system and the concentration of 
power in U.S. hands. 
 Structural realist theory suggests that states facing a stronger competitor may seek to ensure 
their security by engaging in either internal or external balancing—that is, either by building up 
their own military forces or by seeking allies. To a limited extent, China pursued both objectives 
in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse. China soon intensified its program of military 
modernization, bolstered by the country’s resumption of high-speed growth following Deng’s 
reaffirmation of economic reform in 1992. Chinese leaders recognized, however, that military 
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modernization would be a long process. For a long time to come, U.S. military capabilities would 
far exceed those of China. Under these circumstances, with internal balancing insufficient to match 
U.S. capabilities, China had an incentive to look for partners abroad. It therefore sought to build 
close relations with Russia.57 China declined to seek a military alliance with Russia, however. In 
a unipolar world, neither Russia nor any other state was powerful enough to serve as a peer 
competitor to the United States. Therefore, the formation of a counterhegemonic coalition was not 
an option for China. 58  Moreover, despite incentives to engage in balancing, China rapidly 
strengthened its economic ties with the United States, which were crucial for its own continued 
economic growth and accumulation of national power. 
As dramatic as the international system’s transformation from bipolarity to unipolarity was, 
in a sense it did not fundamentally alter China’s official view of the future security environment. 
Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy thinking reveals a clear perception of power in dynamic, nonlinear 
terms that is consistent with the interpretation of power cycle theory, rather than a static view of 
structure. Although the world had become unipolar, Chinese leaders and strategic thinkers initially 
believed that the era of unipolarity would be only a brief interlude preceding the arrival of a 
multipolar world. This belief predated the breakup of the Soviet Union. In 1982, Deng announced 
that China would pursue an independent foreign policy. By the middle of the decade, he declared 
that the threat of major war had receded and that “peace and development” were the dominant 
themes of the era. In this environment, China would be able to focus on the tasks of modernization 
and economic development. Deng also believed by the mid-1980s that the structure of the 
international system was shifting from bipolarity to multipolarity.59 
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Starting around 1986, the notion of emerging multipolarity entered mainstream Chinese 
strategic thought. Huan Xiang, Deng Xiaoping’s “national security adviser,” was the first major 
figure in China to argue that the future security environment would be multipolar.60 Although the 
sharp confrontation between the Cold War’s two armed camps was likely to continue for some 
time, Huan argued in early 1986, several of the superpowers’ allies would become increasingly 
able to assert their own interests. “The trend of world multipolarity will continue to develop,” he 
wrote.61 Deng and Huan both believed that Russia would be one of five “poles” in the future 
international order, along with the United States, China, the European Union, and Japan.62 In 1990, 
Deng argued that Russia would always be one of the poles, even if it were to lose several of the 
non-Soviet republics.63 By 1992, having weathered the storm of the communist world, Chinese 
leaders and strategists converged on a rough consensus regarding their strategic environment. They 
believed that the United States, despite its new status as the sole superpower, would soon fall into 
steady decline. Russia, meanwhile, would soon pass through its initial period of post-Soviet 
strategic confusion and seek China’s assistance in forming a counterweight to the United States.64 
 Regardless of their beliefs about the future security environment and Russia’s likely 
trajectory, China’s leaders, so soon after normalizing relations with the Soviet Union, now had to 
fashion an immediate response to its dissolution. Normalization was an achievement of great 
historical significance that ended three decades of damaging Cold War hostility. Even after 
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normalization, however, relations between China and the Soviet Union remained “weak and 
fragile,” in the words of one Chinese scholar. During the period between normalization and the 
Soviet collapse in December 1991, negative influences left over by history ensured that the level 
of mutual trust could not reach the “hot, deep, and high levels” achieved later.65 As Deng surveyed 
developments in the Soviet Union during this period, he tried to take the long view: “No matter 
how the Soviet Union changes, we always want, on the foundation of the five principles of peaceful 
coexistence, to unhurriedly develop relations, including political relations, and not to carry out an 
ideological struggle.”66 
Nevertheless, the reaction by Chinese leaders to the August 1991 coup attempt in the Soviet 
Union illustrated their concerns. Officially, the government of China responded to news of the 
coup by reiterating its position of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and 
expressing hope that relations with the Soviet Union would remain unchanged. However, 
according to closed sources cited by Oleg Rakhmanin, a China scholar and former Soviet 
Communist Party official, the top leadership in China expressed sympathy with the coup plotters 
and hoped that the coup would succeed.67 Yu Hongliang, the Chinese ambassador to the Soviet 
Union, visited Gennady Yanayev, the formal leader of the conspirators, while the coup was in 
progress. On behalf of the PRC government, he expressed hope that the Soviet Union would now 
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return to the path of upholding socialist ideals and that Beijing and Moscow would be able to 
cooperate more fruitfully.68 At the time of the coup, some Chinese scholars published articles 
criticizing Gorbachev as a traitor to communism.69 
 Following the coup’s failure, the breakup of the Soviet Union four months later posed a 
major challenge for China. The collapse of the world’s first communist country placed ideological 
pressure on China and its communist rulers, while the Western orientation of the new Russian 
government threatened to worsen China’s international environment. The breakup of the Soviet 
Union and the rise of several newly independent states along China’s western periphery also 
threatened to unleash new forces, including ethnic disputes, regional conflicts, and Islamic 
fundamentalism, with potentially negative consequences for China. 70  Chinese leaders also 
recognized that Russia, with its huge territory, economic potential, military capability, and high 
technology, maintained the ability to wield considerable power and influence.71 Less than three 
years after the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, the future of China-Russia relations was 
suddenly cloudy.72  
China’s early approach was to seek continuity and a smooth transition in relations. On 
December 25, 1991, the day that Gorbachev delivered his resignation speech and the Russian 
tricolor flag replaced the Soviet hammer and sickle on top of the Kremlin, China announced that 
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it would abide by all treaties signed with the former Soviet Union, including a May 1991 border 
agreement, and expressed hope that all of the post-Soviet states would do likewise.73 Two days 
later, China’s foreign minister, Qian Qichen, sent a telegram to Kozyrev informing him that China 
would recognize the government of the Russian Federation. That same day, he telegraphed the 
other post-Soviet states to recognize their independence as well.74 On December 29, China and 
Russia signed a joint declaration in which China officially recognized Russia as the successor state 
to the Soviet Union and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. China and Russia also 
pledged to conduct their relations on the basis of joint declarations signed during Gorbachev’s visit 
to Beijing in 1989 and Jiang Zemin’s visit to the Soviet Union in May 1991. The two sides 
expressed their intention to develop friendly, good-neighborly relations based on the five 
principles of peaceful coexistence and to continue negotiations on border demarcation, 
demilitarization, and military confidence-building measures.75 
These agreements did not, however, lead to rapid development of the relationship. Chinese 
leaders were concerned that Russia, given its pro-Western orientation, would neglect its relations 
with China. Given the uncertainty, December 1991 marked a low point in China-Russia relations.76 
One early Chinese assessment of the new phase in China-Russia relations, while 
acknowledging the uncertainty, offered grounds for cautious optimism. This report, co-authored 
by the director of the China Institute of International Studies under the Foreign Ministry, argued 
that the positive trends that had developed in the relationship since the mid-1980s, culminating in 
Sino-Soviet normalization, augured well for future relations. Most importantly, Gorbachev’s 
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demilitarization along China’s border regions would continue to benefit China. This would provide 
China with a secure strategic rear. Moreover, because Russia was about to embark on a difficult 
process of domestic transformation, it was unlikely to conduct an aggressive foreign policy. The 
main risk for China was that Russia would integrate closely with the West in the political, 
economic, and security spheres. China, the report argued, should remain optimistic about the 
relationship while calmly observing Russian developments.77 The fifth plenary session of the 7th 
National People’s Congress, which opened in March 1992, merely affirmed that China would 
maintain normal relations with the former communist countries on the basis of equality and mutual 
benefit.78 
Initial developments in Russia’s foreign policy reinforced China’s concerns. The early 
Russian democrats, in the view of many Chinese leaders and scholars, were “full of illusions” 
about joining the West, establishing a “big Euro-Atlantic family from Vancouver to Vladivostok,” 
and receiving large-scale Western economic assistance on the model of the Marshall Plan.79 In 
their speeches, Yeltsin and Kozyrev spoke frequently of their desire for alliance relations with the 
West but said little about relations with China.80 Kozyrev made an official visit to China in March 
1992, which brought some clarity to the relationship and affirmed that the two countries could 
develop normal relations.81 However, tensions were also evident during this visit, especially when 
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Kozyrev criticized the Chinese leadership on human rights issues. Qian Qichen responded sharply, 
insisting that foreign interference in China’s domestic affairs was unacceptable. During this visit, 
the two sides even acknowledged publicly that they took “different approaches to some quite 
serious issues.82 The next month, Kozyrev published an article outlining Russia’s foreign policy 
interests. He argued that Russia’s top two priorities were to enter the ranks of the advanced 
democratic states and to cultivate friendly relations with neighboring countries. In listing Russia’s 
neighboring countries, however, he neglected even to mention China.83 The unmistakable message, 
it seemed to Chinese leaders, was that China was not a priority for Russia at this stage. If the two 
countries were to build on the foundation of Sino-Soviet normalization and develop strong China-
Russia relations in the post-Soviet era, greater efforts would be required. 
 
Getting China-Russia relations back on track 
 
 Owing to the factors described above, China-Russia relations grew more distant between 
late 1991 and early 1992. However, by mid-1992, China and Russia began to overcome the rift in 
their relations and resumed efforts to build cooperation. Both countries had reasons to cultivate 
this relationship. 
For China, a combination of factors at the international and bilateral levels called for 
improved relations with Russia. China based its policy toward Russia on “three no’s” and “three 
goods.” The three no’s signified no alliance, no opposing each other, and no standing in opposition 
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to any third party. The three goods called for China and Russia to be good neighbors, good partners, 
and good friends.84 
 The new unipolar structure of the international system offered incentives that shaped 
China’s policies toward Russia from the time of the Soviet collapse. China’s inability to approach 
parity with U.S. military power in the immediate future encouraged the country’s leaders to 
cultivate relations with other countries, including Russia. As the “three no’s” suggest, China did 
not require the formation of an anti-Western military alliance, but it wanted to ensure that Russia 
would not conduct a foreign policy that was inimical to China’s interests. At this stage, its main 
concern was to prevent Russia from drifting into the U.S. orbit. The Russian Federation’s early 
pro-Western course caused some Chinese leaders to fear that Russia would become a junior partner 
of the United States.85 In particular, Chinese leaders’ concerns about a possible “linking up” of 
Russia and NATO were a factor in their decision to activate diplomacy toward Russia.86 The 
establishment of friendly relations with Russia, which remained a great power despite the Soviet 
collapse, allowed China to avoid the predicament of isolation in the face of U.S. power and policies 
toward China that it considered hostile.87 
As long as Russia maintained some strategic distance from the United States, China could 
avoid such international isolation. China therefore sought to build upon the momentum gained 
during Sino-Soviet normalization in order to build friendly, good-neighborly relations with the 
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new Russia, as the “three goods” indicate. Amicable bilateral relations, by providing China with a 
secure strategic rear and preventing any repetition of the damage caused by the Sino-Soviet split, 
would be beneficial in their own right. In addition, they would establish the basis for a valuable 
relationship that could relieve international strategic pressure on China. 
China’s diplomacy toward Russia soon had the additional benefit of assisting China’s 
military modernization. Following the Tiananmen Square crackdown, Western sanctions hindered 
China’s ability to import weapons. With the Russian defense industry now desperate for export 
markets following the collapse of domestic orders, China could augment its military modernization 
by purchasing Russian arms. In 1990, China signed a contract to purchase Su-27 fighter jets, which 
Russia delivered in 1992. However, the weapons that China purchased from Russia throughout 
most of the 1990s, including Su-27SK fighter jets and Sovremenny-class destroyers, mostly 
employed technology dating to the 1960s or 1970s, rather than being state of the art models.88 
Despite their contribution to China’s growing military capabilities, therefore, imported Russian 
arms did not allow China to challenge U.S. military might in the early post-Soviet period.89 In fact, 
China remained militarily weak even in comparison to several of its neighboring states in Asia.90 
Although Chinese leaders remained confident about their country’s prospects for accumulating 
national power, they recognized that China’s rise would be a long-term process, requiring at least 
several decades. 
 A combination of factors caused Russia, after an initial period of relative neglect, to seek 
improved relations with China. These included strictly bilateral factors, Russian domestic politics, 
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and, indirectly, pressures exerted by the structure of the international system. Structural factors 
that might have encouraged Russia to balance against the overwhelming power of the United States 
still had no direct impact on Yeltsin and his pro-Western advisers, who remained committed to 
good relations with the United States and integration into Western institutions. However, such 
structural factors began to exert an indirect influence on the Russian leadership, refracted through 
the prism of Russian domestic politics. An early debate had emerged between Westernizers, who 
dominated Yeltsin’s early foreign policy, and Eurasianists, who argued in favor of a more balanced 
approach to the country’s foreign relations. The severe economic recession that Russia endured in 
1992 weakened Yeltsin and his team of liberal reformers politically. As the pro-Western faction’s 
political fortunes waned, the influence of the Eurasianist school of thought grew. Facing these 
pressures, Yeltsin began to adjust his foreign policy. 
Apart from domestic political pressures, Yeltsin increasingly recognized that factors 
intrinsic in the China-Russia bilateral relationship demanded attention. Although Russia continued 
to seek improved relations with the West, it concluded that its national interests required a balance 
between East and West. No matter how its relations with the West developed, Russia needed to 
maintain friendly relations with China, its large neighbor. The Sino-Soviet split had demonstrated 
the heavy costs of adversarial relations for both countries. Igor Rogachev, the Russian ambassador 
to China, concluded that “more than two decades of senseless and dangerous Soviet-Chinese 
confrontation helped the peoples, societies, and leaders of our two countries to work out a kind of 
‘immunity against confrontation,’ which to no small degree guarantees no repeat of what happened 
previously and disposes us to fundamentally different approaches from those of the past.”91 In 
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addition, many practical issues in bilateral relations required cooperation, including efforts to 
demarcate the border, establish stable relations along the two countries’ 2,600-mile eastern frontier, 
and develop bilateral economic cooperation.  
 As 1992 progressed, Yeltsin began to speak more positively about China. In April, he 
called China a “reliable and friendly partner” of Russia.92 In July, he declared that Russia was 
“firmly and unmovably heading to the East” and would establish closer relations with Asian 
countries, including China.93 In September, Yeltsin abruptly cancelled a scheduled trip to Japan, 
following the failure of negotiations over the two countries’ territorial dispute.94 In October, he 
acknowledged that Russia had made many mistakes in its foreign policy over the previous year, 
including that “in developing relations with the West, at the same time, we didn’t persevere in the 
work of opening up the East.”95 By November, when Qian Qichen visited Moscow to prepare for 
Yeltsin’s visit to China the following month, Yeltsin told the Chinese foreign minister that, “Not 
only in our Asian policy, but even in our world foreign policy, China occupies a priority 
position.”96 At an international conference in Beijing one month before Yeltsin’s visit to China, 
participants from both China and Russia overwhelmingly agreed that the prospects for bilateral 
cooperation were bright.97 
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 Upon his arrival in Beijing on December 17, 1992, for his first official visit to China, 
Yeltsin declared that, “Russia and China should establish a new era in our mutual relations.”98 
During this visit, China and Russia laid down the basic conditions for the development of their 
relations.99 The two countries reached agreement on the principle that each country’s development 
path was its own choice, and that each side would respect the other’s choice. 100  In a joint 
declaration, the two sides declared that they “view each other as friendly countries.” Tellingly, 
however, the declaration failed to address China-Russia cooperation on issues at the international 
level. 101  At this stage, the U.S.-Russia honeymoon continued, discouraging Yeltsin from 
emphasizing international factors in Russia’s relations with China.102 Cooperation on international 
issues would have to wait, but China’s leaders were satisfied that their fears of Russia joining the 
West and turning its back on China had proved to be unfounded. From now on, Russia’s foreign 
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The Beginnings of Cooperation on International Issues (1993-1994) 
 
Russia opens to cooperation with China on international issues  
 
Russia’s primary motivation in seeking to improve relations with China during the second 
half of 1992 was to avoid the costs of troubled relations with its large neighbor. The 1993 Foreign 
Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, which Yeltsin approved in April of that year, made this 
point clear.104 “In the past,” this document stated, “confrontation with the PRC was excessively 
costly for the USSR (as for China) and was one of the main reasons for our estrangement from the 
[Asia-Pacific] region.” In seeking the “realistic transformation” of their relations in the post-Soviet 
era, the Foreign Policy Concept argued, the two countries were obliged to recognize the differences 
in their ideology and socio-political systems. Ultimately, however, Russia had “no alternative” to 
friendly, intensive connections with China.105 
During 1993 and 1994, Russia became increasingly open to the idea of cooperation with 
China on international issues, at least in joint bilateral declarations. From Russia’s standpoint, the 
main catalyst for this change was the beginning of discussions in Washington about the possibility 
of expanding NATO to include former Warsaw Pact members. These discussions began during 
the first year of Bill Clinton’s presidency and gained force the following year. This issue also 
resonated in Russian domestic politics, which endured a year of turmoil in 1993. A constitutional 
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crisis developed throughout the year, culminating in a standoff between Yeltsin and the Congress 
of People’s Deputies, the parliamentary body that had carried over from Soviet times. In October, 
Yeltsin resolved this crisis in his favor by ordering the use of military force, including the 
deployment of tanks to shell the White House, the headquarters of the Congress of People’s 
Deputies, which some of Yeltsin’s parliamentary foes had occupied. 
The new parliamentary elections in December brought shocking results. Ultranationalist 
forces led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia fared surprisingly well, 
capturing 22.9 percent of the vote, compared with just 15.5 percent for Gaidar’s party, Russia’s 
Choice.106 Zhirinovsky himself viewed China as a threat, arguing that it was one of Russia’s two 
main enemies, along with the United States. However, other nationalists, including some within 
Zhirinovsky’s own party, considered China to be both a model for successful economic reforms 
and a potential partner in an alliance against the United States.107 Despite these contradictory views 
on China within the nationalist camp, the parliamentary election results clearly added to domestic 
political pressures on Yeltsin to modify his pro-Western stance and to bring greater balance to 
Russia’s foreign policy. The momentum toward NATO expansion that built in the United States 
during 1993 and 1994 coincided with greater diplomatic outreach by Yeltsin to China, as discussed 
below in detail. During this period, not for the last time, Yeltsin complained that the prospect of 
NATO expansion was causing damage to U.S.-Russia relations, to his administration, and to the 
cause of reform in Russia. 
The issue of NATO expansion arose early in Clinton’s presidency. Appeals to Clinton by 
Lech Walesa, the president of Poland, and Vaclav Havel, the president of the Czech Republic, both 
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of whom had gained renown as anti-Soviet dissidents during the Cold War, made an impression 
on the president early in his first term. The announcement in June 1993 that NATO heads of state 
would meet in January 1994 in Brussels, where the topic of enlargement was sure to arise, spurred 
the bureaucracy in Washington to begin formulating a position on the issue.108 A group of officials 
within the administration, most prominently National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, argued that 
NATO should promulgate criteria and a timetable for membership during the meeting in 
Brussels.109 Others, including Strobe Talbott, the ambassador-at-large for the New Independent 
States, argued for a more cautious approach. Offering concrete details about prospective 
enlargement at this stage, Talbott argued, would have a negative effect on domestic political 
developments in Russia, which were already enduring turbulence.110 
As the debate unfolded, the Partnership for Peace, developed by the Pentagon, emerged as 
a means for NATO to develop military-to-military ties, short of alliance membership, with all 
interested states of the former Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union, as well with traditional 
European neutral states. Although the Partnership for Peace was a serious proposal for military 
cooperation, it also represented an interim compromise that postponed a decision about NATO 
enlargement while the debate continued.111  In October, following a meeting of his principal 
advisers to discuss this issue, Clinton decided that the Partnership for Peace would be the 
centerpiece of NATO’s relations with non-member states in the region for the time being, but that 
he would also announce in Brussels that NATO was open to eventual expansion.112 
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 Yeltsin displayed inconsistency on this issue during 1993, but he eventually spoke out 
forcefully against NATO expansion. In August, during a visit to Warsaw, Yeltsin expressed 
understanding of Poland’s wish to join the alliance, saying that this would not threaten Russia’s 
interests. In late September, however, as his conflict with the parliament escalated, Yeltsin 
reversed his position. After dissolving the parliament on September 21, Yeltsin sent a letter to 
Clinton and other Western heads of state opposing any expansion of NATO. Western diplomats 
speculated that Yeltsin had acted under pressure from the Russian armed forces, as well as from 
officials in the foreign and defense ministries. As the showdown with his parliamentary foes 
escalated, Yeltsin desperately needed support from the armed forces, large segments of which were 
fiercely opposed to NATO expansion.113 
A few days after Clinton decided on the approach that he would take at the Brussels summit, 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher met with Yeltsin in Moscow to explain U.S. policy. 
Christopher told Yeltsin that the United States would not take concrete steps toward alliance 
expansion in Brussels but would instead focus on the Partnership for Peace. Christopher added 
that the United States would continue to contemplate NATO expansion in the long term. Yeltsin 
was pleased with the U.S. focus on Partnership for Peace. “This really is a great idea, really great,” 
Yeltsin told Christopher. “Tell Bill that I am thrilled by this brilliant stroke.” Christopher 
concluded in retrospect that Yeltsin must have assumed, mistakenly, that the Partnership for Peace 
would preclude NATO expansion.114 
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 During his trip to Europe in January 1994 to attend the NATO summit, Clinton made 
several statements that hinted at his support for eventual NATO expansion but ultimately reflected 
the lingering ambiguity in administration policy. In his speech at the NATO summit on January 
10, Clinton said that the Partnership for Peace “sets in motion a process that leads to the 
enlargement of NATO.”115 Two days later, at a press conference in Prague with Central European 
leaders, Clinton said that “now the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members 
but when and how.”116  Despite these seemingly clear statements of commitment to eventual 
NATO expansion, both skeptics of expansion within the U.S. government and Yeltsin himself 
could interpret them as largely theoretical or even meaningless.117 During a visit to Moscow, which 
immediately followed the NATO summit and subsequent meetings with Central European leaders, 
Clinton told Yeltsin that while NATO “plainly contemplated an expansion,” the Partnership for 
Peace was “the real thing now.”118 In the course of his meeting with Clinton in Moscow, Yeltsin 
reiterated his support for the Partnership for Peace and expressed hope that one day Russia would 
be integrated in a European-wide security structure.119 
 In the months following Clinton’s trip to Europe in January 1994, U.S.-Russia relations 
appeared to develop smoothly. During Clinton’s visit to Moscow that month, he and Yeltsin signed 
an accord with Leonid Kravchuk, the president of Ukraine, committing Ukraine to eliminate all 
nuclear weapons from its territory. Later that year, Ukraine joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty as a non-nuclear state and received security guarantees from the United States, Great Britain, 
and Russia.120 During the G-7 meeting in Naples in July 1994, Clinton offered to include Russia 
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as a full partner in the G-8 for political discussions, though the G-7 retained its role in managing 
the global economy. By the end of July, Yeltsin agreed to complete the withdrawal of Russian 
military forces from the Baltic states before the end of August.121 In the spring of 1994, Kozyrev 
reportedly boasted to a group of Russian ambassadors that “the greatest achievement of Russian 
foreign policy in 1993 was to prevent NATO’s expansion eastward to our borders.”122 In June, 
Kozyrev signed the Partnership for Peace Framework Document, which officially made Russia a 
member of the Partnership for Peace.123 
 By the fall of 1994, however, the Clinton administration’s commitment to NATO 
expansion was becoming clear. In July, during a visit to Warsaw, Clinton had reiterated and 
amplified his remarks from January, indicating that he supported the establishment of criteria and 
a timetable for membership.124 In September, Vice President Al Gore pledged that discussions on 
the question of NATO expansion would begin that fall.125 In late September, Richard Holbrooke, 
the new assistant secretary of state for European affairs, presided over an interagency meeting 
during which he announced, to the surprise of many expansion skeptics in the room, especially 
from the Pentagon, that NATO expansion was now official U.S. policy.126 
In late September, during a visit by Yeltsin to Washington, Clinton told Yeltsin that all of 
the new democracies in Europe, including Russia, would potentially be eligible for NATO 
membership. The alliance would expand, Clinton said, but no timetable had been set. Clinton 
offered Yeltsin “three no’s,” signifying “no surprises, no rush, and no exclusion.” Moreover, 
Clinton pledged that NATO would not offer invitations to any new members until after the 1996 
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presidential elections in Russia and the United States.127 Clinton, who believed that Yeltsin was 
the best hope for the success of democratic and market reforms in Russia, wanted to help Yeltsin 
win re-election in July 1996. Yeltsin, in turn, asked Clinton to attend the summit of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Budapest in December. Russia sought to shift 
the focus of European security issues from NATO to the CSCE, which was rechristened the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) during the December summit. 
Russia favored this organization because its membership encompassed all of Europe, including 
Russia. The United States, however, had no intention of curtailing NATO’s role. Clinton told 
Yeltsin that he would attend the summit in Budapest if it was important to Yeltsin.128 
Clinton went to Budapest, but Yeltsin’s ferocious opposition to NATO expansion turned 
the summit into an embarrassment for the Clinton administration. Yeltsin had been enraged to hear 
the December 1 announcement that NATO planned to conduct a study of expansion during 1995. 
He and other supporters of liberal reform believed that NATO expansion signaled the West’s loss 
of faith in Russian democracy.129 During his speech in Budapest on December 5, Clinton said that 
NATO would expand despite Russia’s opposition, as “no country outside will be allowed to veto 
expansion.” When it was his turn to speak, Yeltsin fired back: “Europe, even before it has managed 
to shrug off the legacy of the Cold War, is risking encumbering itself with a cold peace.” Clinton 
and his foreign policy team were stunned by Yeltsin’s words, but Yeltsin had signaled his opinion 
earlier, while boarding the airplane to Budapest: “Russia is against the North Atlantic Alliance 
expanding the sphere of its influence to the east, since NATO’s boundaries will then approach the 
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borders of the Russian Federation…. The two blocs we have left behind us would reappear in 
Europe and this would certainly not benefit European security.”130 
 In 1993 and 1994, therefore, a combination of domestic and international factors placed 
pressure on Yeltsin to seek greater balance in Russian foreign policy. The growing momentum in 
the United States toward support for NATO expansion, which was the main international factor, 
also exerted influence on Yeltsin through its effect on Russian domestic politics, as Yeltsin’s 
reversal on the issue in the fall of 1993 demonstrates. To be sure, the United States and Russia 
achieved cooperation on many issues in 1993 and 1994, including the removal of nuclear weapons 
from former Soviet states other than Russia, the withdrawal of Russian military forces from the 
Baltics, and an enhanced role for Russia in the G-7. Moreover, until late 1994, Russia believed 
that the United States had not yet made a decision on NATO expansion and would first seek 
cooperation through the Partnership for Peace. 
Yet Russia’s clear discomfort with even preliminary discussions of NATO expansion, 
coupled with domestic political pressures, gave Yeltsin an incentive to seek cooperation with other 
international partners. In early 1994, Kozyrev announced that Russia would adjust its foreign 
policy in response to the will of the voters, as expressed in the parliamentary elections.131 Shortly 
after Clinton’s statement in January 1994 that NATO expansion was a matter of not whether but 
when, Yeltsin began to seek closer relations with China. From Russia’s perspective, China was an 
attractive partner for reasons involving both national interests and national identity. As an 
emerging rival to the United States, China possessed enough geopolitical weight to be a formidable 
partner. China also shared Russia’s unwillingness to accept a U.S.-centered international 
community that would criticize other countries’ domestic political arrangements and restrictions 
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on civil society. For its part, China was receptive to these entreaties because of its own concerns 
about the international environment and tensions in relations with the United States.132 
 
China maintains interest in international cooperation with Russia 
 
 China’s discomfort with the new unipolar structure of the international system continued 
during 1993 and 1994, though the focus of its concerns shifted somewhat. In the immediate 
aftermath of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, having observed the collapse of communism 
throughout the former Soviet bloc, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party were concerned 
about their own regime’s future. They feared that the United States would try to induce the same 
kind of change in China that had occurred in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
The crackdown in Tiananmen Square ensured that China would endure heavy U.S. criticism on 
human rights issues for years to come, which proved to be a constant source of tension in the 
relationship. Nevertheless, China weathered its own domestic turmoil, and the Chinese Communist 
Party remained in power. Deng’s reaffirmation of economic reform in 1992, featuring his famous 
Southern Tour, reignited high-speed economic growth. 
If U.S. leaders had hoped during the period from 1989 to 1992 that the political changes 
occurring in the former Soviet bloc would reach China, then by 1994 they were forced to revise 
their expectations. China demonstrated its growing confidence as early as February 1992, when 
the Chinese National People’s Congress adopted legislation proclaiming the country’s willingness 
to use force to defend its claims in the Senkaku (Diaoyu), Paracel (Xisha), and Spratly (Nansha) 
Islands.133  By 1994, the United States recognized that China had achieved political stabilization 
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and rapid economic growth. In the view of many Chinese leaders and scholars, the United States 
began to propagate the “China threat theory.”134 This theme became more prominent in Chinese 
arguments throughout the 1990s. 
 During the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign, Clinton harshly criticized Bush’s policy 
toward China, charging that Bush had “coddled the dictators.” He also pledged to condition 
China’s access to the U.S. market on an improved human rights record.135 After defeating Bush in 
the election and assuming the presidency, Clinton discovered that it was difficult to fulfill this 
campaign promise. In May 1993, Clinton announced that China would have to meet seven 
conditions for improved human rights in order to obtain extension of its most favored nation (MFN) 
trading status with the United States beyond July 3, 1994. Clinton soon recognized, however, that 
applying pressure on China over human rights issues diminished, rather than enhanced, his ability 
to obtain China’s cooperation on both economic and security issues. As it sought to resist pressure 
on human rights, China had its own sources of leverage. In the economic realm, China sought to 
build support among the U.S. business community by offering access to its large market if bilateral 
relations developed satisfactorily, but threatening to do business with U.S. competitors if they did 
not. Likewise, China made clear that its cooperation on security issues would depend on 
maintaining a good bilateral relationship.136 
By September, Clinton accepted the recommendation of Winston Lord, the assistant 
secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, that the administration adopt a policy of 
“comprehensive engagement” of China.137 In May 1994, with the deadline approaching to decide 
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on China’s MFN status, Clinton announced that he would break the linkage with human rights that 
he had announced one year earlier. He acknowledged that China had not made satisfactory 
progress on human rights, but he argued that the best way to promote human rights in China was 
through engagement, including increased trade, contacts, and dialogue. 138  A combination of 
economic and strategic factors prompted this decision. Economic factors were paramount at this 
stage, as U.S.-China economic ties were growing rapidly, though China’s MFN status remained 
subject to annual renewal by Congress until the country received the status permanently in 1998. 
Overall, cooperation on security issues continued to be a weak link in the U.S.-China 
relationship.139 However, the United States and China achieved modest cooperation in addressing 
North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. On the one hand, China worked to prevent mention of 
sanctions in resolutions by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors 
and the UN Security Council. On the other hand, China abstained from these resolutions rather 
than vetoing them when they came up for votes. China’s unwillingness to use its veto power in the 
Security Council to protect North Korea unconditionally may have increased pressure on the 
regime in Pyongyang to come to the negotiating table. 140  Ultimately, however, the Agreed 
Framework signed in October 1994 was a U.S.-North Korea bilateral accord to which China’s 
contribution was marginal.141 Russia played only a peripheral role the 1994 crisis, having lost 
much of its influence over the North Korean regime after establishing official diplomatic relations 
with South Korea. From China’s perspective, Russia’s marginalization demonstrated the costs of 
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its overly pro-Western orientation. Russia largely agreed with China’s approach toward North 
Korea and gradually increased cooperation with China on this issue.142 
In an environment in which China worried about both the U.S. preponderance of power 
and particular U.S. foreign policy decisions, the leaders in Beijing remained open to increased 
cooperation with Russia. Within about two years of the Soviet collapse, the scholarly community 
in China had reached a rough consensus reaffirming Deng’s view that Russia would be one of the 
“poles” in the emerging multipolar world.143 Scholars disagreed among themselves about domestic 
trends within Russia, with some arguing that the failure of liberal reform had resulted in the rise 
of nationalism, but others contending that Russia’s domestic politics had stabilized and begun to 
develop in a steady fashion. 144  Regardless of their views on Russia’s domestic political 
development, Chinese scholars agreed that Russia would draw closer to China because of ongoing 
tensions in its relations with the West. In order to reestablish its position as a great power in Eurasia, 
Russia would have to place increased emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, especially its relations 
with China.145 These developments, in the view of many Chinese scholars, had helped to lay the 
foundation for a strong China-Russia partnership.146 
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China and Russia find a “common voice” on international issues 
 
 By the end of 1992, China and Russia had put their bilateral relationship back on track 
following a brief period in the wake of the Soviet collapse when China worried about Russia’s tilt 
toward the West. In 1993 and 1994, China and Russia advanced their relationship by emphasizing, 
for the first time, their shared views on many international issues in the post-Cold War period. 
This would become a theme of China-Russia relations in this new era, though the two countries, 
at this stage as during later periods, confined the expression of their common views to declarations 
rather than forming a military alliance. China had been interested in cooperation with Russia on 
international issues since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but Russia initially resisted this 
approach because it sought to build close relations with the West. The beginning of discussions 
about NATO expansion in late 1993, and particularly the clear shift in U.S. policy in favor of 
expansion during 1994, coincided with the emergence of efforts by China and Russia to speak with 
a common voice on a range of international issues. 
 During 1993, China and Russia held no meeting of heads of state, largely because of the 
domestic political turmoil in Russia that year. Having been “burned” by their support for the failed 
coup in August 1991, Chinese leaders took a wait-and-see approach while Russia’s domestic 
political conflict unfolded in 1993. This proved to be the only year following 1992 in which the 
two countries’ leaders did not meet.147 Starting in 1994, however, Russia began to strive for greater 
balance in its foreign policy, placing special emphasis on strengthening relations with China.148 
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In late January 1994, about six weeks after Zhirinovsky’s surprise showing in the Russian 
parliamentary elections and about two weeks after Clinton said that NATO expansion was a matter 
of not whether but when, Kozyrev visited China. During this trip, in contrast with statements early 
in his tenure that emphasized Russia’s Western orientation, he stressed the importance of friendly 
relations with China.149 Kozyrev also delivered to Jiang Zemin a letter from Yeltsin in which the 
Russian president proposed that China and Russia form “constructive partnership relations” 
oriented toward the 21st century.150 As 1994 progressed, Russia elaborated on this proposal. In 
June, the Russian ambassador to China, Sergei Rogachev, gave an interview to People’s Daily in 
which he outlined the proposed content of “constructive partnership relations.” He said that China 
and Russia would enjoy full equality, with no division between “big brother” and “little brother” 
of the type that had marred the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s. In the new era, China and Russia 
were both great powers with common goals in international relations, which he described as peace, 
security, and cooperation. Russia hoped to establish close, cooperative relations with China, 
especially in the Asia-Pacific region.151 
 Yeltsin’s proposal received a favorable response from China.152 From September 2-6, 1994, 
Jiang Zemin made his first official visit as Chinese leader to Russia, where he and Yeltsin held the 
second meeting of the two countries’ heads of states since the breakup of the Soviet Union.153 This 
visit occurred a few weeks before Yeltsin’s visit to Washington, when Clinton affirmed to the 
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Russian president that NATO expansion would occur but promised that the names of new member 
states and timetables for accession would not be announced before the 1996 presidential election 
in Russia. As Yeltsin had suggested, China and Russia upgraded their relationship during Jiang’s 
visit to Moscow from that of “friendly countries,” as expressed in the 1992 joint declaration, to 
“constructive partnership relations oriented toward the 21st century.”154 
In contrast with Yeltsin’s visit to China in December 1992, when China and Russia omitted 
mention of international issues in their joint declaration, this time the two countries indicated their 
desire to “strengthen cooperation in international affairs, including cooperation in resolving global 
issues” and emphasized that they sought to “oppose hegemonism and power politics and oppose 
the establishment of confrontational political, military, and economic groupings.” 155  As one 
Chinese scholar dryly notes, “There is no need to state that ‘hegemonism and power politics’ here 
referred to the United States.”156 The reference to military and political groupings referred not only 
to NATO, but also to the U.S.-Japan security alliance, which soon received an upgrade. 157 
Nevertheless, China and Russia declared that their relationship was not an alliance and insisted 
that it was not directed at any third party. The joint declaration also asserted that a multipolar world 
was taking shape.158 
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 In a sign of their warming relations, China and Russia reached symbolically important 
understandings on nuclear weapons during Jiang’s visit. Russia’s first post-Soviet military doctrine, 
which was promulgated in November 1993, had abandoned the pledge of no first use of nuclear 
weapons that Brezhnev first made in 1982. Many analysts viewed this change as an effort to 
establish nuclear deterrence against potential aggressors, especially China.159 During Jiang’s visit 
to Moscow, however, China and Russia pledged no first use of nuclear weapons in their bilateral 
relations. They also agreed not to target their nuclear warheads at each other.160 
 China and Russia also addressed issues in bilateral relations during this visit. Despite a 50 
percent surge in bilateral trade during 1992, the first full year following the Soviet collapse, overall 
trade volumes remained modest. The volume of bilateral trade reached $5.8 billion in 1992 and 
$7.7 billion in 1993 before falling back to $5.1 billion in 1994.161 As in later periods, bilateral 
economic ties lagged behind the development of political relations. The two countries also reached 
agreement on the demarcation of their short western border. Upon the conclusion of this accord, 
which followed a May 1991 agreement establishing the principles for demarcating the long eastern 
border, the two countries had agreed upon the demarcation of 98 percent of their 2,600-mile border, 
with only some tricky issues along the eastern section yet to be resolved.162 Progress in border 
demarcation, which had eluded the two countries during the Cold War, was an essential step in 
maintaining friendly bilateral relations. It was also a necessary precondition for potential future 
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cooperation on international issues. The border negotiations aroused some domestic opposition in 
Russia, especially in the Russian Far East. These concerns were particularly acute when coupled 
with concerns about Chinese immigration and Russia’s own version of the “China threat theory.” 
Despite these concerns, Yeltsin pressed ahead in improving relations with China.163 
 Officials and scholars in both China and Russia argue that the momentum in favor of 
NATO expansion in the United States during 1993 and 1994 contributed to the strengthening of 
China-Russia relations during this period. Igor Morgulov, a Russian diplomat with long experience 
in Asia-Pacific issues, argues that “this process of movement toward China from the end of 1993 
to the beginning of 1994, of course, went in parallel with the cooling of our relations with the 
West.”164 China, which had been interested in strengthening relations with Russia since the time 
of the Soviet collapse, sensed an opportunity, perceiving that Russia viewed NATO expansion as 
an attempt to “squeeze Russia’s strategic space” and “force Russia out of Europe.”165 “In this way,” 
one Chinese scholar writes, “China and Russia found a common voice on international issues.”166 
 This common voice found expression in joint declarations, but not in the formation of an 
alliance. Both countries perceived that a China-Russia alliance would be insufficient to balance 
U.S. power, and the costs and risks would exceed the benefits. Moreover, both countries 
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maintained a strong stake in their relations with the United States. Russia continued to seek 
productive relations with the United States throughout Yeltsin’s presidency, though Yeltsin 
became increasingly disillusioned with the United States over time. China, despite its concerns 
about U.S. power and disputes with Washington on a range of issues, continued to benefit from 
expanded economic ties with the United States. Therefore, even as China and Russia grew closer 
in 1993 and 1994, their mutual support remained largely rhetorical. They were unwilling to take 
steps that would result in an open break in relations with the United States. This trend continued 
during the next two years, culminating in the 1996 announcement of the China-Russia strategic 
partnership. 
 
Toward the Formation of a Strategic Partnership (1995-1996) 
 
Russia seeks closer ties with China 
 
 In 1995 and 1996, a combination of international and domestic political factors pushed 
Russia into a closer relationship with China, a “strategic partnership” that the two countries 
announced in April 1996. On the international front, Yeltsin’s outburst in Budapest in December 
1994 had made clear the depths of Russia’s frustration with the prospect of NATO expansion. This 
issue remained the chief irritant in U.S.-Russia relations, but other issues caused tension as well. 
Also in December 1994, Russian armed forces invaded Chechnya, which had been effectively self-
governing since the breakup of the Soviet Union, with the goal of bringing the republic back under 
central control. The United States was initially supportive of Russia’s efforts to preserve its 
territorial integrity, but eventually became more critical of the Russian war effort as reports of 
brutal Russian behavior mounted. China, by contrast, offered Russia its full support on what it 




U.S. officials feared could assist Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, also became a 
troublesome issue in U.S.-Russia relations. 
During this same period, however, the United States and Russia achieved cooperation on 
some issues. Despite their disagreements on Bosnia, they agreed to an arrangement for Russian 
forces to participate in the Implementation Force following the November 1995 Dayton Accords. 
The United States also agreed to Russia’s requested modifications of the Conventional Forces in 
Europe (CFE) Treaty, which had been negotiated before the collapse of the Soviet Union. On the 
issue of NATO expansion, the United States pursued a “two-track” approach. On the one hand, it 
prepared for NATO expansion, but on the other hand, it sought to assuage Russian concerns and 
to build a new relationship between Russia and the alliance. This approach eventually achieved 
results, but only in 1997, after Yeltsin had been safely re-elected. 
 During this period, domestic political concerns became paramount in Russia. Yeltsin faced 
re-election in July 1996, and initially his prospects looked dim. A poll taken in January 1996 
showed his support in single digits.167 Yeltsin’s standing had suffered from increasing public 
resentment toward the West. Russians blamed the West for neglecting Russian national interests 
and for what was, in their view, failed economic advice that had resulted in shock therapy, corrupt 
privatization schemes, and widespread suffering among ordinary people. Between 1993 and 1995, 
the share of people viewing the United States as a threat had increased from 26 percent to 44 
percent among the public and from 27 percent to 53 percent among elites.168 
The greatest threat to Yeltsin’s re-election prospects came from Gennady Zyuganov, the 
leader of the Communist Party of Russia. In contrast with the 1993 parliamentary elections, when 
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Zhirinovksy’s Liberal Democratic Party had performed strongly, it was the Communists who made 
the most impressive showing in the December 1995 parliamentary elections, capturing 22.1 
percent of the vote.169 Fearing a return of communism in Russia, the Clinton administration sought 
to assist Yeltsin, whom Clinton and his advisers still considered the best chance for democratic 
and market reform in Russia. Clinton also had his own domestic political reasons for wanting to 
assist Yeltsin. With Clinton himself facing re-election in November 1996, he hoped to avoid facing 
the charge that communism had returned to Russia on his watch. For these reasons, the Clinton 
administration decided to postpone announcement of the names of potential new NATO member 
states, as well as a timetable for accession, until after the Russian presidential election. Yeltsin’s 
opponents, including the Communists, were highly critical of Yeltsin’s foreign policy. In particular, 
the Communists faulted Yeltsin for being too accommodating of Western policies. They called for 
closer ties with China as a means of resisting the West.170 In response to these political pressures, 
Yeltsin adjusted his foreign policy and once again took the initiative in strengthening relations 
with China. It was Yeltsin who, during his flight to China in April 1996, decided to suggest that 
the two countries upgrade their relationship to a “strategic partnership.” 
 Talbott, who had opposed concrete steps toward NATO expansion leading up to the 
January 1994 summit, took control of the two-track U.S. policy in early 1995. His goal was to 
ensure that neither track—neither NATO expansion nor relations with Russia—got too far ahead 
of the other. In January 1995, in conversations with his Russian interlocutor, deputy foreign 
minister Georgi Mamedov, Talbott proposed both a NATO-Russia accord and a NATO-Russia 
standing commission that would give Russia an institutional relationship with the alliance, though 
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no direct influence in its decision-making process. In February, Mamedov told Talbott that Russia 
could accept NATO expansion, provided that the alliance stationed no NATO troops or nuclear 
weapons on the new member states’ territory.171 Yeltsin quickly disavowed this position, however, 
saying that he had not approved it. In March, during a speech to members of the Russian military, 
Yeltsin accused his foreign ministry of “gross blunders” in its handling of NATO expansion, 
particularly the suggestion that Russia would accept expansion in return for the pledges on troops 
and nuclear weapons. Yeltsin assured his military that opposition to NATO expansion remained 
Russia’s position.172 U.S. officials recognized that Russian domestic politics required Yeltsin to 
hold firm on this position at least until the July 1996 presidential election.173 
 Clinton visited Moscow in May 1995 to attend ceremonies marking the 50th anniversary of 
the Allied victory in World War II. During their summit meeting, Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to 
disagree on NATO expansion. Clinton told Yeltsin that the alliance’s expansion was irreversible 
and rebuffed the Russian president’s request that the alliance delay expansion until after 2000. 
Yeltsin agreed to proceed with Russia’s involvement in the Partnership for Peace.174 This summit 
at least managed to repair the damage from the contentious meeting in Budapest the previous 
December. Further progress in relations between NATO and Russia , however, would have to wait 
until after the Russian presidential election the following year. NATO’s study on expansion, which 
was released in September 1995, made clear to Russia that no country would have a veto over the 
alliance’s expansion, that the alliance had no need to station troops on the territory of new member 
states but reserved the right to do so if necessary, and that the new member states would enjoy the 
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full security guarantee under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, including the nuclear 
umbrella.175 
 In addition to the Clinton administration’s desire to help Yeltsin win re-election, the 
ongoing war in Bosnia delayed NATO expansion. As long as the war raged on, it was difficult for 
the United States and its NATO allies to argue that the alliance’s expansion would promote the 
cause of peace in Europe. The November 1995 Dayton Accords, which ended the war in Bosnia, 
therefore also helped to clear the path for NATO expansion. The end of fighting also made possible 
a successful case of U.S.-Russia cooperation, as the two countries agreed to Russia’s participation 
in the Implementation Force in Bosnia. Russia refused to allow its armed forces to serve under 
NATO command. However, it agreed to a plan in which Russian forces would serve under an 
American general, but not under the NATO chain of command.176 
 In 1996, Russia’s attention turned to the upcoming presidential election. Many of Yeltsin’s 
critics, including Zyuganov, his chief rival, accused him of failing to assert Russia’s national 
interests effectively in relations with the West. In response to these criticisms, Yeltsin sought to 
strengthen his nationalist credentials by adjusting Russia’s foreign policy. The most visible sign 
of this adjustment was his decision to replace Kozyrev with a new foreign minister, Yevgeny 
Primakov, in January 1996. Primakov’s views contrasted sharply with Kozyrev’s. He criticized 
the “defeatist” democratic politicians who believed that Russia, having lost the Cold War, should 
establish a relationship with the United States similar to that of Germany and Japan following their 
defeat in World War II.177 In contrast to the pro-Western foreign policy of Russia’s early democrats, 
Primakov insisted that Russia should be an equal partner with the West rather than a client. 
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Primakov favored a Eurasianist foreign policy that emphasized Russia’s need, given its geographic 
location in both Europe and Asia, to act as an independent great power with interests in both the 
West and the East.178 In his memoirs, Primakov later wrote that Russia should adhere to the dictum 
that “there are no permanent enemies, but there exist permanent national interests.”179 He also 
believed that the trend toward world multipolarity, which he supported, had begun long before the 
end of the Cold War and would continue in the post-Soviet era.180 In these circumstances, Russia 
should pursue an “active” and “pragmatic” foreign policy in all directions.181 
 Another step forward in the adjustment of Russian foreign policy came in April 1996, when 
China and Russia upgraded their relationship to a “strategic partnership” during Yeltsin’s visit to 
Beijing. As in 1994, it was Yeltsin who took the initiative and suggested the new language. China 
continued to be receptive to Russia’s diplomacy, especially because a series of disputes arose in 
U.S.-China relations during the period leading up to Yeltsin’s visit. 
 
China’s receptiveness to Russian diplomacy amid growing U.S.-China tensions 
 
 Between the time of Jiang Zemin’s visit to Moscow in September 1994, when China and 
Russia upgraded their relationship to a “comprehensive partnership,” and Yeltsin’s visit to Beijing 
in April 1996, when the two countries further upgraded relations to a “strategic partnership,” a 
series of events caused friction in U.S.-China relations. During this period, China engaged in 
increasingly assertive behavior internationally, especially in the South China Sea and toward 
Taiwan.182 China’s assertion of its territorial claims in the South China Sea strained relations with 
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the Philippines, a U.S. ally, in 1995. The revision of the U.S.-Japan alliance during this period 
caused concern among Chinese leaders. This issue became entangled with ongoing tensions over 
Taiwan, as Chinese leaders grew concerned about the possibility that Japan might intervene in a 
potential military conflict over the island. These concerns became especially acute when the 
Taiwan dispute escalated into a crisis in March 1996. Thus in 1995 and 1996, as one Chinese 
scholar writes, “the bowstring of China-U.S. relations was constantly pulled taut, almost to the 
limit.”183 
 Strategic concerns therefore pushed China and Russia closer together by early 1996. The 
perception by both countries that the United States sought to apply increased strategic pressure, on 
Russia through NATO expansion and on China through the upgrading of the U.S.-Japan alliance, 
served as a catalyst for the formation of the China-Russia strategic partnership that year. Concerns 
about national identity in both countries were also an important factor in their diplomatic 
convergence. Russia bristled at Western criticism of its military campaign in Chechnya, and China 
responded harshly to what it viewed as excessive U.S. support for pro-independence forces on 
Taiwan. 184  Rising tensions in U.S.-China relations offered China an incentive to strengthen 
relations with other countries, especially Russia, with the goal of offsetting, at least partially, the 
U.S. power advantage. Soon, however, growing concerns among other Asian countries about 
China’s growing power and uncertain intentions spurred China to adjust its grand strategy in an 
effort to offer its neighbors greater reassurance, as discussed in the next chapter. 
 The Mischief Reef incident of 1995 brought China and the Philippines into conflict over 
their competing claims in the Spratly Islands, arousing regional concerns about China’s intentions 
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in the South China Sea.185 After months of rising tensions, including both countries’ arrests of 
fisherman from the other side, the Philippines accused China in February of stationing armed 
vessels at and building structures on the reef, all in an effort to establish control of the territory in 
violation of international law. China denied the charges, claiming that the structures were shelters 
for fishermen. This was the first time that China had actively asserted its claims in the South China 
Sea against any country other than Vietnam. The Philippines lacked the military capability to press 
its case, so it sought support from the international community and from the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). China rejected efforts to negotiate the issue in multilateral 
formats, insisting upon bilateral negotiations with the Philippines. The United States sought to stay 
out of this dispute. However, it reminded China of the U.S. treaty obligation to defend the 
Philippines against attack, and U.S. officials also reiterated their determination to protect freedom 
of navigation in the South China Sea. China and the Philippines diffused the immediate tension by 
agreeing on a bilateral code of conduct for settling their disputes, but China’s South China Sea 
disputes remained a long-term source of tension.186 
 The strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance during the 1990s aroused considerable 
concern in China. 187  Because of North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and its political 
instability following the July 1994 death of Kim Il Sung, who had led the country for more than 
forty years, the United States became increasingly concerned about the possibility of military 
conflict on the Korean peninsula. In such a contingency, the United States would rely heavily on 
its military bases in Japan. American policymakers and defense planners, however, were uncertain 
as to how much support they could expect from Japan, given the restrictions that the Japanese 
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constitution imposed on the country’s military activities. With domestic Japanese support for U.S. 
military bases in the country weakening, the United States sought to ensure its continued access. 
American officials also sought to ensure that the alliance with Japan maintained U.S. domestic 
support, which they expected would decline sharply if Japan’s assistance in a potential armed 
conflict on the Korean peninsula were to prove unsatisfactory. For these and other reasons, the 
United States and Japan initiated discussions on how to strengthen their alliance. On the U.S. side, 
Joseph S. Nye Jr., the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, led this review, 
which became known as the “Nye Initiative.” The review, which began during the fall of 1994, 
resulted in the April 1996 bilateral declaration that strengthened the alliance, followed by the 
announcement of the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines in September 1997.188 
 China supported the U.S.-Japan alliance during the 1970s and 1980s, when its target was 
the Soviet Union. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, China continued to perceive some 
utility in the U.S.-Japan alliance because it prevented Japan’s full remilitarization, including its 
potential acquisition of nuclear weapons. As the 1990s progressed, however, China became 
increasingly concerned that the new purpose of the U.S.-Japan alliance was to contain China and 
frustrate its ambitions to reunify Taiwan with the mainland. The alliance’s upgrading during the 
1990s heightened these concerns. Following protracted negotiations, the United States and Japan 
reached agreement by early 1996 on the broad outlines of a plan to strengthen the alliance. During 
Clinton’s visit to Japan in April 1996, he and Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto issued 
a joint declaration on the alliance’s future. The two countries also pledged to draft U.S.-Japan 
Defense Guidelines that would specify the nature of Japan’s expected future contributions. By the 
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time of the Clinton-Hashimoto declaration, events in Taiwan had altered the context of the 
alliance’s upgrade and caused Chinese leaders to see it in an increasingly skeptical light.189 
 The dispute over Taiwan escalated between mid-1995 and early 1996. During this period, 
China maintained its displeasure with U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, which China considered part of 
a U.S. plan to encircle China.190  In 1994, the United States and Taiwan had upgraded their 
relations.191 In 1995, Lee Teng-hui, the president of Taiwan, requested a visa to attend a private 
function in his personal capacity at his alma mater, Cornell University, in June. The Clinton 
administration was initially reluctant to grant the request because it wanted to assure China that 
U.S. ties with Taiwan remained unofficial. Ultimately, under pressure from Congress, Clinton 
relented and granted Lee the visa. China viewed this decision as a betrayal, especially following a 
period in which Jiang Zemin had pursued flexible policies in cross-Strait relations. Now Jiang 
faced domestic political criticism for being too soft on Taiwan. China responded with a series of 
military and diplomatic measures, most notably by expanding the scope and scale of military 
exercises that had already been scheduled for the second half of 1995 and early 1996 near the 
Taiwan Strait. In late July, China held military exercises in the region featuring what it called 
“missile tests.” China carried out a second set of tests and exercises in advance of the March 23, 
1996 presidential election on Taiwan. From March 8-15, China launched missiles toward offshore 
impact areas close to Taiwan. Chinese forces conducted additional live-fire exercises between 
March 12 and 25.192 
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The Clinton administration responded by calling China’s behavior “reckless and 
provocative” and ordering the dispatch of two aircraft carrier battle groups to the waters off Taiwan, 
though not into the Taiwan Strait itself. Although neither the United States nor China expected the 
crisis to escalate to armed conflict, Secretary of Defense William Perry warned Vice Foreign 
Minister Liu Huaqiu, who was visiting Washington at the time of the tests, that “grave 
consequences” would follow if China’s weapons struck Taiwan. The crisis demonstrated that the 
Taiwan issue had the potential to cause a rapid deterioration in U.S.-China relations and therefore 
required careful management.193 These events also colored China’s perceptions of the following 
month’s Clinton-Hashimoto declaration upgrading the U.S.-Japan alliance. Chinese leaders 
became increasingly convinced that China was the target of the alliance. They feared that the 
alliance could facilitate joint intervention by the United States and Japan in a possible future 
conflict over Taiwan.194 
As discussed in the next chapter, the international reaction to these events spurred China, 
starting in mid-1996, to adopt a new grand strategy. China had become concerned that the United 
States, by strengthening its alliances with Asian countries that were alarmed by China’s behavior, 
could lay the groundwork for a long-term strategy of encirclement of China.195 In the spring of 
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China and Russia form a “strategic partnership” 
 
 Chinese and Russian scholars broadly agree that by the mid-1990s, shared strategic 
concerns had pushed the two countries closer together. These concerns focused on both the 
structure of the international system and on specific U.S. foreign policy initiatives that China and 
Russia opposed. At the level of the international system, the change in the global balance of power 
in favor of the United States and at the expense of China and Russia encouraged the strengthening 
of relations between the latter two.196 At the level of policy, both countries asserted that U.S. 
actions were subjecting them to undue strategic pressure. For Russia, the main irritant was NATO 
expansion. For China, the primary concerns were the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance and, 
relatedly, rising tensions over Taiwan.197 China had its own concerns about NATO expansion, 
viewing it as a U.S. effort to consolidate its global hegemony and, potentially, to threaten China 
from the west.198 
 In 1995 and 1996, China-Russia relations continued to improve. In May 1995, during Jiang 
Zemin’s visit to Moscow to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of victory in World War II, China 
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and Russia reaffirmed their commitment to strengthened relations.199 Neither country sought the 
formation of an alliance with the other. Both maintained an interest in productive relations with 
the United States, despite their concerns about U.S power and intentions. Their goals, rather, were 
to use the China-Russia relationship to offer diplomatic resistance to U.S. “hegemonism,” to 
promote world multipolarity, and, more concretely, to gain some bargaining power in relations 
with the United States. 
 By the mid-1990s, several factors motivated Russia to pay increased attention to the Asia-
Pacific region, especially to China. The necessity of maintaining good bilateral relations with 
China, which was the original motivation for Russia to improve relations in 1992, continued to be 
an important consideration. Writing in 1995, two high-ranking officials at the Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs reiterated that maintaining friendly relations with China was a “categorical 
imperative” for Russia.200 In the authors’ view, relations had developed smoothly in the post-
Soviet period. As Yeltsin and Jiang had said during their meeting in May 1995, no political 
contradictions existed between the two countries that would serve as obstacles to the development 
of relations.201 Given the benefits of maintaining stable bilateral relations, as well as the high costs 
of poor relations that history had revealed, Russia would have seen strong incentives to maintain 
good working relations with China even in the absence of problematic relations with the United 
States. 
International factors played a growing role in Russia’s policy toward China, however. The 
foreign ministry officials added that China and Russia held similar or congruent views on a range 
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of international issues. On no international issue, in fact, did the two countries stand on “opposite 
sides of the barricades.”202 The goal was not to form an alliance or bloc with China, but to increase 
Russia’s ability to act independently on the world stage. In the view of leading Russian experts on 
China, Russia’s foreign policy in the mid-1990s was largely an attempt to maintain “balance” and 
“equal distance” from centers of world power.203 Russia should view China as neither an ally nor 
an enemy, one scholar argued. An alliance with China, which China would not accept in any case, 
would incur the enmity of NATO, which was soon to expand, and curtail Russia’s access to 
technology and investment from the West. Attempting to join an anti-China axis would be even 
worse, this scholar argued, because it would pit Russia against a country with a population ten 
times the size of Russia’s and an economy that was rapidly outstripping Russia’s as well.204 
Although Russia did not seek an alliance with China, it hoped to use its relationship with China as 
a counterweight to its “not always smooth relations with the West.” 205  Maintaining friendly 
relations with China would guarantee that Russia, amid difficult relations with the West, would at 
least enjoy a stable “rear.”206 It might also give Russia some additional bargaining power in 
relations with the West. During a meeting at the Kremlin in July 1995, as quoted in Chapter 1, 
Yeltsin clearly articulated this logic: “Relations with China are extremely important for us from 
the point of view of global politics as well,” he said. “We can lean on the shoulder of China in 
relations with the United States. Then the West will start to treat Russia more respectfully.”207 
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 Chinese leaders focused on similar themes. They, too, recognized that bilateral issues alone 
provided a strong incentive to maintain good working relations with Russia. For China as for 
Russia, friendly bilateral relations provided a secure “rear.” This was essential for China’s security, 
especially in light of Cold War history. “Improving and maintaining the stability of the northern 
line of its geographical environment is an unchanging, fundamental security requirement of 
China’s diplomacy,” one Chinese scholar wrote. “Being able to establish stable bilateral relations, 
even to the extent of joining hands strategically with Russia, which shares a 4,300-kilometer border 
with China, is precisely the key to bringing about this diplomatic requirement.”208 
China also continued to emphasize cooperation with Russia on international issues. Like 
their counterparts in Russia, Chinese leaders did not seek to form an alliance, but they believed 
that cooperation with Russia could serve, at least to some extent, as a counterweight to the 
overwhelming power of the United States.209 “China and Russia both regard the other as a pole 
exerting important influence in defending peace and stability in a world that is gradually becoming 
more multipolar,” one Chinese scholar wrote. “Both sides place great emphasis on the other side’s 
important balancing influence in the current world order.” 210  In March 1995, Jiang Zemin 
explained his views on China-Russia relations during a visit to Beijing by Kozyrev. “China and 
Russia are both great powers,” he said. “In the areas of opposing hegemonism and maintaining 
world peace, they bear a heavy responsibility, and they also have common interests.”211 When 
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Premier Li Peng visited Moscow in June 1995, he complained that some countries still sought to 
instruct others on how to live and work, and that this situation must change. The trend toward 
multipolarity, which China and Russia both supported, would reduce the ability of powerful 
countries to interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries, Li said.212 As these statements 
indicate, Chinese leaders were especially concerned about the threat that U.S. power allegedly 
posed to their form of domestic governance. They sought to enlist Russia’s support based on its 
similar concerns, an example of the way in which convergent national identities drew the two 
countries together at least as much as national interests defined in terms of the international balance 
of power. 
 In their bilateral relations, China and Russia increasingly followed this principle of non-
interference in what the other side considered its own internal affairs. During his visit to China in 
March 1992, Kozyrev had criticized China’s human rights record. By 1995, he no longer offered 
such criticisms. Instead, he praised China’s domestic achievements.213 By this time, Russia was 
embroiled in the war in Chechnya and appreciative of China’s support for its policies toward the 
breakaway republic. Both countries were now inclined to view with understanding the other’s 
efforts to preserve its domestic political stability and to defend its territorial integrity.214 Russia 
had reaffirmed its support for the “one China” policy in 1992, and it adhered to this position during 
the crisis over Taiwan in March 1996. On March 12, as the crisis unfolded, the Russian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs issued a statement reaffirming its view that Taiwan was part of China and calling 
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for the peaceful resolution of the crisis.215 Nevertheless, China understood that Russia, like the 
Soviet Union in the 1950s, was unlikely to offer military support in the event of armed conflict 
over Taiwan.216 
Against this background, Jiang Zemin warmly welcomed Yeltsin to China in April 1996. 
This visit allowed Yeltsin to signal to his domestic audience that he was rebalancing Russia’s 
foreign policy and abandoning overdependence on the West. In this way, China’s friendly 
reception for Yeltsin boosted his re-election prospects. This fact was notable, given that Yeltsin’s 
main competitor, Zyuganov, was the candidate of the Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation.217 
During Yeltsin’s visit, China and Russia upgraded their relationship to a “strategic 
partnership.” This phrase reflected the strengthening of relations that China and Russia had 
achieved over the previous few years. The new formula was not, however, the product of careful 
diplomatic negotiations in advance of the summit meeting. Instead, Yeltsin himself suggested the 
new wording while on the airplane to China. Yeltsin read the draft declaration, which called for 
“developing long-term, stable, good-neighborly, friendly, mutually beneficial cooperation and 
constructive partnership relations, oriented toward the 21st century.” The Russian president was 
unsatisfied with this wording because, in his opinion, it contained nothing new compared to 
previous declarations and therefore failed to offer guidance for the future development of the 
relationship. In his own hand, he revised the formula to “equal trusting partnership, directed at the 
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strategic interaction of the two countries in the 21st century.” The most important addition was the 
phrase “strategic interaction.” Several Russian diplomats who accompanied Yeltsin, mindful of 
Chinese diplomacy’s emphasis on protocol, doubted that the Chinese side would accept such a 
last-minute change. During his meeting with Yeltsin, however, Jiang read the proposed wording 
and quickly agreed to it.218 
 In the joint declaration announcing their strategic partnership, China and Russia agreed “in 
the future to strengthen cooperation in those spheres where their approaches are close or coincide, 
and to search for paths of interaction where their positions differ.”219 The declaration also stated, 
regarding the international situation, that “the two sides believe that the world at present is in deep 
and complicated change. The trend of world multipolarization is developing…. Seeking peace, 
stability, cooperation, and development have already become the main currents of current 
international life. But the world is certainly not peaceful. Hegemonism, repeated exertion of 
pressure, and power politics still exist, bloc politics have new manifestations, and world peace and 
development still face severe challenges.”220 China and Russia once again insisted, however, that 
their strategic partnership was not an alliance and was not directed against any third party. 
 During Yeltsin’s visit to China, he and Jiang also met in Shanghai with the leaders of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to sign an agreement on military confidence-building 
measures in the border regions. This “Shanghai five” grouping consisted of Russia, China, and the 
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three newly independent, former Soviet Central Asian republics that shared a border with China. 
The group negotiated this agreement bilaterally, with China on one side and the four post-Soviet 
states on the other. The parties agreed, among other things, not to attack each other with military 
forces stationed in the border regions, not to carry out military exercises directed against the other 
side, to inform each other of important military activities within one hundred miles of the border, 
and to limit the scale, scope, and number of military exercises.221 The following year, the Shanghai 
Five reached an agreement on reduction of military forces in the border regions. Together, these 
agreements continued the work that Gorbachev had begun in the 1980s and offered additional 
security reassurance to all of the countries involved. This group added Uzbekistan in 2001 and 
became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 
 China’s success in cultivating Russia by the mid-1990s served as evidence for many 
Chinese strategists that their pursuit of multipolarity was paying dividends. Japan’s stagnation and 
resulting failure to exert regional leadership in Asia strengthened this conclusion.222 According to 
power cycle theory, Japan reached a peak in relative power during the middle of the decade.223 
After consolidating their own domestic rule, Chinese leaders conducted foreign policy in 
accordance with Deng’s principles. They embraced a patient approach, avoiding provocative 
actions that would have made their country a target of other great powers and embracing 
globalization as a means of stimulating domestic economic growth and modernization. At the same 
time, they cultivated other powerful countries, including Russia, with the goal of limiting U.S. 
political influence. These efforts were only partially successful, as Russia continued to pursue 
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close relations with the United States while U.S.-Japan ties strengthened. Nevertheless, by the 
middle of the decade, several trends, including a U.S. retreat from pressure on China over human 
rights, the stifling of Japan’s regional ambitions, and Russia’s increased receptiveness to close 





 By 1996, China and Russia had achieved considerable progress in their relationship. They 
had built upon the Sino-Soviet normalization of 1989, established overall friendly relations, and 
nearly resolved their longstanding border dispute, with only a few details still to be agreed. 
Economic ties remained weak, and some groups in Russia voiced concerns about Chinese 
immigration. However, the two countries pressed forward in improving relations. This 
rapprochement provided both countries with a secure strategic rear and assured no repetition of 
the damaging hostility of the Sino-Soviet split. Given these benefits, China and Russia would have 
faced strong incentives to improve relations even in the absence of difficulty in their relations with 
the United States. 
 The structure of the international system, now defined by the overwhelming concentration 
of power in the hands of the United States, also partially explains the evolution of China-Russia 
relations from 1991 to 1996. Both countries sought to improve relations with the other as a partial 
counterweight to U.S. power in a unipolar world. Events also pushed China and Russia closer 
together throughout this period, as tension in both countries’ relations with the United States ran 
in parallel with their own improved bilateral relationship. The two countries increasingly expressed 
                                                          




their common views on a range of international issues, particularly their discomfort with U.S. 
power and with what they viewed as undue exertions of U.S. strategic pressure. They also drew 
closer based on affinity between their national identities, affirming their mutual interest in resisting 
Western criticism of their domestic governance. 
At the same time, both countries recognized that they could not match U.S. power through 
traditional balance of power politics. Moreover, both countries recognized throughout this period 
that their modernization and economic development depended on maintaining tolerable working 
relations with the West. Therefore, despite their rhetoric, they resisted the formation of a military 
alliance. Instead, they pursued more subtle goals, hoping to use their relationship to gain some 
bargaining leverage in relations with the West. 
From the perspective of power cycle theory, the first half of the 1990s was a “normal period 
of history” in which neither China nor Russia was passing through a critical point on its power 
cycle, according to the definitions offered in Chapter 1. Indeed, this normal period of history lasted 
well into the new century, though Japan’s arrival at its peak in relative power in the mid-1990s 
was an important event. Consistent with power cycle theory’s expectations, international politics 
in the 1990s were quiescent. At the same time, despite the unipolar structure of the international 
system, changes in relative power continued to occur. Russia was struggling to regain its footing, 
while China was still in the early stages of a period of accelerating growth in relative power. Both 
countries viewed relative power in dynamic terms. They looked ahead to a future in which, they 
hoped, unipolarity would eventually give way to multipolarity. At times, they misperceived the 
trends. Russia’s early democratic leaders initially underestimated China’s prospects for the 
accumulation of power. China’s leaders during this period were overly optimistic about Russia’s 








From Strategic Partnership to the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, 
and Cooperation: 1996-2001 
 
 With the formation of a strategic partnership in April 1996, China and Russia continued to 
draw closer in their post-Cold War relations. The following year, China and Russia declared their 
common support for a new, multipolar international order, which they believed was already in 
formation. Improvement in both countries’ relations with the United States, as well as divergences 
of views on some international issues, limited the two countries’ cooperation at the international 
level during 1997 and 1998. Events in 1999, however, pushed China and Russia closer together 
and renewed their focus on resisting the United States. Two issues, namely the Kosovo War and 
U.S. plans to build national and theater missile defense systems, were especially prominent. 
This confluence of events spurred China and Russia to strengthen their relations and to 
resist, at least rhetorically, what they called “power politics” and “hegemonism” by the United 
States. These efforts culminated in the signing, in July 2001, of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, 
Friendship, and Cooperation. This treaty did not include a mutual defense clause and therefore did 
not signify the creation of a political-military alliance. However, China and Russia pledged not to 
join alliances directed against the other, not to allow third countries to use their territory to stage 
military actions against the other, and to consult each other if either country perceived a threat to 
its security. The treaty therefore laid the legal foundation for the bilateral relationship, served as a 
capstone to a decade of development in China-Russia relations, and established the basis for further 
improvement of relations. 
Throughout this period, the structure of the international system remained unipolar, but 




unipolarity. These concerns led them to increase cooperation. Once again, though Russia continued 
to sell arms to China, the two countries refrained from forming an alliance. Instead, they confined 
their cooperation to joint declarations and other rhetorical efforts, professing their confidence that 
an emerging multipolar order eventually would increase their room for maneuver. This rhetoric 
was meaningful, however, because it signaled a convergence of the two countries’ national 
identities and their desire to create a more favorable normative environment for the pursuit of their 
national strategies. 
During the period that this chapter covers, China was the more consistent of the two 
countries in seeking to expand cooperation. Boris Yeltsin became increasingly receptive to China’s 
entreaties as tensions mounted in Russia’s relations with the West, but Yeltsin never abandoned 
his desire to improve relations with the United States and its allies. After assuming the presidency 
at the end of 1999, Vladimir Putin maintained interest in relations with China, but he initially 
subordinated this relationship to the pursuit of more favorable diplomatic relations with the West. 
 
Limits of the new strategic partnership (1996-1998) 
 
Russia comes to terms with NATO expansion but falls into economic crisis 
 
 By the time of the 1996 Russian presidential election, Russia had adjusted its diplomacy. 
The appointment of Yevgeny Primakov as foreign minister in January of that year signaled that 
Russia would pursue a more balanced foreign policy, which would include closer relations with 
China. However, Yeltsin continued to place great importance on relations with the United States. 
This would remain true throughout his presidency, even as U.S.-Russia relations soured. In 1996 
and 1997, facing the inevitability of NATO expansion, Yeltsin sought and achieved an agreement 




ensured that U.S.-Russia relations remained relatively stable until 1998, when the Russian 
financial crisis created severe disillusionment on both sides. 
The Clinton administration delayed its decisions about which new member-states to admit 
to NATO, and on what timetable, until after the July 1996 Russian presidential election. Once 
Yeltsin had been re-elected, members of the administration were ready to proceed. They had to 
wait a bit longer to reach a deal with Russia, however, because Yeltsin, who had suffered a heart 
attack between the two rounds of the election, was forced to withdraw from his daily duties as 
president until December 1996 because of health problems. When he returned, he instructed 
Primakov, his foreign minister, to cut a deal with the United States that would accept the inevitable 
alliance expansion but seek to protect Russia’s interests.1 In the meantime, Clinton officially 
announced in late October, just two weeks before his own re-election, that NATO would expand.2 
 Russia’s two main demands were for reassurances that NATO would deploy neither troops 
nor nuclear weapons on the territory of new member-states. In order to make a NATO-Russia 
agreement possible, the alliance sought to address these Russian concerns. In December, during 
the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
declared that the alliance had “no intention, no plan, and no need to station nuclear weapons on 
the territory of any new members.” Following this statement, Primakov announced that he was 
willing to work with NATO on a charter. In March 1997, the alliance addressed the issue of troop 
deployments. The alliance declined to offer a binding commitment not to deploy troops on the 
territory of new members, as Russia had sought, but it vowed to use other means besides such 
deployments to provide for its collective defense. During a summit meeting that month with 
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President Bill Clinton, Yeltsin indicated that the terms of the emerging agreement would be 
acceptable.3 
On May 27, 1997, NATO heads of state and Yeltsin signed the NATO-Russia Founding 
Act. This act established the Permanent Joint Council, which was to serve as a mechanism for 
consultation between Russia and alliance members, though it would not give Russia a veto over 
alliance decision making. By the time of the NATO summit in Madrid held that July, the alliance 
had decided to admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Although Yeltsin continued to 
oppose the alliance’s expansion, the NATO-Russia Founding Act was perhaps the best deal that 
he could have obtained, given Russia’s weak position.4 
The Clinton administration and other supporters argued that NATO expansion would 
prevent the formation of a strategic vacuum between Germany and Russia, eliminate the possibility 
of future Russian imperialism in this region, and thereby ensure European security.5 Supporters 
also argued that NATO expansion would promote democratic and market reform in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The policy also drew sharp criticism, however. Many opponents focused on the 
possible negative effects on Russian democracy, U.S.-Russia relations, and European security. In 
the view of many of these critics, NATO expansion was likely to encourage nationalistic, anti-
Western, and militaristic policies in Russia, tendencies which might otherwise lose their appeal in 
a newly democratic Russia facing new possibilities.6 
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Some critiques also highlighted the possible stimulus that alliance expansion could give to 
China-Russia relations. Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis, who noted that his fellow 
historians overwhelmingly opposed the alliance’s expansion, disagreed with those who asserted 
that Russia had no choice but to accept it. “For Russia does indeed have a choice: it is in the 
interesting position of being able to lean one way or another in a strategic triangle that is likely to 
define the geopolitics of the early twenty-first century,” Gaddis wrote. “It can continue to align 
itself, as it has patiently done so far, with the United States and Western Europe. Or it can do what 
the US itself did a quarter century ago under the guidance of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger: 
it can tilt towards China.” 7  Kissinger himself, who supported NATO expansion, was more 
sanguine: “Only the unlikely prospect of relentless American bullying of both [China and Russia] 
could drive them to a deeper partnership.”8 
 Assessing the impact of NATO expansion on China-Russia relations is not a 
straightforward exercise. In the short run, progress toward NATO expansion did coincide with the 
strengthening of China-Russia relations in the 1990s, as discussed in Chapter 2. This strategic 
convergence achieved some milestones, but it remained limited. NATO expansion did not push 
Russia into an alliance with China, which meant that the relationship did not constitute a power-
aggregating arrangement of the kind predicted by balance of power theory. Moreover, for several 
years following the initial round of expansion, Russia maintained interest in improved relations 
with the West and harbored continued misgivings about the expansion of ties with China. In the 
two decades since, despite a considerable strengthening of the China-Russia relationship, this basic 
pattern held. As the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century approached, China and 
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Russia had grown closer together strategically, but they had not yet fulfilled Gaddis’s warning. 
Russia had neither executed a full strategic reorientation toward China nor succeeded in playing 
the China card with anything like the success that Nixon and Kissinger enjoyed. For Russia, NATO 
expansion was troubling not because it posed a direct threat to Russian security, but because it was 
damaging to Russia’s self-image as a great power and its quest for an enhanced foreign policy role. 
In this sense, it was one in a series of events that contributed to a gradual diplomatic convergence 
of China and Russia based on the overlap of their national identities, one component of which was 
their common self-image as aggrieved great powers.9 The partial recovery of Russian power that 
began during the first decade of the twenty-first century eventually enabled Russia to draw a line 
against further NATO expansion into former Soviet territories. 
Whatever the long-run consequences of the alliance’s expansion, the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act helped to sustain some momentum in U.S.-Russia relations during 1997 and part of 
1998. In addition, the United States was pleased with apparent progress in Russia’s economic 
reforms. At the outset of his new term in office, Yeltsin appointed reformers such as Anatoly 
Chubais and Boris Nemtsov to high positions in his government. Inflation came under control, the 
ruble was stable, and Russia recorded positive economic growth in 1997 for the first time in a 
decade.10 By the following year, however, Russia’s government finances were in dire shape, and 
a major financial crisis loomed. On August 1, 1998, the Russian government devalued the ruble 
and defaulted on all outstanding debts to private holders of Russian bonds. The financial crisis 
resulted in a sharp economic contraction, soaring inflation, a stock market crash, and the collapse 
of the banking system. Under pressure from his domestic political opponents, Yeltsin named 
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Primakov as prime minister shortly after the default and devaluation, with strong support from the 
Communist Party. Russia’s liberal reformers were out of power, and their policies seemed 
discredited.11 Although the devaluation of the ruble laid the groundwork for Russia’s economic 
recovery during the following years, the crash of August 1998 caused bitterness on both sides of 
the U.S.-Russia relationship. On the U.S. side, many policymakers who had maintained optimism 
about Russia’s future became pessimistic for the first time.12 
 The generally positive trends in U.S.-Russia relations during 1997 and the first half of 1998 
coincided with a period of improvement in U.S.-China relations. The simultaneous improvement 
of these two bilateral relationships limited, to some extent, the scope of China-Russia interactions 
at the global level during this period.  
 
China adjusts its strategy and improves relations with the United States 
 
 In the early years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, China responded to the new 
unipolar structure of the international system by continuing its military modernization program, 
which had begun in the late 1980s, and by strengthening relations with Russia to provide at least 
a modest counterweight to U.S. power. During this period, China also adopted an assertive posture 
toward Taiwan and its South China Sea disputes. By 1996, however, China had begun to adjust its 
strategy.13 China’s growing power had given rise to a “China threat theory,” which Chinese leaders 
had proven unable to dispel merely by asserting their good intentions. Chinese leaders grew 
concerned about negative reactions, among neighboring states in the Asia-Pacific region, to 
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China’s assertive behavior. As a result, they adopted a strategy that sought to foster an amicable 
external environment that would allow them to focus on China’s internal development and the 
accumulation of what they called “comprehensive national power.” The strategy’s ultimate goal 
was to enable China’s rise to power without provoking a counterbalancing coalition, which was 
most likely to arise under U.S. leadership and to include several states in the Asia-Pacific region.14 
In essence, China sought to buy time for its rise. China pursued this strategy consistently until the 
2008 financial crisis, with some exceptions, including a hardening at times of policy toward Japan. 
 According to a similar analysis based on a review of China’s long history, China by the 
end of the twentieth century had adopted a “calculative” security strategy focused on the need for 
domestic stability and economic growth, a peaceful international environment, and military 
modernization paired with restraint in the use of force. This strategy was based on the recognition 
that China required geopolitical peace and stability in order to pursue its top priority, namely 
uninterrupted domestic economic growth and modernization, which was essential both to ensure 
internal stability and to guarantee China’s security.15 
 The adjustments that Deng Xiaoping made to Chinese foreign policy beginning in the early 
1980s laid the groundwork for this strategy. Starting in 1982, Deng abandoned the alliance strategy 
that China had followed during the preceding decades, replacing it with an independent foreign 
policy featuring equidistance from the two superpowers. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Deng believed by the mid-1980s that the threat of major war was receding, presenting China with 
the opportunity to focus on domestic modernization and economic growth. This trend offered 
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China the prospect of a favorable international environment conducive to the pursuit of China’s 
“four modernizations.” Moreover, bipolarity was yielding to a new era of multipolarity in which 
China would have greater room for maneuver among great powers.16 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, circumstances changed. Deng’s 
strategy had been based on the need to balance both the United States and the Soviet Union, but 
the Soviet collapse and Russia’s weakness during the 1990s weakened the forces with the potential 
capability to resist the United States. Deng had formulated his strategy during a period of close 
relations with the United States, but U.S.-China relations in the post-Cold War era experienced 
both continued cooperation and areas of increased friction. Deng’s strategy had stressed non-
alliance and non-confrontation, but China now perceived a threat to this strategy in the 
strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, as well as in NATO’s eastward expansion.17 The 
United States, in the words of one Chinese analyst, was now approaching China from both east 
and west and “shooting with both hands.”18 
Partly in response to these policies, China strengthened relations with Russia. Together, 
these developments helped to clarify great-power strategic relations, especially the U.S.-Europe, 
U.S.-Japan, and China-Russia alignments. The structure of the international system continued to 
be defined by “one superpower, many great powers,” and the risk of major war remained low, as 
during the early 1990s. The strengthening of pro-independence forces in Taiwan, however, meant 
that the risk of China’s being drawn into a regional war increased as the 1990s progressed.19 
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China’s perception by 1996 that its security situation had deteriorated pushed the country 
toward improved relations with Russia. Chinese leaders, however, mostly perceived a threat to 
their domestic governance, rather than a direct threat to their country’s physical security. In this 
way, their national identity converged with that of Russia. China’s concerns about Taiwan, for 
example, ran in parallel with Russia’s desire to maintain control over Chechnya and its sensitivity 
over foreign criticism of its military campaign in the breakaway republic. This combination of 
strategic and national identity concerns facilitated the strategic partnership that the two countries 
proclaimed in April of that year.  
China’s own growing capabilities and increasingly assertive policies in the preceding 
period, however, had also caused unease among its neighbors. China’s assertive claims in the 
South China Sea, which were especially apparent during the Mischief Reef incident in 1995, and 
its policies toward Taiwan during the 1995-1996 crisis had stimulated other countries in the Asia-
Pacific region to strengthen their security cooperation with the United States. The strengthening 
of U.S. alliances with Japan and Australia were of special concern to China, especially the former. 
In addition, several countries in Southeast Asia also bolstered defense ties with the United States.20 
China, whose actions to enhance its own security had increased perceptions of insecurity among 
its neighbors, was thus caught in a form of the security dilemma.21 Deng may not have faced 
anything like Bismarck’s “nightmare of coalitions,” but his successors encountered a security 
environment in the Asia-Pacific region in which the conditions for balance-of-power politics and 
alliance formation directed against China were increasingly present.22 
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 In response to this predicament, China adopted a new grand strategy starting in 1996. 
Under this strategy, China sought to develop partnerships with the major actors in world politics 
and to reassure its neighbors by participating more actively in regional multilateral institutions.23 
China pursued these goals consistently for more than a decade afterward.24 Foreign Minister Qian 
Qichen articulated this strategy in early 1997, when he introduced China’s “new security 
concept.”25 
Two Chinese analysts argued that China’s regional strategy flowed naturally from its grand 
strategy, the overarching purpose of which was to foster an amicable international environment 
that would allow the country to focus on domestic modernization and economic growth.26 Through 
the construction of partnerships, China sought to maintain good relations with all of the world’s 
great powers. This great-power diplomacy remained largely “U.S.-centric,” however, given the 
importance of U.S. economic, financial, and technological resources for China’s modernization. 
China also sought to improve relations with neighboring countries in order to prevent the formation 
of a counterbalancing coalition, which an aggressive strategy would have been likely to stimulate, 
and thereby improve its regional security environment. To this end, China adopted a more positive 
attitude toward regional multilateral mechanisms.27 Zhang Yunling, a government scholar who is 
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often credited with devising the strategy of reassurance toward ASEAN countries, wrote that the 
strategy sought to counter the “China threat theory” and forestall the formation of U.S.-led 
alliances that would encircle China.28 
 The combination of deterrence of and reassurance toward China in U.S. foreign policy 
during the second half of the 1990s, therefore, yielded a more cooperative approach in China’s 
foreign policy. For example, while strengthening Asian alliances and continuing to support Taiwan, 
the United States also reiterated its commitment to the one-China policy.29 Facing the prospect of 
a U.S.-led balancing coalition in Asia, China had no potential partners in a great-power alliance 
that could successfully balance U.S. power. Russia, which was still mired in its post-Soviet 
transformation and economic weakness, was too weak to serve as an effective ally.30 China-Russia 
economic ties remained weak, and both countries feared that an alliance could jeopardize their 
integration into the global economy. 31  Under these circumstances, China built a strategic 
partnership with Russia in order to purchase weapons for its military modernization, cultivate a 
partner with shared concerns about U.S. primacy, and avoid international isolation. China 
continued, however, to recognize the importance of ties with the United States. 
 Following the U.S.-China confrontation over Taiwan that began in 1995 and culminated in 
the March 1996 crisis in the Taiwan Strait, the United States and China sought to improve relations. 
The crisis showed both countries that disputes in bilateral relations, including those related to 
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Taiwan, could escalate dangerously in the absence of careful management and close 
communication between the two governments. In May 1996, Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher delivered a speech calling for the United States and China to resolve their differences 
through engagement, not confrontation. In November 1996, shortly after Clinton won re-election, 
he met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
summit in Manila. The two presidents agreed to hold bilateral summit meetings in the United 
States in 1997 and in China in 1998. These would be the first visits by the two countries’ leaders 
to the other country since the Tiananmen Square crackdown. 
Indeed, Jiang’s visit to Washington in October 1997 was the first visit by a Chinese head 
of state to the United States since 1985. During this summit meeting, Clinton and Jiang issued a 
joint statement committing both countries “to build toward a constructive strategic partnership” in 
the twenty-first century.32 Thus, a year and a half after forming a strategic partnership with Russia, 
China agreed to describe its relationship with the United States in similar terms. During Clinton’s 
visit to China in June 1998, he publicly reiterated U.S. support for the one-China policy, notably 
U.S. support for the “three no’s”: no independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one 
China. Although Clinton merely restated U.S. policy that had been in effect since the Nixon 
administration, China attached great importance to this statement following the recent Taiwan 
Strait crisis.33 Throughout this period, the United States praised China for its constructive reaction 
to the Asian financial crisis that began in the fall of 1997, especially China’s decision to refrain 
from devaluing its currency.34 
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The result of these trends was therefore somewhat paradoxical. NATO’s eastward 
expansion and the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security alliance provided an impetus for 
strengthened China-Russia relations, which resulted in the strategic partnership that they 
announced by 1996. At the same time, Chinese leaders’ concerns about encirclement by a U.S.-
led alliance network in Asia led them to adopt a more reassuring strategy toward their neighbors 
and to seek improved relations with the United States. China sought to cultivate relations with 
Russia as a partial counterweight to U.S. power, but China’s outreach toward Russia also fit neatly 
into its foreign policy strategy of improving relations with all great powers and neighboring 
countries. Russia held a special place in this process, however, because China’s national identity 
converged with Russia’s to a greater extent than was true in most of China’s other bilateral 
relationships. Although China and Russia would issue a joint declaration in 1997 calling for the 
formation of a multipolar world, their cooperation at the international level was relatively 
constrained between 1996 and 1998. Instead, their focus was on consolidating the security benefits, 
especially in the border regions, of their improved bilateral relationship. 
 
 
Halting progress in China-Russia relations 
 
 During the three years following the establishment of the China-Russia strategic 
partnership in April 1996, their cooperation at the international level made modest progress. The 
highlight was their joint declaration, issued during Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s visit to 
Moscow in April 1997, calling for the establishment of a multipolar world. The two countries 





 Along with the three Central Asian members of the “Shanghai Five,” China and Russia 
built upon the previous year’s agreement on confidence-building measures in the border regions 
by reaching an additional agreement in April 1997 on mutual reductions of military forces in these 
same regions. This agreement stipulated that the five countries would reduce their military forces 
within 100 kilometers of the border to the lowest possible levels, that their deployments in these 
regions would consist of defensive weapons, that they would not use or threaten force against each 
other, that they would not seek unilateral military advantage, and that they would share information 
about military deployments in the border regions. 35  Together with the 1996 agreement on 
confidence-building measures, this treaty established mechanisms to promote the two countries’ 
border security and stability, eliminated the military standoff in the border region that had arisen 
during the Sino-Soviet split, and laid a cornerstone of political trust that was essential for China-
Russia strategic cooperation at the international level.36 
 During his visit to Moscow, Jiang Zemin delivered a speech to the Russian Duma in 
which he explained how relations with Russia fit into China’s overall foreign policy strategy of 
maintaining good relations with neighboring countries in order to create a favorable environment 
for continued domestic reforms.37 China’s cultivation of relations with the Central Asian countries, 
a major aim of which was to promote stability in the countries bordering China’s restless 
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northwestern region of Xinjiang, also fit this strategy.38  The 1996 agreement on confidence-
building measures and the 1997 agreement on military reductions in the border region helped to 
consolidate the security benefits of improved China-Russia relations. The strengthening of China-
Russia relations in the post-Cold War era, while intended largely to resist U.S. primacy in the 
international system, was therefore also an integral part of the strategy of reassurance toward 
neighboring countries that China embraced beginning in 1996.39 
 China-Russia cooperation at the international level sustained some momentum in the 
years following the establishment of the strategic partnership in April 1996. During Jiang Zemin’s 
visit to Moscow in April 1997, China and Russia issued what would become the first of several 
joint declarations on world multipolarity.40 In the 1997 declaration, the two countries pledged that 
they would “strive to promote world multipolarity and the establishment of a new international 
order.” 41 This document expressed the two countries’ mutual concerns about several trends in the 
1990s, including what they perceived as the growing U.S. advantage in relative power, 
increasingly open attempts by the United States to consolidate unipolarity and practice 
“hegemonism,” the weakening of the UN Security Council, and the attempt to marginalize the 
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influence of Security Council members that were not members of U.S.-led alliances in decision-
making on important international issues. Above all, China and Russia expressed concern about 
what they perceived as U.S. efforts to undermine the international order established at the end of 
World War II. China and Russia insisted that their relations were not directed against any third 
country, though their opposition to the “politics of pressure and diktat” was a clear criticism of 
recent U.S. foreign policy.42 
 The document did not impose any formal obligations on the two countries, nor did it 
signify the formation of an alliance. Positive trends in both countries’ bilateral relations with the 
United States during this period, including reciprocal state visits by the U.S. and Chinese leaders 
and the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, made clear that both countries continued to 
value their relations with the United States. The cooperation that this document expressed was, 
like many other aspects of China-Russia relations in the years since the Soviet collapse, largely 
rhetorical. Nevertheless, the joint declaration expressed the two countries’ long-term aspirations 
for the evolution of the international order.43 It signaled their common desire not merely to wait 
passively for the advent of multipolarity, but to exert efforts to bring it into being.44 
 During the second half of the 1990s, China and Russia also reiterated their support for 
each other’s territorial integrity. In 1998, Russia issued its “four no” promises on the Taiwan issue, 
agreeing that it did not support any form of Taiwan independence, that it did not accept the “two 
Chinas” or “one China one Taiwan” position, that it opposed Taiwan’s entry into the United 
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Nations or any other international organization in which membership was limited to sovereign 
states, and that it would not sell weapons to Taiwan. In July 2000, Russia added a fifth “no,” 
agreeing with China’s opposition to interference by external forces in the Taiwan issue.45 Later, 
when Yeltsin visited Beijing in December 1999, he received firm support from China for Russia’s 
conduct of the second war in Chechnya. Yeltsin thus avoided international isolation at a time when 
the United States and other Western countries had intensified their criticism of Russia’s policies 
in this war.46 
 Despite their common views on many international issues and the shared aspirations that 
they expressed in the joint declaration on multipolarity, diverging interests on several issues during 
1997 and 1998 limited the scope of the China-Russia strategic partnership.47 During this period, 
the improvement of China-Russia relations encouraged Japan to seek improved relations with 
Russia.48 Russia, in turn, was far more willing than China to accept the U.S.-Japan security alliance, 
including the upgrading of this alliance in 1996.49 During a visit to Tokyo in May 1997, Russian 
Minister of Defense Igor Rodionov was quoted in news reports as saying that Russia welcomed 
the strengthening of defense ties between the United States and Japan, much to China’s 
displeasure.50 A few months earlier, in December 1996, Rodionov had named China as one of 
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Russia’s potential enemies.51 Rodionov’s statements were outliers among top Russian officials. 
Nevertheless, Russia’s view of U.S. alliances in Asia reflected its recognition that these alliances 
helped to preserve the status quo in Asia and therefore to arrest the further decline of Russia’s 
power in this region.52 In the view of some Russian analysts, China at times paid insufficient 
attention to Russia’s interests in Northeast and East Asia, giving priority instead to relations with 
the United States, Japan, and the two Koreas. 53  In addition, the nuclear crisis on the Indian 
subcontinent in May 1998 left China and Russia on opposite sides. Although both countries 
condemned that month’s nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, Russia maintained close historical 
ties with the former and China with the latter.54 
 Another incident during this period that demonstrated the limits of China-Russia 
cooperation at the global level was Primakov’s abortive proposal for a Russia-China-India bloc to 
resist the United States. Primakov, whose appointment as foreign minister in January 1996 had 
signaled a more balanced Russian foreign policy, continued this approach after becoming prime 
minister in August 1998. In December 1998, the United States launched a bombing campaign 
against Iraq amid a showdown over that country’s nuclear program. During an official visit to 
India later that month, Primakov proposed the formation of a Russia-China-India strategic triangle. 
China renounced the idea the very next day, and India also opposed it.55 Yeltsin quickly disavowed 
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the proposal as well.56 Primakov later wrote that he had primarily envisioned close contacts among 
the three, mostly on a bilateral level, rather than an alliance.57 Had Primakov’s proposal been 
implemented, it would have signaled heightened efforts to resist U.S. primacy in the international 
system. Its rejection clarified that neither the Chinese leadership nor Yeltsin, let alone India, were 
prepared to engage in anything that suggested the formation of an anti-Western bloc. Despite the 
preponderance of U.S. power that existed during this period, none of these countries felt 
sufficiently threatened by the United States to attempt such a geopolitical alignment. A Russia-
China-India bloc would have been difficult to manage diplomatically in any case, given differences 
in the three countries’ national interests and the potential for great-power rivalry between China 
and India. 
 These events demonstrated the limitations of China-Russia cooperation at the 
international level in 1997 and 1998. In addition, the Russian economic crash in August 1998 
dramatically revealed Russia’s weakness and limitations as an international partner for China.58 
Russia was acutely conscious of its own weak position. In part, its pursuit of good relations with 
China reflected its recognition that it lacked the capability, in any case, to oppose China for at least 
the next fifteen years.59 From the perspective of power cycle theory, Russia was still several years 
away from reaching the lower turning point on a new cycle and entering a period of accelerating 
growth. 60  During this period, therefore, several factors served to restrict the international 
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dimension of the China-Russia strategic partnership. These factors included the improvement in 
U.S.-China relations resulting from China’s embrace of a more reassuring foreign policy strategy, 
the stabilization of U.S.-Russia relations following the deal on NATO expansion, both countries’ 
continued need for economic interchange with the West, the diverging interests of China and 
Russia on some international issues, and the inability of a China-Russia partnership to counter the 
United States effectively. Beginning in 1999, however, the flow of events led China and Russia to 
increase their focus on international cooperation. 
  
Increased Cooperation at the International Level (1999-2001) 
 
 Starting in 1999, a series of developments pushed China and Russia closer together 
strategically. Foremost among these were the Kosovo War and the U.S. pursuit of missile defense 
systems. Chinese and Russian experts agree that 1999 was an important turning point in the 
development of their countries’ strategic partnership.61 A period of increased strategic cooperation 
between China and Russia culminated two years later in their signing of the Treaty of Good-
Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation. Although this treaty did not signify the creation of 
an alliance, it did reflect the two countries’ growing strategic convergence.  
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The Kosovo War 
  
The NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia that began in March 1999 aroused 
strong opposition in both Russia and China. The United States, seeking to avoid a repeat of its 
delayed response to the slaughter in Bosnia earlier in the decade, initiated the bombing campaign 
against the Serb-dominated Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the goal of halting atrocities 
against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, an autonomous region within Serbia. Unlike Bosnia, 
which was a sovereign state at the time of the NATO intervention there, Kosovo was a constituent 
element of Yugoslavia. Russia and China therefore objected to the NATO bombing campaign as 
an unlawful intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, rejecting the alliance’s 
argument that the intervention was justified on humanitarian grounds. 
Both countries feared the precedent that NATO’s actions could set for their own restive 
regions. For Russia, this concern centered on Chechnya. China was concerned about Tibet and 
Xinjiang, over which it exercised sovereign control, as well as Taiwan, which enjoyed de facto 
independence but which China considered to be part of its own territory. Moreover, Russia and 
China both objected to NATO’s decision to initiate military action against Yugoslavia without UN 
Security Council authorization, which both countries could have blocked with their veto authority. 
In addition to these concerns, Russia’s longstanding historical, ethnic, and religious ties to the 
Orthodox Serbs aroused passions among the Russian people. The bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade in May, in turn, provoked an intense nationalistic response among the 
Chinese people. For all of these reasons, the Kosovo War was a challenge to the national identities 
of both Russia and China and therefore served to strengthen their relationship.62 
                                                          




 At the time of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May 1997, the alliance heads of state 
had tried to convince Yeltsin that NATO would henceforth be more of a political than a military 
alliance. Now, less than two years later, NATO was going to war for the first time in its history, 
conducting military operations outside of its own territory. Moreover, the bombing campaign 
began just two weeks after Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary joined the alliance. When 
bombing commenced on March 24, 1999, the action drew condemnations across the Russian 
political spectrum.63 The Russian public was united in its opposition to the NATO bombing 
campaign.64 Polls taken in April showed that 90 percent of Russians opposed NATO’s actions. 
Primakov, who was on an airplane to Washington when he learned that the bombing campaign 
had begun, famously ordered the plane to turn around. As a result of this crisis, U.S.-Russia 
relations fell to their lowest level since the end of the Cold War.65 
 U.S.-Russia interactions over Kosovo differed sharply from those in Bosnia, where Russia 
had agreed to dispatch its own forces to serve as peacekeepers under U.S. command at the end of 
hostilities. The NATO Permanent Joint Council, which had been established to promote 
cooperation between the alliance and Russia during crises such as the one in Kosovo, failed to ease 
the tension.66 After the bombing began, Russia broke off relations with NATO.67 Early in the 
bombing campaign, some U.S. policymakers hoped that Slobodan Milosevic, the president of 
Yugoslavia, would surrender quickly, thus minimizing the damage to U.S.-Russia relations.68 
Initially, given the rupture in diplomatic exchanges between the United States and Russia, it 
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appeared that efforts to repair the relationship would have to wait until after the bombing campaign 
had ended. As weeks passed and the bombing campaign continued without a surrender, however, 
Yeltsin engaged diplomatically with the United States in an effort to end the bombing and to ensure 
that Russia would be involved in the resolution of the conflict. Around the time of NATO’s fiftieth 
anniversary celebration in Washington in late April, Yeltsin offered to assign Viktor 
Chernomyrdin to work with U.S. and other international officials to seek an end to the conflict. 
While serving as prime minister earlier in the decade, he and U.S. Vice President Al Gore had co-
chaired a commission that addressed issues in the bilateral relationship. The United States readily 
accepted this offer. 69 
 On May 7, shortly after these diplomatic efforts got underway, a U.S. B-2 stealth bomber 
dropped precision-guided munitions on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. The embassy had been 
identified incorrectly as a Serb military target. The bombing destroyed the embassy, killing three 
Chinese citizens and injuring more than twenty. Chinese officials were reluctant to accept the 
explanation by the United States that it had not intended to bomb their embassy. The bombing 
provoked widespread nationalist outrage in China, triggering large demonstrations at the U.S. 
Embassy in Beijing and at U.S. diplomatic facilities in other cities in China. In many cases, the 
Chinese government helped to facilitate these protests.70 In the words of one Chinese analyst, the 
embassy bombing unified the Chinese people’s feelings with China’s national security interests.71 
Chinese analysts considered NATO’s humanitarian justification for the war to be a mere pretext. 
Instead, they portrayed the military campaign as an attempt by the United States to strengthen its 
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own influence in Europe, to increase the European countries’ reliance on the United States, and to 
squeeze Russia out of the Balkans.72 
 The bombing of the Chinese Embassy also strengthened the desire of China and Russia to 
coordinate their opposition to NATO’s military campaign. On the day of the embassy bombing, 
Yeltsin issued a harsh condemnation. He repeated his call for an end to the NATO bombing 
campaign and argued that the embassy bombing vindicated Russia’s opposition from the outset.73 
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov indefinitely postponed a scheduled trip to Britain on May 8. 
That day, he phoned Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan to express Russia’s condolences for 
the bombing. The two foreign ministers agreed that NATO should halt the bombing campaign 
immediately and pledged continued consultation on the Kosovo issue. On May 10, Yeltsin called 
Jiang Zemin on the hotline that the two countries had established. During this conversation, the 
two leaders agreed that their views on the Kosovo War were identical. The two leaders called for 
a halt to the bombing, which they agreed was a necessary precondition for a political solution to 
the crisis. They agreed that any peace agreement should be acceptable to Yugoslavia and should 
respect its sovereignty. Chernomyrdin, who was already heavily involved in diplomacy to end the 
conflict, made a quick visit on May 11 to Beijing, where he held an emergency meeting with 
Chinese officials on Kosovo.74 
 Throughout May, the United States worked with Chernomyrdin and Finnish President 
Martti Ahtisaari, who was appointed EU envoy, to resolve the Kosovo crisis. The United States 
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insisted upon a total pullout of Serb forces from Kosovo and an international peacekeeping force 
with NATO “at the core.” Chernomyrdin, who shuttled between meetings with Milosevic and with 
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Ahtisaari, pushed unsuccessfully to soften these U.S. 
demands. The upcoming G-8 meeting, which was scheduled to be held from June 18-20 in Cologne, 
Germany, put pressure on Russia to help find a solution, as Yeltsin did not wish to attend the 
summit with the Kosovo crisis still unresolved. On May 27, during a meeting in Belgrade, 
Chernomyrdin told Milosevic that his continued refusal to accept NATO’s terms would probably 
mean the deployment of NATO ground troops. Russia would be unable to block such a deployment, 
Chernomyrdin explained. Facing this prospect, Milosevic became more flexible. On June 1, 
Talbott, Ahtisaari, and Chernomyrdin reached agreement on the terms that they would propose to 
Milosevic, which insisted upon the departure of all Serb forces from Kosovo and a peacekeeping 
force with “NATO at the core.” Milosevic accepted NATO’s conditions.75 
The Kosovo war thus reached its conclusion, though not before another tense moment in 
U.S.-Russia relations arose. A contingent of 200 Russian troops who were stationed in Bosnia as 
part of the peacekeeping force crossed into Serbia before seizing the airport in Pristina, the capital 
of Kosovo, without NATO authorization. Russia was unable to send reinforcements, however, 
because Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania denied the Russians the use of their airspace. The crisis 
fizzled. During the G-8 meeting, Clinton and Yeltsin spoke warmly of their joint efforts to solve 
the Kosovo problem and to preserve the U.S.-Russia relationship.76 
Despite the warm feelings at Cologne, the Kosovo War marked a new low point in the 
U.S.-Russia relationship, which had deteriorated steadily throughout the 1990s. For the first time 
in the post-Soviet era, Russia’s 2000 Military Doctrine listed the West as a security threat to 
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Russia.77 The Kosovo War, especially the bombing of the Chinese Embassy, also caused a sharp 
downturn in U.S.-China relations. One result was that voices in both China and Russia called for 
the formation of a China-Russia alliance. In Russia, some politicians and analysts argued that an 
alliance with China could help Russia resist the United States and NATO, which the Kosovo War 
had allegedly demonstrated was necessary. 78  Some analysts stopped short of calling for the 
formation of a formal military alliance but asserted that the Kosovo War offered opportunities for 
Russia to strengthen diplomatic coordination with China, as well as India. 79  Likewise, some 
Chinese security experts argued that the embassy bombing demonstrated the dire security threat 
that the United States posed to China, to which China should respond by quickly forming an 
alliance with Russia.80 
In neither country, however, did the mainstream view favor the formation of an alliance. 
Despite their concerns about unchecked U.S. power, both countries wanted to avoid a rupture in 
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their relations with the United States. On June 1, just as the Kosovo War was reaching its resolution, 
Ivanov, the Russian foreign minister, visited Beijing. He and his counterpart, Tang Jiaxuan, issued 
a press release that expressed misgivings about NATO’s military campaign in Kosovo and insisted 
that the defense of human rights could not be a pretext for violating state sovereignty. The two 
foreign ministers reiterated, however, that China and Russia would not form an alliance.81 
The Kosovo War demonstrated the similarity of views that China and Russia held on 
important international issues and stimulated a degree of cooperation between the two countries. 
Both China and Russia were concerned about the unconstrained use of U.S. power in a unipolar 
world. They worried that the United States would remove important international decision-making 
from the UN Security Council’s agenda, thus relegating China and Russia to the sidelines. For 
China and Russia, the Kosovo War was “the most dangerous manifestation of this tendency.”82 In 
theory, it could set a precedent for U.S.-led intervention on issues such as Chechnya or Taiwan.83 
China and Russia could take only marginal satisfaction in the Kosovo issue’s return, following the 
end of the war, to the Security Council, which eventually passed five resolutions on the matter.84 
Even in the case of Kosovo, China-Russia diplomatic coordination was not seamless. Russia’s 
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diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict, which featured little coordination with China, raised 
some doubts in China about Russia’s reliability as a partner.85 
Some analysts in China and Russia believed that the Kosovo War emboldened 
independence movements on Taiwan and in the Caucasus.86 On July 9, 1999, Taiwan President 
Lee Teng-hui told the German newspaper Deutsche Welle that cross-Strait relations were “state-
to-state or at least special state-to-state” in character. The government of the People’s Republic of 
China had long threatened to respond with military force to a declaration of independence by 
Taiwan, and PRC leaders considered Lee’s statement to be close to such a declaration.87 The 
Taiwan white paper that China released in early 2000, which Premier Zhu Rongji affirmed was a 
direct response to Lee’s remarks, stated for the first time that the PRC might respond with military 
force to Taiwan’s “indefinite” refusal to negotiate on reunification. 88  The United States 
disassociated itself from Lee’s remarks and engaged in diplomacy to ease cross-Strait tensions.89 
Meanwhile, in August and September of 1999, Chechen rebels led armed incursions into 
the Russian republic of Dagestan with the aim of securing the republic’s independence. During 
this same period, the Russian government blamed Chechen terrorists for a series of deadly 
apartment bombings in Moscow and other Russian cities, though some accounts accuse the 
Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) of carrying out the attacks and blaming them on Chechens 
in order to build public support for another war. 90  Whatever the truth about the apartment 
                                                          
85 Rozman, Chinese Strategic Thought Toward Asia, 98. 
86 吴大辉：《中俄战略协作伙伴关系：十年实践的历史考察》，第 4 页 [Wu Dahui, “China-Russia Strategic 
Cooperative Partnership Relations: Historical Observations on Ten Years of Practice,” 4]; Ларин. Американский 
фактор в российско-китайском стратегическом партнерстве. С. 22 [Alexander Larin, “The American Factor in 
the Russia-China Strategic Partnership,” 22]. 
87 Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams, 61. 
88 Christensen, The China Challenge, 198. 
89 Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams, 61-62. 





bombings, the Russian government responded by launching its second war in Chechnya. This war, 
in turn, caused a further downturn in U.S.-Russia relations. U.S. officials became increasingly 
critical of the Russian conduct of the war, especially the military’s treatment of the civilian 
population in Chechnya. 
The Kosovo War, therefore, drew China and Russia together in their concerns about the 
new doctrine of humanitarian intervention. During this same period, the U.S. pursuit of missile 
defense systems was another issue on which the two countries held similar views. 
 
U.S. missile defense 
 
 China and Russia found common cause in their opposition to the deployment of both 
national and theater missile defense systems by the United States. Both countries feared that the 
deployment of such systems could strengthen and prolong the era of U.S. primacy. Despite 
differences in the nature of their opposition to these systems stemming from contrasts in their own 
nuclear arsenals, China and Russia maintained a unified public position on the issue throughout 
this period. 
 U.S. interest in the deployment of missile defense systems gained momentum in the late 
1990s, just as Chinese and Russian concerns about U.S. power were intensifying. President George 
H.W. Bush abandoned the “Star Wars” missile defense plans that his predecessor, Ronald Reagan, 
had pursued during the 1980s. Instead, Bush sought a more limited missile defense system to 
protect the United States against the accidental launch of Soviet missiles. By late 1991, U.S. 
officials discussed the possibility of designing the system to defend against threats from states such 
as Iran and North Korea as well.91 Stephen Hadley, who was serving as assistant secretary of 
                                                          




defense at this time, wrote later that such a system could also be useful in combating a potential 
missile threat from China.92 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Bush administration 
officials discussed the idea of a limited national missile defense system with their Russian 
counterparts, including the possibility of amending the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 
but they focused primarily on securing a START II arms control treaty with Russia, which Yeltsin 
signed in 1992.93 
Instead of pursuing national missile defense, the Clinton administration chose to focus on 
the construction of theater missile defense systems to protect U.S. troops deployed overseas. The 
ABM Treaty, which the Clinton administration wished to preserve, prohibited national missile 
defense but allowed theater missile defense. Nevertheless, administration officials sought to win 
Russia’s support for the deployment of such theater missile defense systems. They wanted to 
maintain Russia’s good will in order to work with the Russians on traditional arms control 
agreements. In particular, they sought ratification of START II, Russia’s support for the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The 
Russian Duma failed to ratify START II until 2000, however. As U.S.-Russia relations grew 
progressively more acrimonious throughout the 1990s, especially as a result of NATO expansion, 
members of the Duma withheld their support for the treaty in protest.94  
 Toward the end of the 1990s, events forced the Clinton administration to focus on national 
missile defense. In July 1998, a bipartisan commission led by Donald Rumsfeld reported that 
emerging missile capabilities posed a greater threat to the United States than the intelligence 
community had previously recognized. The Rumsfeld Commission predicted that Iran and North 
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Korea might gain the capability to strike U.S. territory within five years.95 Events that summer 
seemed to offer support for the commission’s thesis. Iran conducted its first flight of the Shahab 3 
medium-range missile. Shortly thereafter, North Korea attempted a satellite launch, which was 
unsuccessful but nevertheless demonstrated that the North Koreans were developing the 
Taepodong I, a three-stage rocket. In March 1999, the same month that the NATO bombing 
campaign against Yugoslavia began, both houses of Congress overwhelmingly passed legislation 
calling upon the United States to deploy a missile defense system that would be capable of 
protecting the country as soon as “technologically possible.”96 Clinton signed the National Missile 
Defense Act into law in July.97 
 Clinton announced that he would determine whether to build a national missile defense 
system based several criteria, including the technology’s performance in tests, the effect on arms 
control and overall U.S. national security, the cost, and the nature of the threats facing the United 
States.98 At the G-8 summit in Cologne, the United States and Russia discussed the possibility of 
modifying the ABM Treaty while working toward the arms reductions envisioned in a prospective 
START III Treaty. By late 1999, Russia showed signs of being amenable to such a deal. However, 
Yeltsin resigned from the presidency on the final day of the year. Clinton traveled to Moscow in 
June 2000, where he attempted to strike a deal with Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin, to modify 
the ABM Treaty. Putin declined, having decided that he would wait for the next U.S. 
administration to address the matter.99 
                                                          
95 Bradley Graham, Hit to Kill: The New Battle over Shielding America from Missile Attack (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2001). Cited in Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose 294-295, 440n27. 
96 Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, 294-295. 
97 Craig Cerniello, “Clinton Signs Controversial NMD Legislation,” Arms Control Today, July 1999, 
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_07-08/nmdja99.  
98 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 2002), 380. 




Meanwhile, Clinton had to decide during the summer of 2000 whether to build a national 
missile defense. Without an agreement from Russia to modify the ABM Treaty, the United States 
would have to notify the Russians of its intention to withdraw from the treaty six months in 
advance. Then the United States could begin construction of a national missile defense system in 
2001 and complete it by 2005, by which time the potential threat from North Korea that the 
Rumsfeld Commission had identified might have matured. Clinton had made clear that he did not 
wish to abandon the treaty unilaterally. After initial tests produced mixed results and an NMD test 
failed in July 2000, Clinton announced on September 1 that he would leave the decision on missile 
defense to his successor. George W. Bush, the Republican nominee in that fall’s presidential 
election, made clear that he intended to build a national missile defense system.100 
 As the campaign to deploy missile defense systems gained momentum in the United States, 
China and Russia voiced their strenuous objections through coordinated diplomacy. Both countries 
perceived U.S. missile defense plans as an effort to consolidate the power advantage, already 
overwhelming, that the United States enjoyed and to threaten their deterrent capabilities. Russia 
had sharply reduced the size of its military following the breakup of the Soviet Union, but its 
nuclear forces were one of the few areas in which it maintained equality with the United States. 
Russian leaders and strategists viewed U.S. attempts to revise the ABM Treaty or otherwise change 
the existing strategic equilibrium as an attempt to weaken Russia. Some also professed the concern 
that U.S. national missile defense, designed initially as a limited system to protect the United States 
against rogue states, could eventually threaten Russia’s own deterrent.101 China, which held a 
much smaller nuclear arsenal than Russia’s, wished to ensure its own deterrent capability. Chinese 
leaders viewed U.S. missile defense plans as an attempt to weaken China’s nuclear deterrent and 
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thereby limit China’s rise.102 Some analysts in both China and Russia also viewed U.S. missile 
defense plans as an effort by the United States to draw one or both countries into a ruinous arms 
race similar to the one that had helped to undermine the Soviet Union.103 
In a joint declaration issued in November 1998, China and Russia argued in favor of 
upholding the ABM Treaty.104 In April 1999, they held joint consultations on the issue and agreed 
that their deputy foreign ministers would meet twice annually to discuss it.105  Another joint 
declaration in December 1999 reiterated the two countries’ common views on missile defense. 
These efforts culminated in a joint declaration on missile defense that the two countries’ leaders 
issued during Putin’s first official visit to China as president in July 2000. In this statement, China 
and Russia declared that the ABM Treaty was the cornerstone of international strategic stability 
and should be neither abandoned nor revised. The aim of U.S. plans for national missile defense, 
the two countries asserted, was to gain a unilateral military and security advantage. Such plans 
would harm the security of China and Russia and provoke a new arms race, they warned. Instead 
of undermining the ABM Treaty, the two countries argued, the world’s leading countries should 
seek to reduce offensive strategic weapons and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In 
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addition to their opposition to national missile defense, China and Russia also agreed that theater 
missile defense systems, which were not prohibited by the ABM Treaty, should not be deployed 
in ways that harmed other countries’ security. In particular, the two countries declared that 
including Taiwan in a theater missile defense system was unacceptable.106 Between 1999 and 2001, 
China and Russia introduced three resolutions in the UN General Assembly calling for the ABM 
Treaty’s preservation, all of which received approval.107 
 For both China and Russia, ballistic missile forces helped to offset the U.S. military 
advantage. In a potential conflict, the possession by China and Russia of ballistic missiles 
introduced the risk of nuclear escalation, which could force the United States or another adversary 
to exercise restraint in deploying conventional military forces. If the United States were to deploy 
reliable missile defense systems, then it could eliminate the threat of nuclear escalation by 
adversaries. In this way, the United States could ensure that potential military clashes would 
remain at the conventional level, where it held huge advantages that were likely to endure.108 
Under these circumstances, China and Russia might have been forced to increase their investments 
in conventional military capabilities and means of countering missile defense systems.109 
China and Russia maintained their united diplomatic front on missile defense during this 
period, despite some differences in their national interests on the issue. Russia’s nuclear arsenal 
was much larger and more sophisticated than China’s. Therefore, although Russia opposed U.S. 
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efforts to revise the ABM Treaty or to withdraw from it altogether, Russian leaders remained 
largely confident that a limited U.S. national missile defense system, designed to protect the 
country against accidental launches or limited strikes by countries such as Iran or North Korea, 
would be unlikely to pose a serious threat to the Russian nuclear deterrent. Russia was thus willing 
to consider a deal with the United States to revise the ABM Treaty, especially because the United 
States had the option simply to abandon it. By striking a deal, Russia might be able to ensure 
deeper cuts in offensive strategic weapons than it could otherwise obtain. Putin was unwilling to 
strike such a deal during Clinton’s last year in office, but he held open the possibility of an 
agreement with Clinton’s successor. China, by contrast, feared that even a limited U.S. national 
missile defense system could threaten its nuclear deterrent.110 
China was also much more concerned than was Russia about theater missile defense 
systems. China was especially worried about the possibility of Taiwan being included in a theater 
missile defense system that the United States might deploy in Asia. This would be equivalent to 
the restoration of the U.S.-Taiwan defensive alliance, in the view of Chinese analysts.111 It would 
threaten the utility of China’s short-range missile forces for dissuading Taiwan from pursuing 
independence, pressuring Taiwan to negotiate reunification, or deterring the United States from 
intervening in a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. China also worried about Japan’s potential 
participation in a theater missile defense system, which could increase Japan’s access to advanced 
nuclear technologies. If Japan were to decide in the future to develop a nuclear weapons program, 
possession of such technologies could accelerate this development.112 
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China’s overall concerns about U.S. missile defense plans were greater than Russia’s.113 
This divergence of interests became clear later, when Putin mounted little resistance to President 
George W. Bush’s decision on December 13, 2001, to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. China had 
hoped to maintain a united stance with Russia on this issue, but Putin bowed to the inevitable 
during a period of warming U.S.-Russia relations following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001. Between 1999 and 2001, missile defense was an issue that stimulated increased cooperation 
on international issues between China and Russia, though their cooperation proved ineffective in 
changing U.S. policy.114 
 
Toward the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation 
 
 Throughout the 1990s, broad agreement on a series of international issues pushed China 
and Russia closer together. The nearly simultaneous eastward expansion of NATO and the 
upgrading of the U.S.-Japan security alliance influenced the establishment of the China-Russia 
strategic partnership in 1996. Russia supported China’s positions on Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, 
and China reciprocated by backing Russia’s policies in Chechnya. During the period 1999-2001, 
a series of events, especially the Kosovo War and U.S. pursuit of missile defense, showcased 
further areas of China-Russia agreement.115 
 The shock of the Kosovo war stimulated a debate in China during the second half of 1999 
about trends in international relations. This debate challenged many of the assumptions that had 
been prevalent throughout the decade. Among the main conclusions were that U.S. power was 
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more resilient than expected, that multipolarity would not arrive quickly, and that the United States 
posed a greater threat than Chinese leaders had previously appreciated, particularly in light of its 
emerging interventionist impulses and its plans for missile defense. Chinese strategists resigned 
themselves to the belief that the United States would retain its dominance for a considerable part 
of the twenty-first century. At the same time, they reaffirmed their belief that a new cold war was 
not inevitable and that peace and development would remain the main themes of international 
relations. The main lessons were that China should avoid confronting the United States too directly, 
which would be likely to harm its own interests, and should participate enthusiastically in 
globalization. In this environment, China would continue to find common ground with Russia, and 
the two countries would continue their long-term effort to promote multipolarity.116 
 In addition to common interests, the two men who led these countries at the beginning of 
this period, Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin, also played important roles. Although Yeltsin began the 
presidency of post-Soviet Russia determined to integrate his country into the West, he soon 
recognized the importance of relations with China. Yeltsin persisted in his diplomacy toward 
China despite domestic opposition stemming from such issues as the border negotiations, Chinese 
immigration, and the alleged “China threat theory.” As discussed previously, it was Yeltsin who 
proposed the phrases “constructive partnership relations” and “strategic cooperative partnership 
relations,” which the two countries adopted in 1994 and 1996, respectively.117 Even some of 
Yeltsin’s harshest critics gave him credit for his policies toward China. “One of the few successes 
of the Yeltsin foreign policy—he didn’t have many, but one of the few successes was in relations 
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with China,” said the late Mikhail Titarenko, the longtime director of the Institute of the Far East 
and an advocate of close Russia-China ties in the post-Soviet era.118 
  By the end of his presidency, Yeltsin’s frustrations with the United States had accumulated, 
and his growing warmth toward China was apparent. In addition to the aggravations in U.S.-Russia 
relations that resulted from the Kosovo War and U.S. missile defense plans, the United States also 
criticized Russia for its actions in Chechnya and for its relationship with Iran, including arms sales 
and support for that country’s nuclear program.119 Yeltsin, like many Russians, believed that the 
United States had treated Russia like a defeated power, rather than as an equal.120 During his final 
visit to China, in December 1999, Yeltsin responded harshly to Clinton’s condemnation of 
Russia’s actions in Chechnya. “Yesterday, Clinton permitted himself to put pressure on Russia,” 
he said. “It seems he has for a minute, for a second, for half a minute, forgotten that Russia has a 
full arsenal of nuclear weapons. He has forgotten about that.” Yeltsin added a further warning: “It 
has never been the case, and will not be the case, that he alone dictates to the world how to live, 
how to work, how to rest and so on. No, and again no. Things will be as we have agreed with Jiang 
Zemin. We will be saying how to live, not he alone.”121 
Despite the shock that this statement aroused in the West, especially given that Yeltsin was 
speaking in China, it soon became apparent that these words were a burst of emotion, typical of 
Yeltsin, which did not signal a change in Russia’s foreign policy course.122 U.S.-Russia relations 
had reached a low point, but Yeltsin continued to recognize the importance of this relationship 
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throughout his presidency. At the same time, he viewed China as a valuable partner in the attempt 
to restrain U.S. foreign policy. As he recalled in his memoirs, “China had always supported my 
concept of a multipolar world. The Russian-Chinese dialogue was one of the few levers that could 
turn the concept into a reality.” Yeltsin gave credit to his “meetings in shirtsleeves” with Jiang 
Zemin for the improvement in China-Russia relations.123 
 Yeltsin and Jiang played crucial roles in the development of China-Russia relations during 
the 1990s, but their successors continued to nurture the relationship. Several weeks after his 
election to the presidency in March 2000, Putin made clear that he, like Yeltsin, believed that 
Russia could turn to China as an outlet in order to relieve Western pressure. “If the West threatens 
us and frightens us with sanctions, then in fact it forces us to turn to the East, it pushes Russia in 
this direction,” he told journalists. “The West conducts the same policies in relations to those 
countries, which objectively can become our allies.”124 During Putin’s first year in the presidency, 
the two countries continued to engage in diplomatic coordination, though Russia’s reluctance to 
choose China as a partner over the United States limited their progress.125 Putin expressed his 
wariness about the implications of China’s growing power, and Asia’s economic rise more broadly, 
for Russia’s underdeveloped regions of Siberia and the Russian Far East during a visit to the region 
in July 2000. “If in the coming period we don’t make real efforts to develop the Far East,” Putin 
said, “then the Russian population a few decades from now will primarily speak Japanese, Chinese, 
and Korean.”126 
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Despite such concerns, Putin continued to cultivate China’s partnership. When Putin made 
his first visit to China as president in July 2000, he and Jiang reaffirmed their support for the 
development of a multipolar world.127 The two leaders reiterated that their countries held common 
views on a range of international issues, devoting special attention to the issue of missile 
defense.128 During this visit, Putin explained his approach in an interview with journalists: “We 
will give both European pragmatism and Asian wisdom their due, and therefore the foreign policy 
of Russia will be balanced.”129 He added that Russia should “lean on both wings—the European 
and the Asian” and that he considered relations with China to be “one of our main priorities.”130 
Later that year, Putin penned an article in which he argued that Russia, though it had never 
forgotten that most of its territory lay in Asia, nevertheless had failed to use this fact to its 
advantage in the past. In the future, he argued, Russia should develop political and economic 
cooperation with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region.131 
 While Putin sought balance in Russia’s foreign policy, leaning on the country’s eastern and 
western wings, a series of events in 2000 and 2001 caused U.S.-China relations to deteriorate 
further while raising expectations for improved U.S.-Russia relations. In early 2000, the people of 
Taiwan elected a pro-independence president, Chen Shui-bian. The winner in that year’s U.S. 
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presidential election, George W. Bush, called China a “strategic competitor” and criticized the 
Clinton administration for being too soft on China. On April 1, 2001, a Chinese fighter jet collided 
with a U.S. EP-3 surveillance aircraft that was flying in international airspace near the southern 
coast of China. The Chinese pilot was killed, but the U.S. Navy pilot successfully made an 
emergency landing on Hainan Island. China held the crew for ten days and carefully inspected the 
airplane and its components, including its surveillance technology. China released the crew after 
U.S. officials said that they “regretted” the incident, a statement that China portrayed to its own 
people as an apology. During that same month, the Bush administration announced an arms sale 
to Taiwan worth more than $12 billion. Bush also told a television interviewer that the United 
States would “do whatever it takes” to help Taiwan defend itself.132 
Meanwhile, Bush had entered office seeking to improve relations with Russia. Rather than 
emphasizing Russia’s domestic politics, Bush sought to reach agreement with Russia on issues of 
international security. Above all, he sought Russia’s agreement to a revision of the ABM Treaty 
that would allow the United States to build a limited missile defense system. Bush’s advisers also 
saw Russia as a potential partner in containing China, which the administration viewed as a rising 
power that posed a potential threat to U.S. security in the future.133 
Against this strategic background, China and Russia took important steps during the 
summer of 2001 to advance their relationship. In June, the Shanghai Five added a sixth member, 
Uzbekistan, and reconstituted itself as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Having 
originally come together in order to promote demilitarization and military confidence-building 
measures in the border regions, these countries now set up a permanent organization that would 
seek to combat what the Chinese called the “three evil forces” of separatism, extremism, and 
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terrorism. The SCO members agreed to set up a secretariat and an anti-terrorism center, both of 
which opened in 2004.134 
The progress in China-Russia relations during the first post-Soviet decade, including the 
two countries’ intensified cooperation on international issues during the period 1999-2001, 
culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation on 
July 16, 2001. The treaty summarized the consensus that the two countries had achieved regarding 
their relationship, including both bilateral and international aspects. It did not include a mutual 
defense clause and therefore did not signify the formation of a military alliance. However, it did 
contain some pledges that were typical of alliances.135 For example, Article 9 stated that if either 
party confronted the threat of aggression or perceived a risk to its peace and security, the two 
countries would immediately consult each other in order to eliminate such threats. 
 In recognition of the harm that both countries had suffered from the Sino-Soviet split, 
China and Russia sought to avoid repeating that history. The treaty therefore contained several 
clauses designed to prevent either country from harming the other’s interests. China and Russia 
promised not to use or threaten force against the other. They pledged not to join an alliance or bloc 
that would compromise the other’s sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, nor to allow any 
other party to use its territory for that purpose. They agreed to uphold the five principles of peaceful 
coexistence, including the commitment not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs.136 
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 Assessments of the 2001 treaty varied. Some analysts argued that it signified movement by 
China and Russia toward an alliance against the United States and the West, while others argued 
that the treaty was merely declaratory and had no practical meaning. The treaty clearly did not 
create an alliance. Unlike the treaties that the Soviet Union signed with China’s Nationalist 
government in 1945 and with the People’s Republic of China in 1950, the 2001 treaty did not 
contain a mutual defense clause, the crucial feature of formal military alliances.137 Instead, the 
treaty envisioned parallel action in areas in which their interests coincided.138 Despite the claim by 
China and Russia that their relationship was not directed against any third party, their frequent 
criticisms of U.S. “hegemonism and power politics” gave the relationship an unmistakable anti-
American coloration that had been present at least since the formation of the “strategic partnership” 
in 1996.139 Nevertheless, neither China nor Russia viewed the United States as an enemy. On the 
contrary, both countries sought economic and political cooperation with the West.140 Despite the 
downturn in U.S.-China relations between 1999 and 2001, China chose not to abandon the strategy 
of multilateralism and reassurance of neighbors that it had adopted starting in 1996, though some 
exceptions were apparent in Northeast Asia, where China experienced tensions in relations with 
Japan and South Korea.141 In the view of some Russian analysts, China was not even averse to 
“struggling with ‘hegemonism’ with others’ hands.”142 Nor did Russia renounce its search for 
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improved ties with the United States. The formation of a formal China-Russia military alliance, in 
the view of many analysts, would become likely only if both countries came to perceive a threat 
from the United States that they considered more dangerous than the consequences of renouncing 
cooperation with the United States and other Western countries.143 
 The decision by China and Russia to refrain from forming an alliance did not mean, 
however, that the treaty was devoid of meaning. In the view of some analysts, the 2001 treaty 
signified the formation of a China-Russia quasi-alliance. 144  The treaty’s provisions for 
consultations in the face of a threat to either country’s security raised the possibility that the two 
countries might act as allies in a crisis. Even if no such contingency were to arise, however, the 
treaty reflected a tendency that could become increasingly important in the future. This tendency 
was the desire of two great powers, both of which possessed nuclear weapons and held seats on 
the UN Security Council, to increase cooperation across a broad range of international issues on 
which they held similar views. China and Russia had not yet attained sufficient power to balance 
the United States effectively, but they could at least register their diplomatic opposition to certain 
trends in U.S. foreign policy.145 They could also avoid international diplomatic isolation. 
In the short run, while maintaining dialogue and cooperation with the United States 
whenever possible, the two countries could also resist U.S. foreign policy decisions that they 
opposed, in a pattern that one Chinese analyst called “struggle but don’t break, resist but don’t end 
up in a deadlock.”146 Through bilateral diplomatic coordination, China and Russia could rally other 
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countries to their side, possibly affecting U.S. calculations. The two countries could also signal to 
the United States that in the long run, as China continued its rise and Russia regained its strength, 
the two countries might eventually acquire the capabilities to constitute an effective 




 Between 1996 and 2001, China and Russia continued to make progress in their relationship. 
Through their agreements on demilitarization and confidence-building measures in the border 
regions, the two countries continued to consolidate their “strategic rear.” Their declaration on 
multipolarity in 1997 signaled their rejection of a U.S.-dominated international community that 
would censure governments for failing to meet standards of liberal democracy and human rights. 
Although this declaration amounted to rhetorical support rather than power aggregation, it 
demonstrated the growing convergence of the two countries’ national identities, as well as their 
common desire to refashion the international normative environment in a way that would be 
conducive to the pursuit of their great-power aspirations. 
 The world remained unipolar during this period, but both countries continued to view 
power in dynamic terms and to make projections for the future. The revival of Russia’s relative 
power still lay several years in the future, and national weakness therefore constrained the 
country’s options. During the early stages of his presidency, Putin appeared to conclude that 
Russia’s angry denunciations of U.S. foreign policy during the late Yeltsin era telegraphed 
weakness without achieving results. He therefore pursued a pragmatic approach toward relations 
with the United States. As discussed in the next chapter, he attempted to reorient Russia’s foreign 




meanwhile, enthusiastically analyzed trends in relative power, particularly during the debate on 
peace and development that occurred during the second half of 1999, following the war in Kosovo. 
Although Chinese strategists remained confident of their country’s long-term rise to power, the 
main conclusions that they drew from this debate were that U.S. primacy was likely to last for 
many years to come and that China’s rise would therefore be a lengthy process. This conclusion 
offered further support for Deng’s foreign policy of lying low and biding time. 
In the aftermath of the Kosovo War, some analysts in both countries proposed the 
formation of a China-Russia alliance. Although these arguments failed to carry the day in either 
country, both countries debated the idea more seriously than ever before in the post-Soviet era. For 
reasons discussed throughout this study, China and Russia refrained from forming an alliance and 
therefore eschewed “hard balancing.” Some scholars argue, however, that China and Russia 
engaged in “soft balancing” against the United States during this period. Instead of seeking to 
change the balance of power through traditional or “hard” balancing, states use soft balancing to 
seek the best possible outcome, from their perspective, within the existing balance of power. In 
this view, several actions by China and Russia during this period constituted soft balancing, 
including their formation of a strategic partnership in 1996, their opposition to the Kosovo War, 
resistance to U.S. missile defense plans, robust Russian arms sales to China, and the 2001 treaty.147 
Despite conceptual problems with the notion of soft balancing, which are discussed in Chapter 1, 
several instances of cooperation by China and Russia that occurred during this period fit scholars’ 
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description of soft balancing. Diplomatic coordination that falls short of balancing can still be 
significant for policymakers and is therefore worthy of analysis.148 
One approach is to assess the significance of the triangular relationship of the United States, 
Russia, and China during this period. In the view of one Chinese analyst, from the end of the Cold 
War until 1994, a period during which Russia actively sought to join the West, “triangular relations” 
did not exist in any meaningful sense. Beginning in 1994, however, the triangle began to reemerge. 
Tension in U.S. relations with both China and Russia pushed the two countries together, and Russia 
sought to use its relationship with China as leverage in relations with the United States.149 When 
China and Russia formed their strategic partnership in April 1996, Igor Ivanov, a career diplomat 
who was to succeed Primakov as foreign minister in 1998, argued that the triangle continued to 
exert influence.150 The two countries’ common concerns about U.S. power and foreign policy were 
apparent both in declaratory form, as in joint statements and common positions in the United 
Nations, and in Russia’s willingness to contribute to the buildup of China’s military capabilities 
through arms sales.151 
The limitations of such cooperation were apparent, however. The first form of cooperation 
was limited to rhetorical agreement. Despite the potential significance of this rhetoric for the 
shaping of the future world order, it was ineffective in changing U.S. foreign policy in the short 
run. Russia’s arms sales to China also had limited utility, both because the U.S. military advantage 
over China remained significant and because military coordination between China and Russia 
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lagged far behind that between the United States and its allies in NATO and the Asia-Pacific 
region.152 If true triangular diplomacy requires the ability of two countries to affect the third 
country’s foreign policy through bilateral diplomatic coordination, then the triangle seemed to 
have little meaning during this period. Despite Yeltsin’s desire to “lean on the shoulder of China” 
and his view of China as a “lever” that could promote multipolarity, China and Russia were unable 
to change U.S. foreign policy during this period, whether on NATO expansion, the Kosovo War, 
U.S. pursuit of missile defense, or other issues.153 
The U.S. intelligence community’s interest in China-Russia relations, which had subsided 
following the end of the Cold War, revived somewhat as a result of the diplomatic convergence 
between China and Russia at the close of the twentieth century. However, a U.S. National 
Intelligence Estimate, disseminated in September 2000, concluded that the implications of China-
Russia cooperation for U.S. strategic interests were marginal. China and Russia remained 
relatively weak in comparison to the United States, government analysts concluded, and the two 
countries remained reluctant to challenge the United States, despite their rhetoric.154 When China 
and Russia signed the 2001 treaty, the Bush administration professed its lack of concern.155 During 
the first post-Cold War decade, the notion of a powerful China-Russia partnership that could exert 
                                                          
152 Ларин. Китайская политика России при Президенте В.В. Путине. С. 17 [Larin, “Russia’s China Policy under 
President Putin,” 17]. 
153 Тренин. Китайская проблема России. С. 21 [Trenin, Russia’s China Problem, 21]; Bobo Lo, “The Russia-
China-US Triangle and its Post-Cold War Fate,” in Eurasia’s Ascent in Energy and Geopolitics: Rivalry or 
Partnership for Russia, China and Central Asia?, edited by Robert E. Bedeski and Niklas Swanström (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 37-38; Bobo Lo, A Wary Embrace: What the China-Russia Relationship Means for theWworld 
(Sydney: Penguin Random House Australia, 2017). 
154 “Russian-Chinese Relations: Prospects and Implications (Update),” U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, no. 
2000-10C, September 2000, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005526244.pdf. Cited in Robert Sutter, “Foreword,” in 
Michael S. Chase et. al, Russia-China Relations: Assessing Common Ground and Strategic Fault Lines, The 
National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report #66, July 2017, v. 
155 Jane Perlez, “White House Not Concerned About China-Russia Pact,” The New York Times, July 16, 2001. Cited 









From the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 to the War in Georgia 
 
 The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington occurred just 
months after China and Russia raised their bilateral relationship to new heights with the signing of 
the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation. The attacks changed the course 
of world politics, including relations within the U.S.-Russia-China triangle. On one level, the 
attacks unified the three countries, all of which faced threats from terrorism. At the same time, 
differences in the three countries’ national interests persisted. In the aftermath of the attacks, 
Russia tilted strongly toward the United States. This caused some Chinese policymakers and 
analysts to worry, as they had during the period following the breakup of the Soviet Union, that 
Russia would pursue a pro-Western foreign policy at China’s expense. 
 The post-September 11 U.S.-Russia honeymoon, however, proved short-lived. 
Disagreements between the two countries on a variety of issues, including the U.S. war in Iraq and, 
especially, the wave of color revolutions in the former Soviet Union, caused U.S.-Russia relations 
to deteriorate as the middle of the decade approached. China’s concerns that Russia, in the pursuit 
of closer ties with the West, would ignore China and leave it isolated therefore proved unfounded. 
Meanwhile, at virtually the same time that U.S.-Russia relations deteriorated, U.S.-China relations 
improved considerably. 
The net effect of these changes was that joint efforts by China and Russia to resist U.S. 
foreign policy on the global level, which were a focal point between 1999 and 2001, received less 
emphasis in the years following the terrorist attacks. At the bilateral level, China-Russia relations 




border dispute by 2004, and Russian arms sales to China remained strong until 2005. Yet the two 
countries also encountered some difficulties in their bilateral relations, particularly in their efforts 
to expand energy cooperation. During this period, therefore, China-Russia cooperation focused 
primarily on the regional level. The two countries found common cause in their opposition to color 
revolutions and to U.S. efforts to promote democracy abroad. This issue drew special attention in 
China-Russia relations when the upheaval reached Central Asia in 2005. 
The positive trends in U.S.-China relations continued during the years leading up to the 
2008 financial crisis. China continued to pursue a strategy of reassurance toward its neighbors, 
with some important exceptions, while the United States sought to engage China as a “responsible 
stakeholder” in the international system. By contrast, U.S.-Russia relations deteriorated further. 
Russian President Vladimir Putin harshly criticized the United States during a speech at the 
Munich Security Conference in February 2007, and Russia’s war with Georgia in August 2008 
brought the U.S.-Russia relationship to a new post-Cold War low. 
China and Russia continued to emphasize their support for a multipolar world, but their 
cooperation at the global level remained limited during this period, partly because the two 
countries’ relations with the United States were on different tracks. China offered some limited 
diplomatic support to Russia during the war in Georgia but declined to join Russia in recognizing 
the independence of two breakaway regions from that country. During this period, China-Russia 
energy cooperation was slow to develop, and Russian arms sales to China fell sharply after 2005. 
The financial crisis that began in September 2008, just one month after the war in Georgia, 







China and Russia Confront Terrorism, the Iraq War, and Color Revolutions (2001-2005) 
 
The impact of September 11, 2001 
 
 The war on terrorism that the United States waged in response to the September 11 attacks 
opened avenues for U.S. cooperation with Russia and China. The three countries enjoyed broad 
consensus in their opposition to terrorist organizations.1 Russia and China also saw an opportunity 
to strengthen U.S. support for their own struggles with terrorism. In the years following the attacks, 
the United States rewarded both countries for their support. The Bush administration curtailed its 
criticism of Russia’s domestic policies, including its conduct of the war in Chechnya.2 In August 
2002, the United States publicly classified the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a radical 
organization seeking independence for China’s northwestern region of Xinjiang, as an 
international terrorist organization linked to Al Qaeda.3 Terrorism was also an area of agreement 
in China-Russia relations. The two countries were already engaged in the struggle against terrorist 
threats and now vowed to strengthen their efforts.4 In the view of some analysts, the period 
following the attacks was one in which each country in the U.S.-Russia-China triangle had reason 
to welcome improvements in the bilateral relationship of the other two.5 
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Russia played an especially active role in assisting the U.S.-led war on terrorism. On the 
day of the attacks, Putin was the first foreign leader to call the White House to offer his support. 
Putin saw the attacks as an opportunity to improve relations with the United States following a 
downturn in this relationship during the final years of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency. Crucially, Putin 
gave his blessing to the establishment of U.S. and NATO military bases in Central Asia to support 
military operations in Afghanistan. Most of Putin’s top advisers opposed this step. Minister of 
Defense Sergei Ivanov, for example, argued against a U.S. military presence in Central Asia, 
warning that the United States would inevitably use this presence to promote democracy in the 
region.6 Putin himself was opposed until it became clear that he could not dissuade the leaders of 
the Central Asian countries from offering the United States access to their territories for military 
bases. On September 22, after meeting with his advisers in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, Putin 
called President George W. Bush to inform him that Russia would not object to U.S. military bases 
in Central Asia, on the condition that they would be temporary and used for fighting terrorism.7 
China also did not stand in the way of the U.S. military presence in Central Asia, despite the 
region’s proximity to its western border. 
Both Russia and China offered further support, though not military forces, for the war on 
terrorism. On September 24, Putin announced a five-point plan to support U.S. efforts. Putin 
offered to share intelligence, allow flights providing humanitarian assistance to use Russian 
airspace, work with the Central Asian countries to allow similar access to airspace in their region, 
participate in international search and rescue missions, and increase direct military and 
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humanitarian assistance to the Northern Alliance, the primary force in Afghanistan that the United 
States and its allies would rely upon to fight the Taliban.8 China played a less significant role than 
Russia’s but also took important steps. For example, China urged its close ally, Pakistan, to support 
U.S. efforts to topple the Taliban regime, even though Pakistan’s security and intelligence services 
had played a crucial role in creating it. China also offered aid to Pakistan with the aim of bolstering 
President Pervez Musharraf, who was sure to face domestic criticism for supporting the United 
States.9 
In the months following the attacks, Putin demonstrated that his diplomatic turn toward the 
United States was not limited to the war on terrorism. Putin soon announced that Russia would 
close its signals intelligence site in Lourdes, Cuba, and its naval base in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. 
Both decisions were driven by economic factors and the need to reduce Russia’s worldwide 
military presence, but the United States viewed both steps as gestures of goodwill. 10  More 
significantly, Putin also took a cooperative approach to arms control and to Russia’s relationship 
with NATO, two issues that had bedeviled U.S.-Russia relations during the preceding years. 
Putin’s cooperative approach generated optimism about a new era of warm U.S.-Russia relations, 
but it also aroused concerns in China. Chinese leaders were displeased with some of the 
concessions that Russia made toward the United States, disappointed that Russia had in their view 
failed to consult adequately with China before making these decisions, and convinced that Putin 
received little in return for his concessions. 
With respect to missile defense, an issue on which Russia and China had closely 
coordinated their diplomacy since 1998, Putin showed restraint in his opposition to U.S. plans. On 
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December 13, 2001, Bush informed Putin that the United States would withdraw from the 1972 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Under the terms of the treaty, the withdrawal would take 
effect six months later, leaving no restraints on the development of national missile defense 
systems. The Bush administration made this decision after failing to secure Russia’s support for 
amendments to the treaty that would have allowed the United States to build limited national 
missile defense systems to address threats from states such as Iran and North Korea.11 Putin 
acknowledged that the United States had the right to withdraw from the treaty, adding that “Russia, 
along with the U.S., as distinguished from other nuclear powers, has long had an effective system 
of overcoming anti-missile defenses. For this reason I can state with complete confidence that the 
decision taken by the president of the U.S. presents no threat to the national security of the Russian 
Federation.”12 
In the view of Chinese leaders and analysts, Putin effectively gave tacit approval to U.S. 
withdrawal from the treaty. This was disappointing to Chinese leaders. Together with their Russian 
counterparts, they had expended considerable diplomatic energy in recent years defending the 
treaty, which they regarded as a bedrock of strategic stability.13 The Chinese government, in 
contrast to Putin’s mild response, strongly condemned the U.S. decision. 14  The contrasting 
approaches of China and Russia to U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty revealed, once again, 
their diverging interests on this issue. Russian leaders were displeased with the U.S. withdrawal 
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but remained confident that their nuclear arsenal could overwhelm any potential U.S. national 
missile defense, thus preserving the Russian nuclear deterrent. In any case, Russia could not block 
the United States from abandoning the treaty. China, by contrast, was concerned primarily about 
U.S. deployment of theater missile defense in the Asia-Pacific region. Although the ABM Treaty 
did not prohibit the deployment of theater missile defense systems, China had hoped to maintain 
solidarity with Russia in support of the treaty as part of a joint effort to block U.S. missile defense 
deployment in any form.15 
Bush and Putin also reached agreement on the next stage of nuclear arms reductions. In 
May 2002, during Bush’s first trip to Moscow, the two presidents signed the Strategic Offensive 
Reductions Treaty (SORT). In this treaty, both countries agreed to reduce their arsenals to a level 
between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed nuclear warheads by December 31, 2012. 16  During his 
presidential campaign, Bush had proposed unilateral reductions of the U.S. nuclear arsenal to this 
level. Putin himself had previously announced that Russia would enact unilateral cuts to the level 
of 1,500 deployed nuclear warheads, a level that would have been even lower than the one 
envisioned in a potential START III agreement.17 Putin, however, did not wish to see the United 
States abandon the START arms control framework. During the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) conference in Shanghai in October 2001, he told Bush that he wanted the 
reductions formalized in a treaty. Bush eventually agreed.18 
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The resulting treaty, which was only three pages long, drew criticism from many arms 
control experts. It obligated the two countries to remove the warheads from missiles, but not to 
destroy them. Either side could simply store the excess warheads. The treaty also lacked the robust 
verification mechanisms that had been present in the START treaties.19 In the view of many critics, 
the treaty left the impression that the United States had devalued strategic arms control and signed 
the treaty merely as a gesture to satisfy Russia. Some Russian critics argued that Putin, by 
unilaterally announcing cuts to the level of 1,500 warheads, had removed any incentive for the 
United States to negotiate with Russia on arms control.20 China, which possessed a much smaller 
nuclear arsenal than either the United States or Russia, was not part of the arms control talks. 
Chinese leaders perceived an interest, however, in the continuation of U.S.-Russia arms reductions. 
 Bush and Putin also worked to forge a new relationship between NATO and Russia. Bush 
had already made clear, during a speech in Warsaw in June 2001, that he intended to pursue a 
second round of NATO expansion that was likely to include the three Baltic states of Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania.21 During that same summer, Putin suggested that Russia join NATO. Some 
current and former U.S. officials supported the idea, arguing that membership in the alliance could 
transform Russia into a partner rather than a dissatisfied revisionist state. However, the Bush 
administration did not pursue the idea. Russia’s future was still too uncertain, and many current 
and prospective NATO members continued to view Russia as a potential security threat. In 
addition, accepting Russia as a NATO member would have pushed the alliance’s boundary all the 
way to China’s border, a development with major ramifications for international security.22 As 
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they had during the early 1990s, Chinese leaders worried that Russian membership in NATO, or 
at least a close strategic accommodation between the alliance and Russia, would leave China 
isolated internationally. These concerns increased following the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
when Putin leaned strongly toward the West.23 
 Although the Bush administration opposed Russia’s bid for NATO membership, it still 
sought to improve relations between the alliance and Russia. The administration sought, in 
particular, to replace the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which was established in 
1997. The council had failed to function effectively during the Kosovo War and had generally 
failed to promote cooperation between the alliance and Russia. During the Rome summit of NATO 
heads of state in May 2002, which immediately followed Bush’s visit to Moscow, the alliance and 
Russia formed the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). Under the PJC’s “19 + 1” format, NATO’s 19 
member states had first reached decisions among themselves, then consulted with Russia. By 
contrast, the NRC would work in a format of 20, in which Russia would have the right to offer its 
advice before the member states made their decisions. Putin expressed his approval of the new 
arrangement.24 
During this same NATO summit, the alliance decided to admit seven new members in 2004. 
In addition to Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, the alliance would admit the Baltic states. 
This round of expansion was especially sensitive for Russia because the Baltics had constituted 
three of the Soviet Union’s fifteen republics, though the United States had never officially 
recognized their incorporation into the Soviet state. Poland’s accession to NATO had already 
brought the alliance’s territory into contact with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic 
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Sea, and now the alliance would border the Russian heartland. In the words of Yevgeny Primakov, 
the former Russian foreign minister and prime minster, “Russia remains staunchly opposed to 
NATO expansion, since it brings a military alliance right up to our borders for no real purpose.”25 
Nevertheless, Putin’s response to the second round of NATO expansion, like his reaction to the 
U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, was restrained.26 
On missile defense, NATO expansion, and other issues, Putin sought to break from the 
pattern typical of the Yeltsin years. Yeltsin would fulminate against a U.S. foreign policy decision 
that he opposed before inevitably backing down and accepting it.27 According to one theoretically 
based interpretation of Russian foreign policy during the period following the 2001 terrorist attacks, 
Putin and some of Russia’s leading national security strategists realized that the policy of 
multipolarity and opposition to U.S. foreign policy that Russia pursued during the preceding years 
had failed. During the Yeltsin era, Russia repeatedly put its credibility on the line by clearly stating 
its opposition to U.S. positions, but consistently failed to alter U.S. foreign policy. When Russia 
was forced to back down, often in humiliating fashion, it appeared weak. Putin knew that Russia 
eventually would be forced to compromise on issues such as U.S. withdrawal from the ABM 
Treaty and NATO expansion in any case. With Russia still in a relatively weak position, the 
September 11 terrorist attacks offered Putin an opportunity to make these compromises as part of 
an overall strategy of bandwagoning with the United States.28 
 Putin’s tilt toward the United States during this period, however, raised concerns in China. 
By abandoning Russia’s policy of the late Yeltsin years, when Russia strongly opposed the United 
                                                          
25 Примаков Е. Годы в Большой Политике. М.: Совершенно Секретно, 1999. С. 64 [Yevgeny Primakov, Years 
in Big Politics (Moscow: Sovershenno Sekretno, 1999), 64]. Quoted in Stent, The Limits of Partnership, 77. 
26 Stent, The Limits of Partnership, 78. 
27 Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, 323. 
28 William C. Wohlforth, “Revisiting Balance of Power Theory in Central Eurasia,” in Balance of Power: Theory 




States on withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and NATO expansion, Russia had, in the view of some 
Chinese critics, struck a blow to the China-Russia relationship and called into doubt whether this 
relationship would fulfill the promise of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and 
Cooperation.29 China would have preferred that Russia pressure the United States to abandon its 
planned deployment of missile defense, or at least limit the extent of such systems, and decline to 
expand NATO further. Above all, Chinese leaders wanted Russia to coordinate its positions more 
closely with their country. Ideally, the two countries would maintain a united front.30 
Russia’s decision to allow the United States to establish military bases in Central Asia also 
complicated China’s security situation.31 Chinese leaders, recognizing the benefits that would 
result from successful U.S. efforts to topple the Taliban and stabilize Afghanistan, did not seek to 
block the establishment of U.S. military bases in this region. Nevertheless, they harbored concerns 
about this deployment. Chinese leaders feared that a U.S. military presence in close proximity to 
China’s volatile provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet, deployed under the pretext of fighting the war 
on terrorism, eventually could become part of a strategy to encircle China and threaten its western 
frontier.32 
The pro-Western shift in Russia’s foreign policy caused some bewilderment for Chinese 
strategists, who were concerned about the stability and predictability of Russia’s diplomacy. 
Although Russia did not abandon its desire to improve relations with China, its tilt toward the West 
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nevertheless caused some cooling in relations with China during this period. Sympathetic Chinese 
analysts argued that Russia’s rapprochement with the West was not anti-China in character. Rather, 
at a time when China sought closer relations with Russia, Putin simply aimed to achieve 
equilibrium in relations with the United States and China.33 Nevertheless, Russian critics argued 
that Putin made concessions to the West too hurriedly and without adequate consultation with 
Chinese leaders. Although the Chinese government refrained from saying so publicly, Putin’s 
decisions caused some concern in China that Russia was returning to the pro-Western foreign 
policy of the Kozyrev years. In this case, China would find itself in the undesirable situation of 
facing the United States one-on-one, isolated in the international system. In time, China also came 
to believe that Russia received little or nothing in return for its unilateral concessions to the United 
States.34 
The May 2002 summit in Moscow proved to be the high point of the U.S.-Russia 
rapprochement following the September 11 attacks. In 2002 and early 2003, as the United States 
prepared to wage war against Iraq, cracks in the new U.S.-Russia partnership began to appear. 
This, in turn, encouraged Russia once again to pursue diplomatic outreach to China. 
 
The Iraq War 
 
 During his State of the Union Address in January 2002, at the height of the post-September 
11 U.S.-Russia rapprochement, Bush labeled Iraq, Iran, and North Korea an “axis of evil.” 
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Although the U.S. and Russian positions on the struggle against Al Qaeda and other terrorist 
organizations were aligned, the two countries disagreed on how to approach these countries. The 
Bush administration, like its predecessor, was annoyed by Russia’s continuing relationships with 
what it considered “rogue states.” Russia insisted that it was pursuing legitimate political and 
economic interests in its bilateral relations with each. It therefore resented U.S. efforts to stop 
Russia from doing business with them.35 Russia was also uncomfortable with the new National 
Security Strategy of the United States, published in September 2002, which claimed the right to 
engage in preventive war and called for the United States to maintain its dominant position in the 
international system.36 These differing views came to the forefront over the next year as the Bush 
administration built the case for war against Iraq. 
 Bush decided to take his case to the United Nations initially. On September 12, 2002, he 
addressed the UN General Assembly, where he called for an intensified international effort to 
confront Saddam Hussein’s regime over its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. 
Hussein had evicted UN weapons inspectors following the December 1998 bombing of Iraq, which 
President Bill Clinton had ordered. On November 8, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 
1441, which demanded that Iraq allow the weapons inspectors to return and threatened “serious 
consequences” if Iraq failed to cooperate. Russia and China voted for the resolution, which passed 
15-0.37 
Following the adoption of Resolution 1441, the Bush administration sought to build 
support for military action against Iraq among U.S. allies in Europe, as well as from Russia. Instead, 
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the United States quickly encountered opposition. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who 
had criticized the Bush administration’s contemplated invasion of Iraq during his successful 2002 
re-election campaign, announced that he would not support military action. Germany filled a 
rotating seat on the Security Council starting in January 2003. France, by contrast, was a permanent 
member and therefore had the authority to veto Security Council authorization of military action. 
French President Jacques Chirac also announced that he would oppose war against Iraq. France 
and Germany then competed with the United States for support from Putin, who was considering 
his options.38 
One possibility was for Russia to support the U.S. war in Iraq. The Bush administration 
decided in February 2003 to seek an additional UN Security Council resolution that would 
authorize military action against Iraq. This would have required Russia’s support, or at least its 
agreement not to veto the resolution. Despite Putin’s desire to strengthen relations with the United 
States, the option to support the war was unappealing for Russia in many ways. Russia’s support 
would have encouraged the use of U.S. military force, which Russia had an overall interest in 
restraining. The war in Iraq might have strengthened U.S. positions in the Middle East at Russia’s 
expense. It also threatened to strain Russia’s relations with the Muslim world and to produce 
negative consequences for Russia’s volatile and largely Muslim North Caucasus. On the other 
hand, opposing the United States would threaten the U.S.-Russia rapprochement and force a test 
of Russia’s relations with the most powerful country in the world.39 
On February 5, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the Security Council, urging 
members to support military action against Iraq to halt its alleged chemical, biological, and nuclear 
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weapons programs. Immediately following Powell’s speech, Putin flew to Berlin and Paris for 
meetings with Schroeder and Chirac, respectively. The German and French leaders made 
concerted efforts to gain Russia’s support.40 Putin therefore confronted a second option, namely to 
join France and Germany in publicly opposing the war. This approach offered diplomatic cover 
from major Western countries, allowing Russia to avoid diplomatic isolation should it choose to 
oppose the war. It also carried the promise of improved relations with Europe, a crucial economic 
partner for Russia.41 
A final possibility for Russia was to follow China’s example. China’s approach was to 
withhold support for war, but to act quietly, rather than waging a public diplomatic campaign to 
oppose military action against Iraq.42 On Iraq, as on other issues that did not directly affect its vital 
interests, China followed Deng Xiaoping’s admonition to “remain in the shadows” and “strive not 
to put oneself forward in any way.” China opposed the war publicly, but it did not strive to “play 
first violin in the anti-war orchestra.”43 Initially, China was concerned that Russia would support 
the war. If Putin had done so, this would have signaled that relations with the United States, not 
China, were Russia’s priority. In this case, Chinese leaders feared, Russia’s policies toward China 
would henceforth be heavily influenced by U.S. desires.44 
China’s initial concerns that Russia might support the war proved unfounded, however. 
Russia’s stance ultimately proved to be convergent with that of China. On February 19, Putin 
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spoke with Jiang Zemin by telephone to coordinate the two countries’ positions. The two leaders 
agreed that UN weapons inspectors should be allowed to continue their work to ensure Iraq’s 
compliance with Resolution 1441. They urged a peaceful solution to the crisis.45 Russia and China 
reiterated these principles during Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov’s visit to Beijing on February 27.46 
Notably, however, this visit also revealed a difference in the two countries’ views. Ivanov 
announced that Russia would, if the interests of international stability demanded it, veto a new 
Security Council resolution authorizing war in Iraq. China declined to join Russia in this 
proclamation, leaving open the possibility that it might abstain from such a resolution rather than 
exercise its veto power.47 It remained to be seen whether Russia would ultimately adopt China’s 
low-key diplomatic approach or express more outspoken opposition to the war. 
The United States expended most of its diplomatic efforts trying to win support from allies 
in Europe, but it also courted Russia. The Bush administration sent no high-level official to 
Moscow to make its case to the Russians. However, during February it offered several inducements 
to Russia, including assurances about the $8 billion in debt that Iraq owed Russia, a pledge that 
Russian companies would be allowed to participate in Iraq’s postwar reconstruction, and a vow to 
repeal the Jackson-Vanik amendment, legislation dating to 1974 that had made Russia’s most-
favored nation trading status contingent on its policies on Jewish emigration.48 In the end, Putin 
declined these offers, declaring that Russia would not bargain its foreign policy position in return 
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for economic favors, “as in an oriental market.”49 Primakov, who visited Iraq that same month, 
failed to convince Hussein to comply with the UN resolution and avoid a war that he was sure to 
lose .50 
 In the end, France and Germany succeeded in winning Russia’s support. Putin ultimately 
decided to take a strong diplomatic stand against the war, joining forces with these leading 
European powers. On March 5, 2003, Chirac and Schroeder appeared at a press conference with 
Putin to announce that all three countries would oppose a new Security Council resolution 
authorizing military force against Iraq. The three leaders called for UN weapons inspectors to 
receive additional time to continue their work. Thus, Russia was able to express its public 
opposition to the war in concert with leading Western powers who also opposed the U.S. position, 
rather than being forced to turn away from the West.51 The United States, realizing that its attempt 
to obtain a new resolution was futile, abandoned these efforts and initiated the war on March 20. 
That same day, Putin sharply criticized the U.S. decision for war. The invasion of Iraq would 
undermine the principle of state sovereignty, making all states feel insecure, he argued. He also 
said that international law should not be replaced by the “law of the fist.”52 Putin repeatedly warned 
of the dangers of unilateral action and called the war a mistake.53 
 Putin’s rhetoric echoed many of the complaints about U.S. foreign policy that Russia and 
China had made in numerous joint statements over the preceding years. Strikingly, however, in 
becoming part of the most vocal diplomatic bloc opposing the war in Iraq, Russia joined forces 
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not with its strategic partner, China, but with two major U.S. allies in Europe, France and 
Germany.54 To be sure, Russia and China differed not in their views on the war, but in their 
diplomatic tactics. During a telephone call on March 18, two days before the war began, Putin and 
newly elected PRC Chairman Hu Jintao agreed on their common approaches to the impending 
war.55 
China, however, was more restrained than Russia in its opposition. Several factors help to 
explain this difference. China’s overall foreign policy strategy was to maintain an amicable 
international environment, with a special focus on good relations with the United States, in order 
to pursue domestic modernization and economic growth. It therefore sought to insulate the U.S.-
China relationship from shocks by moderating its criticism of the United States for confronting 
third countries, such as Iraq, in which China had no vital national interests at stake.56 This was 
essentially the policy that China followed at the beginning of the Kosovo War. Only after the 
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade did China become more outspoken in its opposition. 
In the view of Chinese leaders, serious confrontations with the United States were not only 
unwelcome, but also unnecessary, given the favorable international environment that China faced 
at the beginning of the twenty-first century. During his report to the 16th National Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party of China in November 2002, outgoing Chinese leader Jiang Zemin 
declared that the first two decades of the twenty-first century would be a “period of strategic 
opportunities.”57 Yang Jiechi, who would later serve as China’s foreign minister, wrote that China, 
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during this period, was “not the focus of world contradictions” and therefore able to “concentrate 
its forces on modernization, gradually develop itself, and become stronger on a peaceful path.”58 
Another prominent Chinese scholar wrote that China’s best means of creating a counterweight to 
the United States was not to confront the United States directly or struggle against it, but to defend 
international norms on a multilateral foundation.59 
 When encouraging multilateral resistance to U.S. policies, China often had the luxury of 
allowing Russia to take the lead. In this way, Russia would bear the brunt of U.S. pressure. In the 
run-up to the war in Iraq, not for the last time, China followed this approach. Following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, Russia’s permanent seat in the UN Security Council was one of the few 
remaining attributes of great-power status that the  country continued to possess. Therefore, Russia 
had an especially strong stake in maintaining the UN’s decisive role.60 After the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq, Chinese strategists remained uncertain whether Russia would have taken a strong public stand 
against the war had France and Germany not done so first. Russia maintained closer diplomatic 
ties with France and Germany than did China. This factor helps to explain why China, while 
supporting the position of France, Germany, and Russia, refrained from joining their forceful 
public denunciation of the war.61 
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 Despite their disagreement over the war in Iraq, the United States and Russia sought, 
following the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime, to regain the positive momentum in the 
relationship that had existed prior to the war.62 Despite its earlier concerns about the impact that 
opposition to the war would have on relations with the United States, Russia paid no heavy price 
for its position. The Bush administration took an understanding view toward Russia. National 
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice’s position, which leaked to the media, was succinct: “Punish 
France, ignore Germany, forgive Russia.” Bush visited St. Petersburg in late May to attend the 
celebrations of the city’s three hundredth anniversary. “We will show the world that friends can 
disagree, move beyond disagreement, and work in a very constructive way to maintain peace,” 
Bush said. The Russian Duma ratified the SORT Treaty, an act that it had previously delayed as a 
sign of opposition to the war in Iraq.63 The war strained U.S.-Russia relations but did not cause 
them to rupture. 
 In the view of Chinese analysts, the war in Iraq caused some loosening, though no 
fundamental change, in the China-Russia strategic partnership.64 This trend continued following 
the toppling of Hussein’s regime, when Russia appeared to take a more cooperative approach than 
did China toward Iraq’s postwar reconstruction.65 Nevertheless, Russia and China both welcomed 
the U.S. willingness to assign responsibility for postwar reconstruction to the United Nations.66 In 
the view of some Chinese analysts, Russia lost much and gained little from its post-September 11 
rapprochement with the United States. In this view, in return for Russia’s accommodation of U.S. 
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positions on missile defense and NATO expansion, the United States ignored Russia’s objections 
to the war in Iraq and continued to squeeze Russia’s strategic space through NATO expansion. As 
a result, Russia realized that it needed to improve its relations with China to improve its bargaining 
leverage with the United States.67 However, a significant improvement of U.S.-China relations 
during this period limited the scope for China-Russia cooperation at the global level. 
 
U.S.-China relations improve 
 
 Around the turn of the twenty-first century, a series of events and trends produced tension 
in U.S.-China relations. These included the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, 
the growing power of pro-independence forces in Taiwan, and the EP-3 incident in April 2001. 
President George W. Bush, who had called China a “strategic competitor” during his presidential 
campaign, initially took a tougher line toward China than had the Clinton administration, 
especially during the second Clinton term. Bush increased U.S. support for Taiwan and made 
relations with U.S. allies in Asia a higher priority than relations with China.68 Following the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, China supported the U.S.-led war on terrorism but worried about a 
potential long-term U.S. presence in Central Asia, the region that abutted China’s western frontier. 
Despite these tensions that arose during this turbulent period, U.S.-China relations improved 
considerably during the first half of the decade. Both countries took steps that helped make this 
possible. 
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 By the middle of 2001, Chinese leaders concluded that it would be in their interest to 
improve relations with the United States. Despite confidence in their own country’s long-term 
prospects, they calculated that the United States was likely to remain the most powerful country 
in the world for a significant period to come. Under these circumstances, China should seek to 
avoid any further deterioration of the relationship. Chinese officials therefore sought to achieve 
common ground and to downplay differences with the United States whenever possible. Both the 
Chinese government and state media softened their criticism of the United States.69 The United 
States took some limited steps to reciprocate, most importantly by supporting China’s accession 
to the World Trade Organization in December 2001. By the time of the 16th Party Congress in 
September 2002, having reflected upon the conclusions of the debate on peace and development 
in 1999 in the light of subsequent events, Chinese leaders reaffirmed their strategy of lying low, 
avoiding direct confrontation with the United States, and exploiting their country’s twenty-year 
window of strategic opportunity.70 
 China also continued to pursue the foreign policy strategy, stressing multilateralism and 
reassurance of other countries, that it had embraced in 1996.71 During the early years of the new 
century, China continued to expand its ties with ASEAN, a process that had begun during the 
second half of the 1990s. In 2002, following four years of negotiations, China signed a declaration 
with ASEAN on a code of conduct for the management of offshore territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea. China made compromises to achieve this result, as the code of conduct largely adopted 
the ASEAN countries’ position on these issues. 72  In addition to its embrace of limited 
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multilateralism, China also grew increasingly aware of ways that it could use its growing economic 
might to increase its influence among countries in the Asia-Pacific region.73 
 Beginning around 2003, the Bush administration began to increase its focus on positive 
engagement of China. The difficulties that the United States faced in Iraq and in the war on 
terrorism, among other issues, may have contributed to the shift. The administration continued to 
be concerned about the long-term implications of China’s rise as a competitor to the United States, 
but U.S. officials hoped that engagement with China would channel its future behavior in 
constructive directions. 
Likewise, China continued to worry about U.S. pressure and possible attempts at 
encirclement, but nevertheless welcomed the increase in U.S. engagement. Chinese leaders 
believed that this policy served China’s interests in fostering a tranquil international environment 
during China’s period of “strategic opportunity.”74 According to one analysis by a leading Chinese 
foreign policy thinker, China opposed “hegemonic behavior” by the United States but could accept 
the fact of U.S. hegemony.75 In the view of one leading U.S. analyst, China’s foreign policy during 
this period demonstrated that it was a status quo power.76 However, Chinese strategists calculated 
that the difficulties facing the United States in foreign policy would cause U.S. soft power to 
decline, giving China additional room to maneuver. Even as they stressed the pursuit of common 
interests, Chinese leaders focused on the need to resist U.S. claims to unquestioned leadership in 
the realms of both power and values.77 
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Cross-strait relations were one area in which the U.S. adjustment was evident. Although it 
continued to offer Taiwan diplomatic support and arms sales, the Bush administration also took 
important steps to reassure China that it adhered to the one-China policy. The election in 2000 of 
Chen Shui-bian, the first president of Taiwan from a pro-independence party, raised the stakes. 
During a speech that he delivered during the summer of 2002, the Taiwanese president suggested 
that he viewed Taiwan as an independent country. His characterization of cross-Strait relations as 
“one country on each side” went well beyond Lee Teng-hui’s formula from three years earlier of 
“special state-to-state relations.”78 
The Bush administration rejected Chen’s statements, both during Deputy Secretary of State 
Richard Armitage’s visit to Beijing in August 2002 and during the summit between Bush and Jiang 
Zemin at Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas, two months later. With Chen’s provocative statements 
continuing throughout the run-up to the March 2004 presidential election, Bush took a strong 
public stand against Chen’s views during a visit to Washington by PRC Premier Wen Jiabao in 
December 2003. With Wen standing at his side during a press conference in the Rose Garden, 
Bush reaffirmed that the United States opposed actions by either the PRC or Taiwan to change the 
status quo unilaterally. He also criticized Chen’s policies and statements. Chinese leaders were 
pleased with Bush’s words. Chen was re-elected, however, prompting the PRC leadership, through 
the National People’s Congress, to pass an anti-secession law threatening “nonpeaceful” measures 
against Taiwan under specified conditions.79 
 During this period, China also began to play a more active role in international efforts to 
stop North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons. This issue returned to prominence on the 
international agenda following events at the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003. In late 2002, 
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the United States presented evidence that North Korea was seeking to produce highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) in violation of international agreements. North Korea denied the accusation, 
withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and resumed the reprocessing of spent fuel 
rods at the Yongbyon nuclear plant for the first time since the 1994 Agreed Framework had frozen 
this activity.80 
For the previous decade, China had played a largely passive role on the issue of North 
Korea’s nuclear program.81 However, the possibility of U.S. air strikes against North Korea, one 
of the countries that Bush had included in the “Axis of Evil,” encouraged China to become more 
active.82 China temporarily cut off oil shipments to North Korea during the winter of 2002-2003. 
Chinese leaders also suggested that their country’s defense commitment to North Korea, sealed in 
a 1961 treaty, would be conditional on North Korea’s international conduct. Beginning in April 
2003, China hosted three-party talks in which it participated along with the United States and North 
Korea. Eventually North Korea agreed to participate in the expanded Six Party Talks, which began 
in August and included Japan, South Korea, and Russia.83 
Russia had called for six-party talks since the mid-1990s. However, because Russia had 
lost much of its influence in the Asia-Pacific region following the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
including in Pyongyang, China in recent years had viewed Russia as a peripheral actor on the 
Korean peninsula. When Japan proposed the Six Party Talks in 2003, Russia supported the idea. 
Russia’s interests on the Korean peninsula differed in important respects from those of 
China. For reasons of both security and economics, Russia supported a “soft landing” for North 
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Korea and the gradual reunification of the peninsula. Russian strategists believed that such an 
outcome, by making an immense contribution to stability in Northeast Asia, would help to ensure 
the security of the Russian Far East. It could also stimulate the economy of the Russian Far East, 
especially if Russia could extend the Trans-Siberian Railway and a regional oil pipeline, which 
was then still under discussion, through the Korean Peninsula to link up with the dynamic economy 
of South Korea. As the weakest power in Northeast Asia, Russia sought to achieve balance among 
the great powers. Russia sought to contain Chinese power in the region, but it also sought to 
cooperate with China, as well as with Japan and South Korea, to check U.S. regional ambitions.84 
Nevertheless, Russia’s position converged with that of China. In both the run-up and in the talks 
themselves, Russia primarily coordinated its position with those of China and South Korea. In a 
series of joint statements, China and Russia stressed their shared commitment to denuclearization 
of the peninsula through peaceful means.85 For example, in a joint statement on May 27, 2003, 
Putin and Hu Jintao criticized North Korea for its pursuit of nuclear weapons but declared that 
“scenarios of power pressure or the use of force to resolve the problems existing [in Korea] are 
unacceptable.”86 
Despite Russia’s inclusion in the talks, the United States and China exerted the greatest 
influence on North Korea. The Six Party Talks yielded a joint statement, issued on September 19, 
2005, in which North Korea and the other parties committed to the denuclearization of the Korean 
peninsula. The agreement quickly broke down, however, as North Korea tested a long-range 
missile on July 4, 2006 and a nuclear device in October of that same year. China harshly 
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condemned both tests. 87  Although the Six Party Talks did not achieve North Korea’s 
denuclearization, they demonstrated that China was more engaged, and from the U.S. perspective 
more cooperative, than it had been on this issue previously. The bottom line, however, was that 
China was reluctant to put pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and missile 
programs. Instead, Chinese leaders called for the United States to offer North Korea a security 
guarantee as a starting point for discussions, and they encouraged the idea that the issue could be 
resolved through modest compromises.88 
Along with positive developments, a series of disagreements continued to create tension in 
U.S.-China relations during this period. For example, the U.S.-Japan “2+2” report, issued in 
February 2005, proclaimed that the two countries shared an interest in peaceful and stable relations 
across the Taiwan Strait. The two allies could hardly fail to share an interest in cross-Strait stability, 
given the island’s geographic proximity to Japan and the certainty that the United States would 
require the use of its military bases in Japan in any potential armed conflict over Taiwan. The 
Chinese leaders and people, however, recalled Japan’s imperial rule over Taiwan and opposed any 
suggestion that Japan might become directly involved in an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait.89 
The United States and Japan issued this report at a time when China-Japan tensions were running 
high over issues related to World War II history. At times, the hardening of China’s position toward 
Japan served as an important exception to the general pattern of a more reassuring Chinese foreign 
policy between 1996 and 2008. 
Nevertheless, like the Clinton administration that preceded it, the Bush administration 
gradually embraced the policy of engagement with China. The most prominent expression of this 
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policy viewpoint came in a speech by Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in September 
2005. Zoellick urged China to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system.90 
This position reflected the view that China’s cooperation was desirable, and increasingly necessary, 
in addressing a series of important international issues. It also reflected the belief that China’s 
acceptance of the international order, rather than its attempt to undermine or drastically reshape it, 
would serve both U.S. interests and the goal of international stability.91 The 2006 National Security 
Strategy of the United States reflected Zoellick’s arguments.92 
The commitment by both the United States and China to improve relations during this 
period, despite ongoing areas of tension, achieved notable results. One byproduct was that China-
Russia cooperation at the global level to resist the United States became a less pressing concern 
during this period than it had been between 1999 and 2001. China and Russia also achieved mixed 
results during this period at the bilateral level. Together, these factors combined to shift the focus 
of China-Russia cooperation onto the regional level, especially in Central Asia.93 
 
  
                                                          
90 Remarks of Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, “Whither China? From Membership to Responsibility,” 
New York, National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, September 21, 2005, https://2001-
2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm.  
91 Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, 148. 
92 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, 40-42. 
93 吴大辉：《中俄战略协作伙伴关系：十年实践的历史考察》，第 7-8 页 [Wu Dahui, “China-Russia Strategic 




Mixed results in China-Russia bilateral relations 
 
 Between 2001 and 2005, China and Russia achieved important successes, but also suffered 
frustrating setbacks, in their bilateral relations. In 2004, the two countries signed an agreement on 
the eastern section of their border. This agreement almost completely resolved the border issue, 
leaving only a few minor details to be settled four years later.94 Putin and the Russian leadership 
believed that settling the border dispute before the balance of power shifted further in China’s 
favor was the prudent course.95 Russian arms sales to China also reached new heights during this 
period, though the technological level of the weapons that China purchased increased only slightly 
compared to that of the 1990s. Important purchases included multipurpose Su-30MKK fighters, 
Sovremenny destroyers, and the S-300PMU-2 air defense system.96 
A number of setbacks, however, demonstrated lingering mistrust in the bilateral 
relationship. In 2004, against China’s objections, Russia granted a visa to the Dalai Lama to visit 
Buddhists in the Russian province of Kalmykia.97 The most important setbacks to China-Russia 
relations at the bilateral level occurred in the energy sphere. These included the failed attempt by 
Chinese energy companies to acquire equity stakes in Russian energy companies, as well as 
China’s frustrations in securing Russia’s commitment to build an oil pipeline to China. 
 China’s dependence on imported oil grew steadily after 1993, when the country became a 
net oil importer. To protect its energy security, it sought to diversify its sources of supply. 
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Following the 2001 terrorist attacks, China aimed to reduce its dependence on Middle Eastern oil 
supplies. As one means of diversifying supply, China sought to import oil and gas from Russia, 
eventually through newly constructed pipelines. China also expressed interest in acquiring equity 
assets in Russia’s upstream production. During the 1990s, when it enjoyed low oil prices, China 
showed little interest in securing upstream assets in Russia.98 By the early 2000s, its interest had 
grown. An opportunity seemed to present itself in 2002 when Russia, under pressure to repay its 
heavy sovereign debt, decided to sell Slavneft, a state-owned company that possessed modest oil 
reserves, mostly in West Siberia, but had suffered from mismanagement. 
At the invitation of the Kremlin, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 
prepared a bid for the upcoming December 2002 auction. Initially, CNPC was optimistic about its 
chances because no Western companies were bidding and CNPC had greater financial resources 
than its two leading Russian competitors, Tyumen Oil Corporation (TNK) and Sibneft. CNPC’s 
bid reportedly enjoyed the support of Putin, who wanted to prevent Slavneft from falling under the 
control of Sibneft and its owner, Roman Abramovich, a wealthy oligarch loyal to the Yelstin-era 
“family,” which was in competition with Putin’s St. Petersburg faction.99 Nevertheless, CNPC’s 
attempt to purchase Slavneft drew intense nationalistic opposition in Russia. 100  The Duma 
overwhelmingly passed a bill preventing any foreign company with more than 25 percent state 
ownership from participating in the privatization of Russian enterprises.101 CNPC withdrew its 
offer. Sibneft and TNK bought Slavneft for $1.86 billion, much less than the $3 billion that CNPC 
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was reportedly prepared to pay for a 74.59 percent stake.102 Later, in the summer of 2003, CNPC 
won a bid for the Stimul oil company, but Gazprom, a state-run gas company, mounted a legal 
challenge to the takeover and succeeded in pressuring CNPC to pull out of this deal.103 Both bids 
ultimately failed largely because of Russian concerns about the national security implications of a 
Chinese state-owned energy company controlling Russia’s strategic energy assets.104 
 China’s efforts to secure the construction of an oil pipeline from Russia initially 
encountered several years of frustration as well. Russia raised the possibility of an oil pipeline to 
China as early as 1994.105 However, oil prices were low during the 1990s, emboldening China to 
take a hard line in price negotiations with Russia while remaining reluctant to commit to the 
construction of costly infrastructure.106 As the twentieth century came to an end, however, world 
energy prices rose, due in part to China’s own increased energy demand, causing China to become 
increasingly concerned about its energy security and to sharpen its interest in oil and gas pipelines 
from Russia.107 In 1999, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov and Chinese Premier Zhu 
Rongji agreed that the two countries would conduct an initial feasibility study for an oil pipeline 
that would extend from Angarsk in Siberia to Daqing in northeastern China.108 In July 2001, the 
two countries signed an agreement to build the oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daqing.109 The 
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pipeline, which was to be completed by 2005, would cost $1.7 billion. It would carry 20 million 
tons per year from 2005-2010 and 30 million tons per year from 2010-2030.110 
 Soon, however, China faced competition from a competing route with Japan’s support. In 
2002, Russia’s state pipeline monopoly, Transneft, proposed the construction of an export pipeline 
from Angarsk to the port of Nakhodka on Russia’s Pacific Coast. Transneft officials argued that 
this route would have important economic advantages over the Angarsk-Daqing line. The oil 
pipeline to China would be cheaper to build, but it could serve only one market. A pipeline to 
Russia’s Pacific Coast, by contrast, would allow Russia to export oil not only to Japan, but to the 
entire Asia-Pacific region, thus contributing to strategic diversity in Russia’s energy export policy. 
This option would avoid excessive dependence on the China market and thus prevent China from 
gaining the upper hand in price negotiations.111 
In January 2003, Japan offered Russia large-scale financial support to build the pipeline to 
the Pacific. This support included $5 billion for construction of the pipeline, which would have a 
capacity of 80 million tons per year, much greater than the proposed line to China. Japan offered 
an additional $2 billion to finance oil exploration in Eastern Siberia. In May 2003, just days after 
Putin and Hu Jintao had endorsed the Angarsk-Daqing route during the Chinese leader’s visit to 
Moscow, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made his own visit to the Russian capital. 
During this meeting, Putin made clear that he was already having second thoughts about the 
pipeline to China and was intrigued by the Pacific route.112 Russia perceived that it could play off 
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China and Japan against each other to obtain maximum financial support for the eventual pipeline 
project, while also increasing its geopolitical clout in the Asia-Pacific region.113 
 In the negotiations over a proposed pipeline to China, the Yukos oil company, owned by 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, initially played a leading role. In May 2003, Yukos reached agreement 
with CNPC on the construction of the Angarsk-Daqing oil pipeline. Under this deal, Russia would 
supply China with a total of 700 million tons of oil for $150 billion over 25 years.114 However, 
this agreement soon fell apart when the Russian state attacked Yukos. Following his election to 
the presidency, Putin was determined to harness Russia’s vast energy resources to increase his 
country’s global clout. In pursuit of this objective, he sought to expand state control of the energy 
sector.115 The attack on Yukos was a crucial event in this process. 
During the first year of his presidency, Putin warned Khodorkovsky and other “oligarchs” 
who made their fortunes in questionable privatizations during the tumultuous 1990s to stay out of 
politics. Khodorkovsky ran afoul of the Kremlin by defying this directive. In February 2003, 
during a meeting broadcast on live television, Khodorkovsky confronted Putin over alleged 
corruption in the acquisition of Northern Oil by Rosneft, a state-owned oil company. 
Khodorkovsky alleged that Sergei Bogdanchikov, the CEO of Rosneft and a friend of Putin, 
overpaid for Northern Oil with state money.116 Khodorkovsky also attempted to set up a power 
base to rival the Kremlin and funded opposition parties such as Yabloko.117 Yukos negotiations 
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with China irritated Putin, who believed that the Russian government, not a private oil company, 
should make decisions about export pipeline routes.118 Khodorkovsky also expressed interest in 
selling parts of Yukos to Western oil majors such as Chevron or Exxon-Mobil. Putin feared that 
such a transaction would give foreign companies an unacceptable level of control over Russia’s 
strategic energy sector, potentially including indirect control over an export route.119 During the 
summer of 2003, the Kremlin began its assault on Yukos, culminating in Khodorkovsky’s arrest 
in October of that year and the subsequent dismantling and state takeover of the company. 
During 2003 and 2004, Russia appeared increasingly inclined to construct the Pacific route. 
Japan raised the stakes, indicating that it would provide as much as $15 billion of investment. This 
would have been a greater net investment than China was offering, even accounting for the 
considerably higher cost of the Pacific route.120 This investment would be spread out along a 
longer route through economically struggling provinces in Siberia and the Russian Far East, a point 
that Japan stressed as it cultivated local Russian elites in these regions.121 China, meanwhile, 
insisted that it would not invest in an oil pipeline extending to Russia’s Pacific coast without a 
branch to Daqing.122 In December 2004, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov announced that 
Russia would build the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline to its Pacific coast. To allay 
concerns that the pipeline would pass too close to Lake Baikal, the Russian government announced 
that the pipeline would begin at Taishet, 250 kilometers northwest of Angarsk, and terminate at 
Perevoznaya Bay, not far from Nakhodka.123 
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On the very same day, Russian Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko said that CNPC might 
be offered a 20 percent stake in Yuganskneftegaz, the main production unit of Yukos that the 
Russian government was then endeavoring to bring under state control by seizing it as payment 
for back taxes that it claimed Yukos owed.124 Many observers speculated that this offer was 
compensation for Russia’s decision to renege on the agreement to build the Angarsk-Daqing 
pipeline.125 China declined the offer for a minority stake in a unit that would soon be integrated 
into the largely state-owned Rosneft. Instead, it secured a commitment by Rosneft to ship 48.4 
million tons of oil to China by rail from 2005 to 2010.126 These shipments would serve as collateral 
for a $6 billion loan provided by Chinese banks to help finance Rosneft’s $9.4 billion purchase of 
Yuganskneftegaz.127 Although China welcomed these rail shipments of oil, a pipeline would offer 
a more stable, long-term, and cost-effective source of supply.128 
 Russia’s turn toward the Pacific route was frustrating for China, but China remained patient. 
To increase the pressure on Russia, China sharpened its interest in a Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, 
an idea which made steady progress.129 China and Kazakhstan began construction on this pipeline 
in September 2004, and the line was completed in December 2005.130 In April 2005, Khristenko, 
the Russian energy minister, announced that the first stage of ESPO construction would connect 
Taishet with Skovorodino, a city located near the border with China. This left open the possibility 
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that the pipeline spur from Skovorodino to Daqing might be built prior to ESPO’s extension from 
Skovorodino to Russia’s Pacific Coast.131 
 The pipeline saga reflected Russia’s struggle to maximize the economic gains from its oil 
resources, but it also had geopolitical implications. Russia hoped not only to maximize profits, but 
to use pipeline export routes to increase its political influence in the Asia-Pacific region, which 
had waned following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Although Russia’s relations with China 
were warming, Russian leaders sought to maintain geopolitical balance by cultivating relations 
with Japan and other major countries in the economically dynamic Asia-Pacific region. Some 
Russian analysts warned, however that Russia’s wavering on the pipeline route, especially 
following the Slavneft and Stimul episodes, could cause China to lose confidence in Russia and 
exert a harmful effect on the bilateral relationship.132 
 
The color revolutions 
 
 The United States and Russia sharply disagreed over the war in Iraq, causing strains in their 
post-September 11 rapprochement. Nevertheless, it appeared initially that the war would not cause 
the relationship to rupture. In the months following the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the 
United States and Russia sought to put their relationship back on track. However, a series of 
popular revolts in the former Soviet Union that became known as “color revolutions” caused far 
more serious damage to U.S.-Russia relations. The first color revolutions were the Rose 
Revolution in Georgia, which occurred in late 2003, and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, which 
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took place one year later. In both cases, popular demonstrations against election fraud brought 
democratic, pro-Western forces to power. 
Russia was concerned about these developments because they threatened to erode Russia’s 
influence in former Soviet territories and, at least conceivably, to become a model that opposition 
forces in Russia might seek to emulate. China remained uninvolved in diplomacy between the 
United States and Russia at the time of the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. When the upheaval 
spread to Central Asia in the spring of 2005, however, China began to play a more active role. 
Russia and China shared an interest in preventing color revolutions in Central Asia, fearing that 
they would lead to instability and chaos. The color revolutions caused a sharp downturn in U.S.-
Russia relations, but this trend occurred simultaneously with a significant improvement in U.S.-
China relations. As a result, the focus of China-Russia cooperation shifted to the regional level, 
especially in Central Asia.133 
 The Rose Revolution occurred in the wake of Georgia’s parliamentary elections on 
November 2, 2003. The elections pitted Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze’s party against 
opposition forces. Shevardnadze had served as Soviet foreign minister under Mikhail Gorbachev, 
whose efforts to improve relations with the West as part of “New Thinking” had led to the end of 
the Cold War. In the fall of 2003, several former members of Shevardnadze’s party who had grown 
disillusioned with corruption now led the opposition. Mikheil Saakashvili and the other opposition 
leaders were pro-Western and sought Georgia’s membership in NATO and the European Union. 
After the polls closed, the Central Election Commission, which was stacked with Shevardnadze 
supporters, announced that the president’s party had won a plurality of votes. Observers from the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), however, said that the elections 
                                                          
133 吴大辉：《中俄战略协作伙伴关系：十年实践的历史考察》，第 7-8 页 [Wu Dahui, “China-Russia 




failed to meet international standards. The opposition mounted large demonstrations, and its 
leaders, carrying roses, disrupted the opening session of parliament on November 22, insisting that 
Shevardnadze resign. Russia sent Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, who had worked for Shevardnadze 
in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, to seek a solution. Shevardnadze agreed to a compromise that 
would keep him in power. After he later reneged on the deal, continued demonstrations by the 
opposition forced him to resign. On January 4, 2004, Saakashvili was elected president.134 
 Saakashvili vowed to improve relations with Russia, but this relationship quickly 
deteriorated. Saakashvili’s priorities, which were to integrate Georgia into Euro-Atlantic 
organizations and reassert central control over the country’s breakaway regions, were at odds with 
Russia’s preferences. Saakashvili also sought close relations with the United States, which viewed 
him as an example of the success of U.S. democracy promotion. Although the United States had 
sought to mediate between Shevardnadze and the opposition during the months leading up to the 
parliamentary elections, even urging the opposition not to mount large street demonstrations, many 
critics in Russia accused the United States of supporting the revolution with the aim of increasing 
its own influence along Russia’s borders.135 
 The Orange Revolution in Ukraine created even greater tensions in U.S.-Russia relations. 
In this case, it was the presidential election of November 2004 that stimulated the revolution. 
Russia supported the candidacy of Viktor Yanukovych, the chosen successor of departing 
President Leonid Kuchma. His main opponent was Viktor Yushchenko, a pro-Western candidate. 
Seeking to avoid a repeat of the events in Georgia, Russia invested considerable resources into 
Yanukovych’s campaign. The United States, rather than endorsing either candidate, stressed that 
the election should be free and fair. To this end, USAID invested $1.4 million in election-related 
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activities. The Soros Foundation spent $1.3 million funding Ukrainian NGOs. More than two 
months before the election, Yushchenko suffered poisoning by dioxin, leaving his face disfigured. 
The poisoning remained unsolved, but an investigation revealed that the dioxin had come from a 
Soviet-era laboratory.136 
After an inconclusive first round of elections, the second round was held on November 22. 
Two days later, the Central Election Commission declared Yanukovych the winner, even though 
exit polls and parallel vote counts by NGOs showed that Yushchenko had prevailed. The orange-
clad opposition forces, eventually one million strong, mounted a protest on the central Maidan 
Square. Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that the election results were illegitimate. 
Following mediation efforts by EU high representative Javier Solana, Russian Duma Speaker 
Boris Gryzlov, and the presidents of Poland and Lithuania, the Ukrainian Supreme Court declared 
the election results invalid and scheduled a new election for December 26. This time, Yushchenko 
was declared the winner.137 
Russia’s careful attempt to engineer a favorable outcome had failed. Many critics in Russia 
argued that the United States was the driving force behind the Orange Revolution. The Russian 
government subsequently enacted measures designed to ensure that no such revolution would 
occur in Russia, including the formation of the pro-Kremlin Nashi youth group and restrictions on 
foreign NGOs. Russia was also concerned that the West would seek to pull Ukraine into its orbit, 
thus weakening Russia’s influence in former Soviet territories.138 If Ukraine were to join the West, 
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one Russian analyst warned, then Russia would be reduced to the old duchy of Muscovy and would 
be no better than a third-rate power on the international stage.139 
The color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine were an important turning point in U.S.-
Russia relations. Several U.S. officials, reflecting upon the evolution of U.S.-Russia relations 
during the Putin era, identified the Orange Revolution, in particular, as the crucial turning point in 
Putin’s perceptions of the United States. U.S. support for the revolution, in Putin’s view, threatened 
Russia’s attempt to build a sphere of influence in former Soviet territories.140 The color revolutions 
seemed to fit the declared U.S. aim of promoting democracy, which had been part of the 
justification for war in Iraq and later became part of the Bush administration’s “freedom agenda.” 
During Bush’s Second Inaugural Address, which he delivered in January 2005, just weeks after 
the Orange Revolution, Bush declared that the freedom agenda would define his foreign policy.141 
Russian leaders and analysts viewed this agenda skeptically, believing that democracy promotion 
was a cover for the pursuit of U.S. geopolitical goals, including the reduction of Russian power.142 
In the years to come, both Georgia and Ukraine became flashpoints in a deteriorating U.S.-Russia 
relationship. 
China, meanwhile, remained on the sidelines as the color revolutions unfolded in Georgia 
and Ukraine. However, when the upheaval arrived in Central Asia in the spring of 2005, China 
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perceived that it could no longer stand to the side.143 The important events in this process were the 
Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in March and Uzbekistan’s bloody crackdown on an uprising in 
Andijan in May. China’s active diplomacy on this issue included significantly increased 
cooperation with Russia to resist color revolutions in Central Asia. 
The Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan erupted following two rounds of parliamentary 
elections, held in February and March 2005, which observers viewed as fraudulent. Under the 
presidency of Askar Akayev, who had ruled the country since independence, corruption increased 
steadily. Akayev’s political opponents feared that he would employ fraud to secure the election of 
a parliament that would change the constitution and allow him to remain in office. Following mass 
protests in Bishkek, the capital, as well as in Jalal-Abad and Osh, Akayev and his family fled to 
Russia through Kazakhstan. Kurmanbek Bakiyev, a former prime minister, won the newly 
scheduled presidential election. The revolution in Kyrgyzstan differed from those in Georgia and 
Ukraine, where pro-Western leaders took power. The opposition in Kyrgyzstan had no clear pro-
Western proclivities and no clear commitment to democratic reform. The major U.S. concern was 
its military base at Manas airport near Bishkek, which supported U.S. operations in Afghanistan. 
Bakiyev raised the issue of an eventual U.S. departure from the base during his first press 
conference, but he soon agreed to allow the U.S. military to remain. The United States and Russia 
were not aligned with opposing sides, as they had been in Ukraine, so the Tulip Revolution did not 
become a source of diplomatic conflict between the two countries.144 
The next country in Central Asia to face domestic upheaval was Uzbekistan, where a 
domestic uprising occurred in the eastern city of Andijan in May 2005. No color revolution 
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occurred here, however, as the ruling regime employed repressive measures and survived. The 
precipitating event was the upcoming verdict for twenty-three businessmen who belonged to 
Akramiya, an Islamist organization, and stood accused of “extremism, fundamentalism and 
separatism.” As the verdict approached, supporters of the businessmen gathered in the central 
square outside the courthouse. During the night following the businessmen’s conviction, a group 
of armed men broke into the prison and freed them before entering government buildings and 
taking officials hostage. On the evening of the following day, after Karimov flew into Andijan to 
observe the situation firsthand, government forces opened fire on the protesters in the square, 
killing many of them.145 The government of Uzbekistan claimed that its forces killed 187 people, 
all of whom were Islamist terrorists or insurgents who posed a threat to the government. Human 
rights organizations disagreed, claiming that around 800 people, mostly innocent civilians, were 
killed. 146  Uzbekistan rejected calls by the United States and the European Union for an 
independent investigation of the events in Andijan, and the exact circumstances remained 
murky.147 
The Andijan events and the ensuing U.S. criticism of Uzbekistan’s government provided 
an opportunity for Russia to regain influence in Tashkent. Russia seized this opportunity in 
cooperation with China and its other partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). 
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States had gained access to the Karshi-
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Khanabad (K2) military base in Uzbekistan, which supported operations in Afghanistan. Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who had negotiated U.S. access to the base, supported Karimov 
following the events in Andijan, but most other top U.S. officials criticized the Karimov regime’s 
repression. Karimov, who was infuriated by the criticism, began to consider evicting the U.S. 
military from the Karshi-Khanabad base. 
Uzbekistan appealed for and received diplomatic support from Russia, China, and the other 
members of the SCO. Although Karimov consistently sought to maintain Uzbekistan’s foreign 
policy independence, these countries were attractive partners for him, in the aftermath of the 
Andijan events, because they were willing to provide diplomatic support for his regime without 
lecturing him on democracy and human rights.148 During the summit of heads of state that was 
held in Astana, Kazakhstan, in July 2005, the SCO issued a declaration calling for outside actors, 
a clear reference to the United States and its NATO allies, to establish a timetable for withdrawal 
from their military bases on the territory of SCO member countries.149 Karimov made the original 
proposal, which Russia enthusiastically embraced. It eventually received support from the other 
members, including China.150 Later that month, Uzbekistan ordered U.S. forces to withdraw from 
the K2 military base within six months. In November, one week after the U.S. withdrawal from 
the base, Uzbekistan signed a treaty of alliance with Russia and re-joined the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO), from which it had withdrawn in 2002. Kyrgyzstan, which suddenly 
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became the lone remaining host country for a U.S. base in Central Asia, sought and received a 
substantial increase in rent from the United States.151 
This series of events represented a setback for U.S. influence in Central Asia, which had 
increased significantly along with the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan. The primary 
beneficiary of the weakened U.S. position was Russia, which took advantage of the unexpected 
turn of events to improve its relations with Uzbekistan and thereby recover some of its lost 
influence in Central Asia.152 Russia attributed the color revolutions to U.S. plots to replace existing 
Central Asian elites, who had come to power during the Soviet era and were largely sympathetic 
to Russia, with pro-Western elites, thereby enhancing U.S. influence in the region at Russia’s 
expense. Opposition to color revolutions therefore became a priority for Russian policy toward 
Central Asia.153 Moreover, some Russian analysts warned, the United States had no intention of 
forming an equal partnership with Russia and would instead seek to foment a color revolution in 
Russia itself.154 
The SCO’s response to the events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan also indicated growing 
cooperation by Russia and China to limit U.S. influence in Central Asia.155 Both countries accepted 
the U.S. military presence in Central Asia, which promised to weaken terrorist groups in the region 
and thereby increase their own security, provided that its duration remained limited. Chinese 
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analysts, however, perceived worrying signs that the United States was preparing for a long-term 
presence.156 Moreover, both countries used the SCO vote to express their opposition to further 
color revolutions in Central Asia.157 Like Russia, China viewed the color revolutions skeptically, 
fearing that they would lead to chaos, not stability. Chinese analysts portrayed the color revolutions 
as part of the Bush administration’s strategy to strengthen the U.S. “hegemonic” position and to 
contain China and Russia.158 If these revolutions were successful, from the U.S. perspective, then 
the new regimes that emerged would be pro-Western and less friendly toward China than their 
predecessors, as well as less inclined to play active roles within the SCO.159 China was concerned 
that democratic movements in Central Asia would spread across the border into its own western 
province of Xinjiang, potentially causing instability.160 The convergence of Russian and Chinese 
attitudes toward the color revolutions led some Western analysts to perceive an emerging 
confrontation between Western support for democracy and authoritarian forces led by Russia and 
China.161 The common position that China and Russia held toward the color revolutions was 
another example of the way in which overlaps in national identity had driven the two countries 
together and strengthened their partnership.162 By 2005, common concerns about U.S. policies and 
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values had forged a durable, if limited, partnership between China and Russia.163 The two countries 
continued to express this convergence of views in cooperation at the global level. 
 
China-Russia cooperation at the global level in 2005 
 
During this period, China-Russia strategic cooperative relations focused primarily on the 
regional level, especially in response to the threat of color revolutions in Central Asia. However, 
the two countries continued to engage in cooperation at the global level as well. During the summer 
of 2005, the two countries issued another joint declaration on the international order and held their 
first joint military exercises. 
On July 1, during Hu Jintao’s visit to Moscow, the two countries’ leaders signed a joint 
declaration on world order in the twenty-first century. 164  This declaration stressed the two 
countries’ convergent views on several major international issues and asserted that “peace and 
development” were still the main themes of the era. In contrast with the statement on multipolarity 
that China and Russia had issued in 1997, this declaration not only elucidated the two countries’ 
common views, but also emphasized their historic responsibility for establishing a new 
international order.165 Like the 1997 document, this statement called for a multipolar world. The 
two countries, were, however, undergoing changes in their approaches to multipolarity. China, 
which argued strenuously for multipolarity during the 1990s, reduced its rhetorical emphasis on 
this point during the 2000s. One reason was that Chinese analysts, though they perceived the rise 
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of power centers around the world, had concluded that the current international structure of “one 
superpower, many great powers” was nevertheless likely to last for a long period to come.166 
Another reason was that China, especially after joining the World Trade Organization, was reaping 
substantial benefits from its participation in the existing international order.167 Finally, China 
shifted its emphasis from multipolarity to seeking increased leverage with both Russia and the 
United States.168 Russia, by contrast, warmed to the idea of multipolarity, viewing it as a way to 
recover its great-power status.169 For precisely this reason, Russia opposed not only unipolarity, 
but also the formation of a new U.S.-China bipolarity, which threatened to marginalize Russia in 
international affairs.170 
In another apparent sign of increased international cooperation, China and Russia held their 
first-ever joint military exercises in August 2005. These exercises, called Peace Mission 2005, 
were conducted under SCO auspices. They involved just over 10,000 soldiers, more than 90 
percent of whom were Chinese, as well as 140 naval ships and submarines, Russian Tu-22M long-
range bombers, and Tu-95 strategic bombers. Military leaders from both China and Russia said 
that the drills, which the participating countries conducted on China’s Shandong Peninsula and in 
the surrounding waters, simulated the deployment of troops to restore order in a third country 
facing large-scale ethnic unrest.171 They said that the exercises were designed to strengthen the 
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two countries’ capabilities to fight terrorism and extremism jointly and were not directed at any 
third country. For China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the exercises also offered an 
opportunity for training in the use of weapons systems that China had purchased from Russia.172 
Outside observers suggested additional possible motives. Some argued that China, which initially 
suggested holding the exercises across from Taiwan, intended to send a signal to the island. China 
also may have designed the exercises’ heavy focus on maritime operations to send a message to 
Japan.173 Others suggested that an additional goal was to show the United States that Russia and 
China were capable of close partnership.174 
 
Limited China-Russia Global Partnership Before the Financial Crisis (2005-2008) 
 
 Despite the joint declaration on world order and the joint military exercises, China-Russia 
cooperation at the global level during this period was relatively restrained. This trend continued 
during the period leading up to the international financial crisis that erupted in 2008, another 
turning point in international politics. The primary reason was that, not for the first time, U.S.-
Russia relations and U.S.-China relations exhibited opposite trends. In the years following the 
color revolutions, especially Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, U.S.-Russia relations deteriorated. 
Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, in which he sharply criticized 
U.S. foreign policy, made this deterioration dramatically apparent. U.S.-China relations, by 
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contrast, were relatively cooperative during the period leading up to the financial crisis. China’s 
demand for strategic cooperation from Russia, therefore, was less than Russia’s corresponding 
demand of China. Therefore, although China-Russia relations remained on a solid footing, their 
strategic partnership at the global level remained underdeveloped. 
 
U.S.-Russia relations suffer a downturn 
 
 Beginning around 2005, U.S.-Russia relations suffered a downturn featuring disagreement 
on many issues. As discussed above, the color revolutions were a major turning point. Putin 
objected to what he perceived as U.S. efforts to limit Russia’s influence along its periphery, 
including in former Soviet territory, and to foment regime change within Russia itself. Perceived 
changes in the two countries’ relative power also had an impact on the relationship. The setbacks 
that the United States faced in foreign policy, including an insurgency and civil war in Iraq, 
ongoing instability in Afghanistan, and the continued challenge of halting the nuclear programs of 
Iran and North Korea, contributed to perceptions that the United States was in decline, or at least 
had encountered the limits of its ability to project power worldwide. Russia, by contrast, seemed 
to be enjoying a revival of power and was therefore emboldened. Rising oil prices stimulated 
economic growth and increased government revenues.175 The possibility that Russia could use its 
large oil and gas reserves as a geopolitical weapon raised the specter of the country as an emerging 
“energy superpower.”176 From the perspective of power cycle theory, Russia was approaching the 
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lower turning point on a new cycle. If it could surpass this point, then it would embark on a period 
of accelerated growth in relative power.177 
 Following the events in Central Asia, Putin challenged the United States in several areas. 
He exerted economic pressure on Ukraine and Georgia, cutting off gas to Ukraine on New Year’s 
Day 2006 amid a price dispute and imposing economic sanctions on Georgia during the fall of 
2006 following the expulsion of Russian spies from that country. He also hosted Hamas leaders in 
March 2006, approved a large arms sale to the Hugo Chavez regime in Venezuela, and announced 
that foreign companies would be prohibited from participation in the development of Russia’s 
Shtokman offshore gas field.178 Dmitri Trenin, a leading Russian foreign policy analyst, described 
Russia’s disillusionment during the summer of 2006. “Until recently,” he wrote, “Russia saw itself 
as Pluto in the Western solar system, very far from the center but still fundamentally a part of it. 
Now it has left that orbit entirely: Russia’s leaders have given up on becoming part of the West 
and have started creating their own Moscow-centered system.”179 Some Western analysts argued 
that a new cold war between Russia and the West was emerging.180 
 Throughout Bush’s presidency, Russia also endeavored to soften United Nations 
resolutions condemning Iran for its nuclear program. Despite the revelation in 2002 of Iran’s 
previously secret uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, Russia consistently argued that Iran 
sought only nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In 2005, Russia strengthened safeguards at the 
Bushehr nuclear plant that it was building for Iran and reached an agreement under which Iran 
would return spent fuel to Russia. The United States urged the UN Security Council to address 
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Iran’s nuclear program, but Russia insisted that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
should handle the issue. Russia also opposed new sanctions against Iran. Eventually, following 
negotiations among the United States and Russia, as well as Britain, France, and Germany, which 
represented the EU, the Security Council placed the issue of Iran’s nuclear program on its agenda. 
Along with Germany, the five permanent members of the Security Council addressed the issue 
through the P5+1 process. In December 2006, the Security Council passed Resolution 1737, which 
called for Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing and imposed sanctions. Further 
resolutions in 2007 and 2008 added to the pressure on Iran. Russia succeeded, however, in 
weakening the sanctions that the United States and the EU countries proposed. Russia also 
approved the sale of the S-300 air defense system to Iran in 2007.181 Like Russia, China sought to 
reduce the sanctions’ impact on Iran, a country with which it enjoyed a growing economic 
relationship.182 In contrast with the Six Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program, in which 
China played a leading role, China allowed Russia to take the lead in the effort to soften 
international sanctions on Iran. 
 The fate of democracy and human rights in Russia added to U.S.-Russia tensions. Bush 
muted his criticism of Russia’s record on democracy early in his presidency, but he became more 
vocal as the freedom agenda came to define his foreign policy. In February 2005, before the Tulip 
Revolution in Kyrgyzstan and the Andijan incident in Uzbekistan, Bush endured a difficult summit 
meeting with Putin in Bratislava, Slovakia, during which Putin bristled at Bush’s expression of 
concern about the state of democracy in Russia.183 In May 2006, during a speech in Vilnius, 
Lithuania, Vice President Dick Cheney sharply criticized Russia. After praising the Baltic states, 
                                                          
181 Stent, The Limits of Partnership, 150-153. 
182 Christensen, The China Challenge, 232-233. 
183 Elisabeth Bumiller and David E. Sanger, “Bush and Putin Exhibit Tension Over Democracy,” New York Times, 




the Central European states, Georgia, and Ukraine for their democratic progress, Cheney criticized 
those in Russia who sought to reverse democratic reforms in their country. He also criticized 
Russia for attempting to use energy resources as a political weapon and to undermine the territorial 
integrity of its neighbors. Putin replied a few days later during a meeting with Russian lawmakers: 
“As the saying goes, Comrade Wolf knows whom to eat, it eats without listening, and it clearly is 
not going to listen to anyone.” 
That fall, two prominent critics of Putin’s government, Anna Politkovskaya and Alexander 
Litvinenko, were murdered. Politkovskaya, a journalist who had reported on alleged human rights 
abuses by the Russian military in Chechnya, was shot to death in her apartment building. 
Litvinenko, a former Federal Security Service (FBS) agent, suffered polonium poisoning after 
meeting with Russian agents at a restaurant in London. That same year, Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s 
deputy chief of staff, introduced the term “sovereign democracy” to describe Russia’s political 
system. Although Putin expressed reservations about the use of this term, the message was that 
Russia had its own unique political system that should not be subject to outside criticism.184 
 Putin expressed his dissatisfaction with the United States most dramatically during his 
speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007. He argued that unipolarity, 
understood as “one center of power, one center of force, and one center for taking decisions,” was 
unjust, incompatible with democracy, and ultimately unsustainable because it could not attract the 
world’s moral support. He singled out the United States for criticism: “Today we are witnessing 
an almost uncontained hyper use of force—military force—in international relations, force that is 
plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. One state and, of course, first and 
foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way.” Putin asserted that 
                                                          




the world was already becoming multipolar, with economic power shifting to the BRIC countries 
of Brazil, Russia, India, and China.185 He believed that the United States would have to adjust to 
this new reality.186 
Together with the assertiveness that Russia had shown in the preceding couple of years, 
Putin’s Munich speech put pressure on China to join Russia in taking a tougher line against the 
United States. Just a few years earlier, in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks, Chinese leaders 
had worried that Putin would tilt too far toward the West. Now, they grew concerned that Putin 
would seek to enlist them in efforts to oppose the United States that could prove destabilizing, 
precisely at a time when China was satisfied with trends in its own development. They preferred 
to remain aloof while allowing Russia to bear the burden of criticizing the United States.187 
 Missile defense was one security issue on which Russia continued to press for changes in 
U.S. policy. In July 2007, three years after Bush gave the policy initial approval, the United States 
began negotiations to deploy radars in the Czech Republic and interceptors in Poland. These 
installations would be components of a missile defense system that was designed, U.S. officials 
said, to protect the United States and its allies from a potential nuclear attack from Iran or North 
Korea. U.S. officials argued that the planned missile defense system would lack the capability to 
defend against Russia’s large nuclear arsenal and therefore posed no threat to Russia’s nuclear 
deterrent. Russian officials nevertheless objected strenuously to this deployment. They feared that 
the United States eventually would expand the system to an extent that would threaten Russia’s 
deterrent. They particularly objected to the installation of these components in former Warsaw 
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Pact countries near Russia’s territory. Putin countered with a proposal that the United States and 
Russia cooperate on missile defense using a radar station that Russia rented in Azerbaijan, but U.S. 
officials concluded that the plan was technically infeasible. In December 2007, a frustrated Putin 
announced that Russia would suspend its participation in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in 
Europe (CFE) in retaliation for the planned U.S. missile defense deployments.188 
 In the wake of these developments, a series of events in 2008 foreshadowed the deepest 
rupture, up to that point, in U.S.-Russia relations since the end of the Cold War. By 2008, 
disagreement between the United States and Russia over the status of Kosovo came to a head. The 
United States concluded that only independence for Kosovo would prevent a further outbreak of 
violence between Serbs and ethnic Albanian Kosovars. Russia’s rejection of this conclusion made 
UN approval for Kosovo’s independence unattainable. Putin warned on multiple occasions that 
U.S. and EU support for Kosovo’s independence could backfire on the West. He argued that the 
same set of rules for ethnic self-determination should apply in the Caucasus as in the Balkans. In 
the face of Russia’s defiance, Kosovo declared its independence in February 2008, receiving 
support from the United States and a majority of EU countries.189 
Then the issue of potential NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia caused further 
tension. In advance of the summit of NATO heads of state in Bucharest, scheduled for April 2008, 
both countries sought membership action plans (MAPs) that would put them on the path to 
eventual membership in the alliance. Putin made clear that he considered such an outcome to be 
unacceptable. With his own administration divided on the issue, Bush decided to support MAPs 
for both countries. At Bucharest, however, he also faced a divided alliance. The NATO heads of 
state ultimately decided not to offer MAPs to the two countries for the time being, but their joint 
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declaration stated, “We agreed today that Georgia and Ukraine will become members of 
NATO.”190 Putin, who arrived later that day for a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council, expressed 
strong opposition to NATO’s promise of eventual membership for the two countries, no matter 
how ambiguous it was. In a conversation with Bush, he said that Ukraine was “not even a 
country.”191 
These events set the stage for the clash in Georgia that erupted in August 2008. During this 
period, the United States placed its hopes for improved relations with Russia on Dmitri Medvedev. 
Facing his constitutional limit of two consecutive terms as president, Putin had struck a deal with 
Medvedev in which the two leaders would switch positions for the next four years. Amid the 
downturn in U.S.-Russia relations that preceded the war in Georgia, Putin continued to cultivate 
relations with China. His speech in Munich indicated that he hoped to use the growing economic 
power of the BRIC countries, including China, as leverage in relations with the West. Medvedev 
continued Putin’s approach, visiting China soon after taking office in May 2008. The continued 
positive trends in U.S.-China relations, however, limited the extent of China-Russia cooperation 
at the global level during this period. 
 
Continued warming of U.S.-China relations 
 
 The largely positive development of U.S.-China relations that gained momentum around 
2003 continued in the years leading up the 2008 financial crisis. The Bush administration 
continued to encourage China’s development as a “responsible stakeholder,” in Robert Zoellick’s 
phrase. The United States sought to engage China through dialogues on economic and security 
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issues, with the goal of encouraging China’s interdependence with the world economy and support 
for the international system. This arrangement was largely suitable for China during a period in 
which it perceived an opportunity to focus on domestic modernization and economic growth.192 
This was the case despite some divergence in the U.S. and Chinese understandings of 
“responsibility.” The United States encouraged China to assume greater responsibility for good 
governance and the protection of political rights. China, by contrast, placed emphasis on respect 
for sovereignty and noninterference in other states’ internal affairs. China resented any suggestion 
that global responsibility was equivalent to adopting policies that the United States preferred.193 
Nevertheless, China perceived the advantages of this framework for relations with the United 
States. It was consistent with the overall foreign policy strategy that China had pursued since the 
era of Deng Xiaoping, and especially since 1996, of seeking to maintain positive relations with its 
neighbors and with the United States. 
 Zoellick and his Chinese counterpart, Dai Bingguo, created the bilateral Strategic Dialogue. 
In December 2006, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and his counterpart, Vice Premier Wu Yi, 
initiated the Strategic Economic Dialogue, which would meet twice per year to discuss bilateral 
and global economic issues. Among other items, the Strategic Economic Dialogue discussed issues 
in the U.S.-China economic relationship that contributed to global economic imbalances. The 
United States urged China to revalue its currency, which China kept undervalued to support its 
export industries. Partly as a result of the undervalued RMB, China ran large current account 
surpluses with the United States and with the world as a whole. U.S. efforts appeared to achieve 
results, as the RMB appreciated by approximately 21 percent between 2005 and 2008. The two 
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sides also discussed the adjustments in macroeconomic policy that were required of the United 
States in order to address global imbalances, in particular the need for the United States to reduce 
its current account deficits and government debt.194 Chinese leaders were frustrated by the failure 
of Chinese state oil firm CNOOC’s bid to purchase the U.S. oil firm UNOCAL in 2005, but the 
Strategic Economic Dialogue at least allowed U.S. leaders to explain that resistance from Congress, 
not the executive branch, had scuttled the deal.195 
 In the security realm, the United States and China remained engaged in the Six Party Talks. 
The September 2005 agreement quickly fell apart. On July 4, 2006, North Korea tested a long-
range missile. In October of that year, North Korea tested a nuclear device for the first time. China 
harshly condemned both tests. In each case, it supported a Security Council resolution that imposed 
sanctions on North Korea.196 In late 2006 and early 2007, China quietly increased diplomatic and 
economic pressure on North Korea.197 At this juncture, as throughout the Six Party Talks, China 
and Russia sought to prevent regime change in Pyongyang. Thomas Christensen, who participated 
in the talks as a State Department official, writes that Chinese and Russian officials were especially 
receptive to proposals stressing the U.S. willingness to accept a denuclearized North Korea.198 In 
negotiating the wording of UN Security Council resolutions, Chinese and Russian diplomats also 
sought to remove any mention of the possible use of force and to allow sanctions to be adjusted if 
North Korea were to change its behavior.199 
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By February 2007, North Korea increased its willingness to negotiate. That month, North 
Korea agreed to allow the Yongbyon nuclear facility to be disabled, to disclose all of its nuclear 
activities up to that point, and to move toward denuclearization. In return, the United States would 
provide North Korea with heavy fuel oil and other benefits. By June 2008, U.S. government 
engineers and technicians had neutralized many of the Yongyon facility’s operations. Later that 
year, however, the Six Party Talks broke down once again and were not resumed during Barack 
Obama’s presidency.200 The sustained engagement of the United States and China, along with 
Russia and the other participants in the Six Party Talks, over a period of five years was notable. It 
was in keeping with the generally positive trends in U.S.-China relations during this period. Yet 
this modest success could not conceal the ultimate failure of the talks, which left a dangerous 
problem to fester for years to come. 
During this period, the United States and China made the mutual calculation that stable 
bilateral relations were in each of their interests. The United States calculated that as China’s 
interdependence increased, and as it became increasingly socialized into norms of international 
behavior, its commitment to upholding the international order would grow. China, in turn, 
calculated that the United States would not seek to thwart its growing power.201 Despite U.S. 
concerns about China’s rise, Chinese leaders and strategists had several reasons to be confident in 
this respect. For the foreseeable future, the United States would be preoccupied with more pressing 
security challenges, including the war on terrorism, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the nuclear 
programs of Iran and North Korea. Chinese leaders also recognized that their country had become 
indispensable in addressing a range of international challenges, including nuclear proliferation, 
environmental threats, and health issues. 
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Moreover, they perceived that the rise of other power centers in addition to China, 
including the EU, Russia, Japan, and India, would inevitably constrain the exercise of U.S. power. 
In some cases, as in China’s desire to prevent the use of force or the imposition of heavy sanctions 
against Iran, China could rely on others, including Russia and possibly some EU countries, to play 
the leading role in opposing the United States.202 China’s leaders therefore shared Putin’s view, 
which he expressed in his Munich speech, that the global dispersion of power would naturally 
constrain U.S. foreign policy. In this view, China and Russia could leverage the other’s power in 
order to check the United States. To some extent, this process would act naturally, without the 
need for the two countries to increase their strategic cooperation significantly, let alone form an 
alliance. 
From the perspective of power cycle theory, China took satisfaction in its continued rise to 
power. Although the consensus view among Chinese strategists continued to project that the 
United States would remain the world’s sole superpower until sometime in the 2030s, recent events 
had revealed some of the limits of U.S. power. China’s increased self-confidence was apparent in 
its resistance to criticism of its crackdown in Tibet in March 2008 and in its staging of the Beijing 
Olympics in August of that year. Despite the stability in U.S.-China relations during the preceding 
years, therefore, questions arose about China’s trajectory and intentions. Despite its recent 
emphasis on multilateralism and pragmatic cooperation with other great powers, China continued 
to defend interpretations of sovereignty and noninterference in other states’ domestic politics that 
were at odds with liberal principles that the United States and other Western countries sought to 
promote in the international community. China’s economic prowess offered benefits to other major 
                                                          




economies in the Asia-Pacific region, but those countries also grew nervous about China’s growing 
power.203 
Nevertheless, the general trend in U.S.-China relationship during the period covered in this 
chapter was positive. China’s relative satisfaction with the U.S.-China relationship limited the 
scope for China-Russia strategic cooperation at the global level during this period. With U.S. 
influence in Central Asia suffering a setback following the events in Uzbekistan, China and Russia 
turned their attention to issues at the bilateral level, where they began to make halting but 
significant progress in the energy sector. 
 
Progress in China-Russia bilateral relations 
 
 Despite the limitations of the China-Russia strategic partnership during this period, China 
and Russia continued to engage in some cooperation at the global level. China and Russia 
participated in international efforts to address the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, but 
both countries sought to forestall the use or threat of force and to soften international sanctions 
against these two regimes. In 2007, China and Russia held their second set of joint military 
exercises, called Peace Mission 2007, in Chelyabinsk, Russia, and Urumqi, the capital of China’s 
Xinjiang Province. Once again, they conducted these exercises under the framework of the SCO.204 
China and Russia also issued a joint declaration on major international issues. This document 
stressed familiar themes, such as the inevitability of world multipolarity, the importance of 
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upholding the authority of the United Nations and the Security Council, and the two countries’ 
opposition to missile defense systems and the militarization of outer space.205 
 China and Russia continued to discuss the possible construction of pipelines that would 
deliver oil and gas from Russian territory into China. In 2005, it became clear that Russia would 
not commit exclusively to the Pacific route for an oil pipeline. Instead, Russia made plans for the 
eventual construction of ESPO, but with a spur to China. In January 2006, at the height of a gas 
crisis with Ukraine, Putin stated publicly that he expected construction of the Taishet-Nakhodka 
pipeline to begin later that year. Russia would begin by building the first stage connecting Taishet 
to Skovorodino. From there, a spur to China could easily be built.206 In March 2006, Transneft and 
PetroChina signed a memorandum of understanding for a feasibility study on construction of the 
section of a potential China spur extending from Skovorodino to the Chinese border. This 
agreement was announced during Putin’s visit to Beijing that same month.207 Construction of the 
first stage of ESPO began in April 2006.208  However, as oil prices spiked, Russia sought to 
renegotiate its oil pricing agreement with China, creating a dispute that slowed progress on the 
pipeline and a possible spur to China.209 The construction of an oil pipeline to China was moving 
closer to reality, but the deal was not yet done. 
 Russia and China also discussed cooperation in the gas sector, though cooperation in this 
area was even slower than in oil. The most promising source of Russian gas for export to China 
was the Kovykta gas field, which is located in East Siberia near the Chinese border. This field, 
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which holds about 1.9 tcm of gas, is Russia’s third-largest undeveloped field. In 2003, BP formed 
a joint venture with the private Russian oil company TNK. This joint venture, known as TNK-BP, 
purchased a 62.9 percent stake in the consortium that held the license to develop Kovykta. TNK-
BP had proposed a 4,000-kilometer pipeline that would supply China with 20 billion cubic meters 
of gas per year and South Korea with 10 billion cubic meters per year.210 
This joint venture, however, also fell victim to Russia’s rising resource nationalism. 
Because Gazprom held a monopoly over Russia’s gas export pipelines, TNK-BP had no 
independent way to export the gas. TNK-BP sought repeatedly to negotiate an export agreement 
with Gazprom, but was unsuccessful. Unable to export the gas, TNK-BP failed to achieve the level 
of production specified in its contract for Kovykta. Gazprom exploited this Catch-22 to delay and 
eventually derail TNK-BP’s plans to export Kovykta gas.211 Under an agreement in principle 
struck in 2007, Gazprom was to purchase TNK-BP’s controlling stake in the Kovykta field.212 
However, this deal stalled when the two companies were unable to reach agreement on the final 
price. In March 2010, TNK-BP announced that it intended to reach agreement by the end of the 
year to sell its stake in Kovykta to Rosneftegaz, a state holding company that controlled the 
Russian government’s 75.16 percent stake in Rosneft and its 10.74 percent stake in Gazprom.213 
In March 2013, Rosneft purchased TNK-BP in a $55 billion deal.214 
 Even as TNK-BP was tangling with Gazprom, Russia deepened its interest in gas exports 
to China, provided these exports were firmly under state control. During Putin’s March 2006 visit 
to Beijing, Russia promised to build two natural gas pipelines to China, costing a total of up to $10 
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billion. Under this agreement, Russia would supply China with 60 billion to 80 billion cubic meters 
of gas per year, with the pipelines expected to be ready by 2011.215 This amount would equal up 
to half of Russia’s current gas exports to Europe. One of the gas pipelines, the “Altai” line, would 
originate at gas fields in West Siberia, pass through Russia’s region of Altai, and arrive at Russia’s 
short western border with China between Kazakhstan and Mongolia. This pipeline would connect 
with China’s West-East Gas Pipeline, which runs from Xinjiang to Shanghai. The other gas 
pipeline would begin at the Kovykta natural gas field and enter China’s Northeast. Despite this 
agreement, negotiations on gas pipelines would continue for many years to come. 
 
The war in Georgia 
 
 Russia’s five-day war against Georgia in August 2008 brought U.S.-Russia relations to a 
new low point in the post-Cold War era, but it also demonstrated some of the limits of the China-
Russia strategic partnership. Russia-Georgia relations had grown steadily worse since the 2003 
Rose Revolution. After Kosovo declared its independence in February 2008, Russia argued that 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two breakaway regions in Georgia, should by the same logic gain 
independence as well. The statement that NATO heads of state issued in Bucharest during their 
summit meeting in April 2008, which declared that Georgia and Ukraine would become members 
of NATO, infuriated Russia, even though NATO refrained from offering membership action plans 
to these two countries. Tensions between Russia and Georgia built steadily throughout the summer. 
Georgia participated in U.S.-led military exercises on its own territory in July, along with forces 
from other post-Soviet states that had sent forces to Iraq and Afghanistan. Russia conducted its 
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own military exercises in the North Caucasus region near the border with Georgia. U.S. officials 
warned Saakashvili not to allow Russia to bait him into military action, which would result in 
Georgia’s defeat.216 
 The war broke out on the night of August 7, just as Beijing was preparing for the opening 
ceremony of the 2008 Summer Olympics. The events that precipitated hostilities remain murky. 
Georgia launched a major artillery attack against Tshkinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, resulting 
in the deaths of Ossetes and Russian peacekeeping forces deployed in the region. Russia accused 
Georgia of aggression, but Georgian officials insisted that they acted in response to a Russian 
invasion. 217  Russian troops entered Georgia in force on the following day. The Georgian 
government also suffered a simultaneous cyberattack that crippled many of its functions. Russian 
forces easily defeated their Georgian opponents but refrained from marching on Tbilisi. With 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy acting as mediator, Russia and Georgia declared a cease-fire on 
August 12. On August 25, Russia recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states.218 
Russia’s victory in the war appeared to send the message that Russia would tolerate no further 
efforts to integrate former Soviet territories in Euro-Atlantic institutions. 219  In late August, 
Medvedev declared that Russia was entitled to a sphere of “privileged interests” that would be 
located “in the border region, but not only.”220 
In the immediate aftermath of the war, Russia turned to China and the other members of 
the SCO for support. Shortly after the war broke out, China had issued a vague response. A 
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spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that China expressed “grave concern” over the 
conflict and called for all parties involved to exercise restraint and agree to an immediate 
ceasefire.221 At the end of August, just days after Russia recognized the independence of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, the SCO held its summit of heads of state in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. Russia 
received some diplomatic backing at this meeting, but not full support for its policies. China and 
the other SCO states were privately sympathetic with Russia’s view that Georgia provoked the 
conflict and that Russia’s intervention was justified. 222  However, they did not support 
independence for the two breakaway regions. Indeed, only a handful of countries around the world 
did so. The statement’s wording was cautious: “The member states of the SCO express their deep 
concern in connection with the recent tension around the issue of South Ossetia, and call on the 
relevant parties to resolve existing problems in a peaceful way through dialogue, to make efforts 
for reconciliation and facilitation of negotiations.” The declaration did not express support for 
Russia’s military action explicitly, but it noted that the member states “support the active role of 
Russia in promoting peace and cooperation in the region.”223 
China could not support Russia’s recognition of the two breakaway regions’ independence 
because this would have conflicted with its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
states, a longstanding pillar of its foreign policy. China was concerned about separatism because 
of the implications for China’s own territorial integrity. Recognition of the breakaway regions’ 
independence would have set an especially worrying precedent for its own continued control over 
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Tibet and Xinjiang and for its efforts to reunify Taiwan with the PRC. Support for Russia’s position 
on Abkhazia and South Ossetia also would have conflicted with the mission of the SCO, one of 
the main goals of which was to combat the “three evil forces” of separatism, extremism, and 
terrorism.224 The SCO’s Central Asian member states also sought to uphold the principle of 
territorial integrity and therefore opposed Russia’s recognition of the two breakaway regions’ 
independence. China’s position gave them political cover to maintain this stance at the SCO 
meeting.225 
In the view of some Western analysts, the war in Georgia demonstrated the hollowness of 
the China-Russia strategic partnership, as the two countries failed to maintain solidarity during a 
crisis.226 Other analysts argued that the SCO’s failure to offer full support to Russia’s position in 
the aftermath of the war in Georgia was a crisis for the organization.227 At least in their public 
statements, however, Russian officials did not view the summit as a defeat. At the summit’s 
conclusion, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev expressed satisfaction with the SCO’s 
understanding of, and support for, Russia’s position.228 
Several Russian and Chinese analysts argued that the summit’s outcome was acceptable to 
both sides. In the view of some Russian analysts, despite the other member states’ unwillingness 
to support Russia’s recognition of the two breakaway regions’ independence, the organization 
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effectively stood on Russia’s side in the war.229 Others noted that in closed-door meetings at the 
summit, member states’ support for Russia’s position on the war was clear.230 For Russia and its 
fellow SCO members, the joint statement of the SCO heads of state was an acceptable result 
reached through negotiation. Ultimately, the difference in opinion did not lead to a rift or to long-
lasting damage, either in China-Russia relations or in the functioning of the SCO.231 This episode 
demonstrated that the interests and viewpoints of China and Russia sometimes diverged, and that 
their full support for each other was not automatic. Nevertheless, China took no action to hinder 
Russia’s pursuit of its objectives. In this instance, China’s limited support for Russia was sufficient 




 During the period lasting from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 to the war in 
Georgia, China-Russia relations continued to develop steadily. The two sides expanded 
cooperation at the bilateral, regional, and global levels. Their partnership remained, however, a 
limited one.232 The two sides continued to pursue cooperation at the bilateral level, though with 
mixed results. Achievements in bilateral economic relations continued to be disappointing. 
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Military-technical cooperation remained a highlight of the relationship, with volumes of Russian 
arms sales to China reaching new heights, but new arms sales declined considerably after 2005. 
The two sides pursued tortuous negotiations over the eventual construction of oil and gas pipelines 
from Russia to China. They also expanded regional cooperation, especially in Central Asia, where 
they worked within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In the wake of the 
color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, the spread of domestic upheaval to Central Asia 
provided a new focus for China-Russia cooperation in the region. Here, this cooperation achieved 
concrete results, as the U.S. withdrawal from its military base in Uzbekistan signaled that the U.S. 
military presence in the region would not be of unlimited duration. 
At the international level, China and Russia engaged in limited cooperation. The two sides 
shared common views on many international issues and a common desire to limit what they 
considered to be the undesirable effects of the unipolar structure of the international system. They 
continued to issue rhetorical challenges to the unipolar world order and to U.S. foreign policy 
decisions that they opposed. The initiation of regular joint military exercises in 2005 signaled to 
the United States that China and Russia could strengthen their partnership if necessary. Russian 
arms sales to China also began to improve China’s position in the military balance of the Asia-
Pacific region. In the view of some international relations scholars, some of the actions that China 
and Russia took during this period, including the SCO’s 2005 declaration calling for a timetable 
for the withdrawal of U.S. military bases from Central Asia and the Peace Mission joint military 
exercises, constituted further “soft balancing.”233 
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During this period, however, a series of factors combined to limit the effects of China-
Russia cooperation on the international system. As had been the case since the breakup of the 
Soviet Union, traditional hard balancing remained impractical because China and Russia lacked 
the aggregate power to counter U.S. power effectively.234 Nor did China and Russia perceive an 
urgent need to engage in hard balancing. Both countries benefited from their participation in the 
global economy, which fostered interdependence, and neither country feared U.S. invasion. 
Moreover, the flow of events and the evolution of the two countries’ power trajectories 
also limited their cooperation at the international level. In the immediate aftermath of the 
September 11 attacks, Russia sought to improve relations with the United States. This caused some 
unease among Chinese leaders, who were concerned that the U.S.-Russia rapprochement would 
come at China’s expense. Russia and China both opposed the war in Iraq. However, Russia joined 
with France and Germany to express vocal public opposition, while China maintained a low-key 
approach. The color revolutions, especially the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, soured U.S.-Russia 
relations, which deteriorated for the next several years. The shared interest of China and Russia in 
stopping the spread of color revolutions, especially in Central Asia, yielded some of the decade’s 
most productive China-Russia cooperation. Meanwhile, U.S.-Russia relations continued to 
deteriorate for the next several years. 
The color revolutions contributed to Russia’s increasingly negative view of the West, but 
the factor that enabled Russia to resist the West more forcefully as the decade progressed was its 
own growth in power. Russia’s steady economic growth from 2000-2008, fueled by high oil and 
gas prices, contributed to the revival of Russian power, which had fallen precipitously in the 
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aftermath of the Soviet collapse. This trend increased Russia’s confidence, especially as setbacks 
in U.S. foreign policy seemed to confirm the limits of U.S. power. By 2008, Russia felt confident 
enough to strike a blow against Georgia’s pro-Western aspirations and, by extension, against any 
further expansion of Euro-Atlantic institutions into the post-Soviet region. Although China did not 
support Russia’s recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Chinese leaders 
approved of Russia’s efforts to resist any further eastward shift of NATO and U.S. influence.235 
The improvement in U.S.-China relations during this period, however, limited China’s 
desire to join with Russia to balance the United States. China perceived the first two decades of 
the twenty-first century as a strategic window of opportunity to focus on domestic modernization 
and the consolidation of China’s national power. The best way to pursue these goals, in their view, 
was persist in the strategy that Deng had outlined in the 1980s, and which Chinese leaders had 
followed consistently since 1996 after a period of foreign policy assertiveness in the early 1990s. 
This strategy called for China to foster an amicable international environment enabling the country 
to focus on domestic issues. Forming an alliance or close partnership with Russia to resist the 
United States aggressively would have undermined these objectives. 
In the years leading up to the financial crisis of 2008, therefore, both China and Russia 
were experiencing growth in national power. Both countries also perceived that the United States, 
which faced challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, had encountered the limits of its 
power. The trend toward multipolarity, which China and Russia had supported for more than a 
decade in joint declarations, seemed to be gaining momentum. Putin expressed this theme in his 
2007 speech in Munich, and Chinese leaders shared this view. The international structure 
consisting of one superpower and many great powers would last for many more years, but the 
                                                          





growing aggregate weight of the other great powers seemed likely to act as a natural constraint on 
the exercise of U.S. power. The outbreak of the global financial crisis in September 2008, however, 
administered a shock to the international system and prompted reassessments of future dynamics 




From the Financial Crisis to the Ukraine Crisis and Its Aftermath 
 
 The global financial crisis that erupted in September 2008 had important implications for 
international politics, including relations within the U.S.-Russia-China triangle. The stock market 
collapse led to a deep recession in the United States, and the Russian economy, which faced the 
shock of a collapse in oil prices, suffered more than any other major economy in the world. The 
financial crisis and resulting global recession also affected the Chinese economy, especially 
through reduced world demand for Chinese exports, which fell sharply. However, with help from 
a large stimulus package, the Chinese economy passed through the global recession in relatively 
good condition, maintaining annual GDP growth rates that never fell below 6 percent. 
In the period following the outbreak of the financial crisis, China’s foreign policy toward 
the United States and neighboring countries became more assertive on several issues than it had 
been for more than a decade. Many observers believed that Chinese leaders had concluded, in the 
wake of the financial crisis, that U.S. power was on the wane and therefore increasingly open to 
challenge. Meanwhile, the United States and Russia, whose bilateral relationship had reached a 
post-Cold War low at the time of the war in Georgia, pursued a “reset” of relations under new 
President Barack Obama. The financial crisis also had immediate implications for China-Russia 
relations, as China finally secured Russia’s agreement to the construction of a new oil pipeline 
spur through an “oil for loans” deal. 
The U.S.-Russia reset achieved some important successes, including the conclusion of a 
new strategic arms control treaty, Russian support for tightened sanctions against Iran, and U.S.-




military operations in Afghanistan that passed through Russian territory. However, a series of 
issues caused the reset to break down, including domestic protests in Russia over Vladimir Putin’s 
announced intention to return to the presidency in 2012, Russia’s granting of asylum to former 
U.S. government contractor Edward Snowden following his leak of classified information, and 
disagreements over Syria. The crisis in Ukraine, which began in late 2013 and led to the toppling 
of the Ukrainian government, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and Russian support for an 
insurgency in eastern Ukraine, brought U.S.-Russia relations to yet another post-Cold War low. 
As U.S.-Russia relations deteriorated, the outlines of a potential great-power confrontation 
between the United States and China became more apparent. The Obama administration 
announced a “pivot to Asia,” which aimed to shift the focus of U.S. strategy away from the Middle 
East and toward the Asia-Pacific region, where leading administration officials believed that the 
most important strategic challenges of the future lay. In late 2010 and early 2011, China appeared 
to pull back somewhat from its assertive behavior during the period that followed the financial 
crisis. However, China soon resumed its new assertiveness. This was most apparent in the South 
China Sea, where China made expansive territorial claims and took several measures to strengthen 
them, most notably the construction of artificial islands and the installation of military 
infrastructure on them. 
The simultaneous deterioration of U.S.-Russia relations and increased tension in U.S.-
China relations facilitated a growing strategic convergence between China and Russia. Even before 
the Ukraine crisis erupted, Russia had attempted its own pivot to Asia. In the wake of the Ukraine 
crisis, facing diplomatic isolation and Western sanctions, Russia’s need for outreach to China grew. 
China, meanwhile, perceived both the desirability of cultivating Russia as a counterweight to the 




in energy and arms. As a result of these trends, the China-Russia relationship, which had been 
essentially a normal relationship in the period from the collapse of the Soviet Union until 2014, 
now became, in the words of a former U.S. ambassador to China, “unhealthily close.”1 
 
From the Financial Crisis to the Ukraine Crisis (2008-2014) 
 
Breakthrough on Russia-China oil pipeline spur 
 
The global financial crisis, which erupted just one month after the war in Georgia, had 
immediate implications for Russia’s energy policies toward Asia. The financial crisis and the 
ensuing collapse in oil prices struck a heavy blow to Russia’s energy sector and overall economy. 
Rosneft, the largest state-owned oil company, and Transneft, the state-owned pipeline monopoly, 
both of which were desperate for cash, turned to China for loans. In October 2008, Russia and 
China reached initial agreement on an “oil for loans” deal, which they finalized the following 
February after resolving a disagreement over interest rates. Under this deal, China agreed to loan 
$15 billion to Rosneft and $10 billion to Transneft. Russia, in turn, agreed to build a pipeline spur 
to China, branching off from the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline, and to provide 
China with 15 million tons of oil per year over the following twenty years.2 The Russia-China 
pipeline spur would begin operation prior to the completion of ESPO’s construction. This was the 
second time in four years that Rosneft had turned to China for loans, in both cases during periods 
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of tension in Russia’s relations with the West.3 The pipeline spur was soon under construction. In 
April 2009, construction began on the Russian section from Skovorodino to the Chinese border, 
and in May 2009 construction opened on the Chinese section, from the border city of Mohe to 
Daqing.4 
On August 29, 2010, Putin opened the 67-kilometer Russian section of the pipeline spur, 
which was built by Transneft.5 The entire pipeline spur to Daqing went into operation on January 
1, 2011. For the first time, Russia could now ship oil by pipeline directly to China, without transit 
through a third country. When Putin attended the opening ceremony for the Russian section of the 
China pipeline spur, he pledged that Russia eventually would provide China with 30 million tons 
of oil per year (600,000 barrels per day), an increase over the original amount of 15 million tons 
(300,000 b/d). The price that China would pay for oil shipped through the pipeline spur was equal 
to the free-on-board price of oil shipped from Russia’s new oil transshipment port at Kozmino Bay, 
the projected terminus of the ESPO pipeline’s second stage.6 After the pipeline opened, China and 
Russia had to settle some price disputes that arose.7 
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In the view of one Chinese analyst, the oil for loans deal and the construction of the pipeline 
spur represented a new, breakthrough stage in China-Russia energy relations.8 This breakthrough 
was typical of a pattern in China-Russia energy relations, however. In both the oil and gas sectors, 
China and Russia engaged in protracted negotiations over the construction of pipelines. Russia 
continually sought the best possible use of its energy resources to maximize its economic and 
geopolitical interests, while China patiently sought the best possible deal for itself. In this case, as 
in the major China-Russia gas contract signed in May 2014, Russia struck a deal at a time when it 
found itself under economic and diplomatic duress, allowing China to drive a favorable bargain. 
The financial crisis and the oil for loans deal therefore underscored the long-term dynamics of 
China-Russia relations, in which Russia, despite its revival on the strength of high energy prices 
during the first decade of the twenty-first century, faced a growing gap in relative power compared 
to China. 
 
China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy 
 
 The Obama administration entered office vowing to carry out a “pivot” toward the Asia-
Pacific region. The administration’s most influential advocate of this approach was Kurt Campbell, 
who served as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs during Obama’s first 
term. He had argued for years that military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan distracted U.S. 
attention from the Asia-Pacific region, the most economically dynamic part of the world and scene 
of the major strategic challenges that the United States would face in the future, including the rise 
of China. The pivot to Asia was designed to correct this alleged misallocation of U.S. attention 
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and resources.9 This strategy had political, military, and economic components, some of which 
were already being implemented before Obama entered office. The United States strengthened its 
military forces in the region by, among other actions, increasing its Marine presence in Darwin, 
Australia. The Obama administration promoted the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free-trade 
initiative that originated among countries in the region. The administration also activated its 
regional diplomacy, for example by signing the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and 
joining the East Asia Summit.10 “The United States is back,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
said during a visit to Thailand in July 2009.11 
 The pivot to Asia represented a clear attempt to strengthen the U.S. position in the region 
in preparation for the challenge of addressing China’s rise. At the same time, the Obama 
administration also sought to offer strategic reassurance to China.12 The administration hoped to 
work with China to address a range of international issues. Although the idea never became official 
U.S. policy, former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and other analysts outside of 
government promoted the idea of a G-2, in which China would become the main U.S. partner in 
addressing global challenges.13 During the first two years of the Obama administration, however, 
China’s behavior in a series of incidents and on a range of issues appeared to become increasingly 
assertive. Together, these actions represented at least a partial break with the foreign policy of 
multilateralism and reassurance that China had pursued since 1996. 
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 This pattern began early in Obama’s first term, when Chinese military and civilian ships 
harassed the Impeccable, a U.S. Navy ocean surveillance ship, in international waters south of 
China’s Hainan Island in March 2009. At the end of that year, following the disappointing results 
of the December 2009 climate change conference in Copenhagen, Western negotiators blamed 
China for obstructing the conclusion of a strong international agreement. 14  China responded 
harshly to the Obama administration’s announcement of new arms sales to Taiwan in January 2010 
and to the Dalai Lama’s meeting with Obama the following month. Obama had delayed both 
actions until after his visit to China in November 2009. 
During a meeting in March 2010, high-ranking Chinese officials reportedly told their 
visiting U.S. counterparts, in what would have represented an important shift in China’s foreign 
policy, that the South China Sea was “a core interest, on par with Taiwan and Tibet.”15 In July 
2010, while attending an annual security forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) in Hanoi, Vietnam, Secretary of State Clinton spoke in favor of freedom of navigation, 
asserted that maritime territorial claims were legitimate only if based on international law, and 
offered U.S. support for efforts to create a code of conduct in the region. Chinese Foreign Minister 
Yang Jiechi responded angrily, criticizing countries in the region for turning to outside actors such 
as the United States for support and saying that “China is a big country and other countries are 
small countries and that’s just a fact.”16 
Following North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests during the spring of 2009, China 
bolstered its support for the North Korean regime. The next year, following the sinking of the 
South Korean naval ship Cheonan in March, China defended North Korea in the UN Security 
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Council despite an international commission’s finding that a North Korean submarine had sunk 
the ship. Similarly, China protected North Korea from international criticism after the regime in 
Pyongyang revealed a secret uranium-enrichment site during the fall of 2010 and shelled a South 
Korean island in November of that year. China also reacted angrily to Japan’s arrest of a Chinese 
fishing boat captain and his crew in September 2010. The Chinese boat had intentionally rammed 
a Japanese Coast Guard vessel in waters near disputed islands in the East China Sea that Japan 
calls the Senkaku and China calls the Diaoyu. After Japan threatened to prosecute the captain under 
domestic Japanese law, the Chinese government not only criticized Japan sharply, but also 
reportedly restricted the shipment of rare-earth minerals used extensively in Japan’s electronics 
industry. Even after Japan agreed to release the ship’s captain and crew, the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry demanded that Japan issue an apology and pay reparations.17 
 Alastair Iain Johnston argues that this series of actions did not, in fact, represent a pattern 
of newly assertive Chinese behavior.18 In some cases, as in the announcement of new arms sales 
to Taiwan and Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama, China’s response did not differ dramatically 
from past practice.19 U.S. officials who participated in the March 2010 meeting also denied that 
China claimed the South China Sea as a “core interest.”20 Johnston acknowledges that China took 
an increasingly assertive approach toward the South China Sea in 2009 and 2010, when its military 
and paramilitary presence increased. Some of this behavior, however, was a response to attempts 
by other countries in the region to establish their own territorial claims in the sea, he argues.21 
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China’s policies on North Korea were similarly reactive. China had not changed its policy toward 
the peninsula, which called for both sides to refrain from provocative behavior. In the context of 
North Korea’s aggressive actions, however, this policy was tantamount to support for the regime 
in Pyongyang.22 
Whether China’s assertiveness was proactive or reactive, however, it posed similar 
challenges to the United States and its allies in Asia. Moreover, during this period and later, China 
seemed to take advantage of provocations in order to strengthen its maritime claims.23 Several 
factors may have influenced China’s foreign policy during this period, including the desire by 
Chinese leaders to appear strong in advance of the political transition scheduled for late 2012 and 
early 2013, an effort by Chinese leaders to take advantage of the Obama administration’s offers of 
strategic reassurance, or, perhaps most importantly, a perception that the United States was in 
decline following the financial crisis. 
 The mainstream view in Chinese strategic thinking during this period appeared to be that 
the financial crisis had weakened the United States, but not sufficiently to alter the unipolar 
structure of the international system. Multipolarity would arrive eventually, but for now the 
concept of “one superpower, many great powers” continued to characterize the global distribution 
of power.24 Beginning in mid-2009, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) School and the China 
Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), the latter a think tank operated by the 
Chinese Ministry of State Security, held a series of internal conferences to debate the extent of 
U.S. decline in relative power and whether it afforded opportunities for China to challenge the 
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United States. “More moderate voices—those who believed that there had been no major shift in 
power and that Deng’s axiom of avoiding conflict with the United States remained valid—were 
not obviously on the defensive in these debates,” Johnston writes.25 Throughout 2009, therefore, 
Chinese leaders were still debating the extent of U.S. relative decline, and they had not yet 
concluded that the era of multipolarity had arrived. 
 Nevertheless, many Chinese analysts perceived that the financial crisis and its aftermath 
had damaged U.S. power and prestige. In the view of one, the financial crisis had exerted a 
“comprehensive impact on U.S. hegemony.”26 Another, writing in the People’s Daily, argued that 
“U.S. strength is declining at a speed so fantastic that it is far beyond anticipation.”27 Many 
Chinese leaders appeared to conclude that China could be gaining ground on the United States 
faster than expected.28 Some scholars estimated that China’s progress had advanced by five to 
seven years. 29  In the view of other scholars and intelligence officials who were even more 
optimistic, China might even have leaped ten to twenty years ahead of schedule.30 Under these 
circumstances, Chinese leaders perceived the opportunity to “advance incrementally.”31 As the 
relative balance of power shifted in their favor, they could press their interests with increasing 
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assertiveness. At the same time, they would carefully calibrate the challenges that they mounted 
in order to ensure that these actions did not result in a sharp rupture in relations with the United 
States. 
 By the end of 2010, Chinese leaders recognized that their foreign policy over the previous 
year had alienated neighboring countries and hurt China’s image in the region.32 This was precisely 
the outcome that China had sought to avoid when it adjusted its strategy in 1996. In advance of 
President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States, scheduled for January 2011, China took steps to 
reduce tensions and to improve relations with the United States. 33  In December 2010, State 
Councilor Dai Bingguo, who also served as secretary-general of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small 
Group and was generally recognized as China’s most influential foreign policy official, published 
an article reasserting China’s commitment to its foreign policy of peace and development. 34 
During this period, China resumed high-level military exchanges that it had suspended following 
the arms sale to Taiwan one year earlier, exerted diplomatic pressure on North Korea to cease its 
provocations against South Korea and to resume negotiations on its nuclear weapons program, and 
played a more cooperative role in the November 2010 climate change conference in Cancun than 
it had in Copenhagen.35 
Despite these and other constructive steps, China resumed its assertive approach in the 
following years, most notably through its expansive claims in the South China Sea. The frictions 
in U.S.-China relations that were associated with China’s rise and the changing distribution of 
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power in the international system, it appeared, would pose a long-lasting challenge. In this process, 
Russia had the potential to play an important role. The “reset” that the United States and Russia 
attempted in their relationship during this period therefore had potentially important implications 
for U.S.-China relations. 
 
The U.S.-Russia reset 
 
 In the post-Soviet period, Russia twice attempted a major foreign policy reorientation 
toward the United States and other Western countries. The first attempt came during the years 
immediately following the breakup of the Soviet Union, when President Boris Yeltsin and his 
administration sought to integrate Russia into the West. The second attempt came during the period 
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when President Vladimir Putin sought to 
trade concessions on several issues for stability in U.S.-Russia relations and U.S. recognition of 
Russia as an equal partner. Both attempts ended in disappointment. Moreover, both instances of a 
pro-Western tilt in Russian foreign policy aroused concerns in China but were followed, in the 
wake of their failure, by Russian diplomatic outreach to China. 
 The Obama administration’s attempted reset with Russia, by contrast, was a U.S. initiative. 
Russian leaders viewed the reset as an acknowledgment by the new administration that U.S. policy 
had been primarily responsible for the deterioration in bilateral relations and therefore required 
adjustment.36  One U.S. analyst speculated that concerns about China’s rise were a factor in 
Russia’s receptiveness to the Obama administration’s attempted reset, though he acknowledged 
that proving this had proven virtually impossible.37 In any case, changes in relative power within 
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the U.S.-Russia-China triangle were a source of concern in Russia. Some Russian analysts believed 
that the proposal for a G-2 involving the United States and China, the world’s two largest 
economies, was directed against Russia’s interests.38 Although this proposal never became official 
U.S. policy, the possibility that the United States and China might play the leading roles in global 
decision-making, while leaving Russia marginalized, loomed as the worst possible outcome for 
Russia.39 The prospect of a formal or informal G-2 therefore served as additional motivation for 
Russia to welcome the Obama administration’s outreach. As with the earlier instances of a pro-
Western tilt in Russian foreign policy, the attempted reset during Obama’s first term raised some 
issues that were potentially of concern to China, as discussed below.  
 Vice President Joe Biden announced the reset strategy during a speech at the Munich 
Security Conference in February 2009. He argued that NATO and Russia should seek cooperation 
in order to overcome a recent “dangerous drift” in their relations.40 As it pursued the reset, the 
Obama administration faced the challenge of dealing with the “tandem” of Medvedev and Putin. 
U.S. officials recognized that Putin would continue to wield considerable power, but they hoped 
that Medvedev’s arrival in the Kremlin would make the reset proceed more smoothly. It soon 
                                                          
assessment: “Russia was interested in the reset because in principle we want to have good relations with all 
countries, including the United States. I think that China was not a factor.” Author’s interview with Alexander 
Lukin, Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, June 3, 2014. 
38 Лукин А.В. Россия и Китай сегодня и завтра // Россия и Китай: четыре века взаимодействия—история, 
Современное состояние и перспективы развития российско-китайских отношений / Под ред. А.В. Лукина. 
М.: Весь мир, 2013. С. 623 [A.V. Lukin, “Russia and China Today and Tomorrow,” in Russia and China: Four 
Centuries of Interaction—History, Contemporary Conditions, and Prospects for the Development of Russia-China 
Relations, ed. A.V. Lukin (Moscow: Ves’ Mir, 2013), 623]. 
39 Титаренко М.Л. Геополитические значение Дальнего Востока. Россия, Китай и другие страны 
Азии. Москва. Памятники исторической мысли. 2008. С. 38 [M.L. Titarenko, The Geopolitical Meaning of the 
Far East: Russia, China, and Other Countries of Asia (Moscow: Pamyatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2008), 38]. 






became clear that every major decision required Putin’s approval, but Obama nevertheless dealt 
with primarily with Medvedev.41 
Strategic arms control was at the top of the agenda for the reset. The impending expiration 
dates for existing arms control agreements imposed a sense of urgency, as the 1991 START treaty 
was set to expire in December 2009, followed by the 2002 SORT agreement in December 2012. 
The negotiations for New START proved arduous, especially when Russia sought to link the 
agreement to limitations on U.S. missile defense plans. During the final stage of negotiations, in 
December 2009, the Russian side abandoned this linkage and agreed to the terms of the treaty. 
New START, which was to be implemented by February 2018, required both sides to deploy no 
more than 1,550 strategic warheads and no more than 700 strategic delivery vehicles. The total 
number of deployed and nondeployed launchers was not to exceed 800. The treaty also included 
extensive verification measures. For the United States, the treaty ensured significant reductions of 
Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. For Russia, the treaty reaffirmed Russia’s great-power status and 
the importance of arms control negotiations in U.S.-Russia relations.42 
As in the past, China supported progress in arms control between the United States and 
Russia. Following the conclusion of New START, however, some Russian analysts argued that 
China should participate in future arms control negotiations.43 On this issue, the interests of the 
United States and Russia might prove to be aligned, at least to some extent. 
In contrast with its approach toward Russia, the United States did not view the U.S.-China 
strategic relationship as one based on mutual deterrence. Indeed, the United States sought to delay 
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or even prevent China’s attainment of this status by developing missile defense systems and high-
precision weapons. Russia, meanwhile, was also concerned about China’s nuclear capabilities, 
despite its strategic partnership with China. Russia already faced a growing military imbalance in 
Asia resulting from the growing capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army, especially the PLA 
conventional forces based in northern China. Officially, Russia and China did not acknowledge 
that mutual deterrence was inherent in their strategic relationship. Nevertheless, as the 2010 
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation hinted, Russia’s deterrent capability against a potential 
Chinese invasion ultimately depended on the country’s nuclear forces, including both strategic and 
tactical nuclear weapons.44 If China were to attain the capability to launch nuclear strikes against 
the European part of Russia, then the credibility of Russia’s nuclear deterrent in the Russian Far 
East would be in doubt. 
China consistently argued that it would not participate in arms control negotiations until 
the United States and Russia first reduced their levels of strategic weaponry to levels that were 
closer to China’s. At the same time, China maintained secrecy about its total number of warheads, 
which international experts believed to number in the hundreds. In future arms control talks, 
China’s nuclear forces were likely to be on the minds of U.S. and Russian negotiators, whether or 
not Chinese negotiators were present at the table.45 
On the issue of missile defense, Obama altered the plans that he inherited from Bush. In 
September 2009, he cancelled the deployment of ground-based interceptors in Poland and a radar 
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facility in the Czech Republic. Instead, he planned to implement a four-phased deployment 
program, starting with smaller SM-3 interceptors that would be deployed first on ships and later 
on land, including in Europe. The Obama administration argued that Iran had achieved more 
success in testing short- and medium-range missiles, which the new system was designed to 
counter, than in testing long-range missiles, which were the target of the system that the Bush 
administration had envisioned. The administration insisted that it had not made the decision in 
response to Russian pressure, and it sought to reassure Poland and the Czech Republic of U.S. 
support. Medvedev expressed appreciation for Obama’s decision.46  
The United States also sought to achieve agreement between NATO and Russia on a 
cooperative missile defense program. The NATO-Russia Council discussed this issue during its 
meeting in November 2010, held alongside the NATO summit in Lisbon.47 During this meeting, 
which Medvedev attended, the council agreed to conduct a threat assessment and to resume 
cooperation on this issue. Negotiations on a joint NATO-Russia missile defense system continued 
for the next year, but without achieving results. Russia remained suspicious about U.S. intentions 
for missile defense. Russian officials were especially concerned that the third and fourth phases of 
the Obama administration’s program could eventually threaten Russia’s nuclear deterrent.48 In 
November 2011, Medvedev announced that Russia would withdraw from negotiations on 
cooperative missile defense. The Russian president repeated his threat to deploy Iskander missiles 
                                                          
46 Peter Baker, “White House Scraps Bush’s Approach to Missile Shield,” New York Times, Sept. 17, 2009; Stent, 
The Limits of Partnership, 226-227. 
47 For an assessment of these discussions by a Russian expert, see Дворкин В. Перспективы противоракетного 
сотрудничества США/НАТО и России // Противоракетная оборона: противостояние или сотрудничество? / 
Под ред. А. Арбатова и В. Дворкина. М.: Московский Центр Карнеги, 2012. С. 192-211 [Vladimir Dvorkin, 
“Prospects for Counter-Missile Cooperation Between the United States/NATO and Russia,” in Alexei Arbatov and 
Vladimir Dvorkin, eds., Missile Defense: Confrontation or Cooperation (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2012), 
192-211]. 
48 Richard Weitz, “Illusive Visions and Practical Realities: Russia, NATO and Missile Defense,” Survival 52, no. 4 




in Kaliningrad, which he had first made the day after Obama was elected, and also warned that 
Russia might withdraw from New START in the absence of U.S. willingness to limit its missile 
defense capabilities.49 
Although China did not publicly raise objections to negotiations on cooperative missile 
defense between NATO and Russia, some Russian experts believe that China must have been 
concerned. In their view, China might have perceived a NATO-Russia cooperative missile defense 
system as an “anti-Chinese conspiracy” that would have damaged China-Russia relations and 
necessitated a large build-up of Chinese nuclear forces.50 During the NATO-Russia negotiations 
on cooperative missile defense, as Russian security expert Alexei Arbatov explained, the two sides 
discussed missile defense based on sectors. Under this arrangement, Western countries would have 
defended Russia against missiles flying over their territory, while Russia would have defended 
Western countries against missiles flying over its territory. The problem was that neither North 
Korea nor Iran, the two countries against which the United States and its NATO allies sought to 
defend themselves from missile attacks, would have fired missiles over Russian territory. Nor, for 
that matter, would any country targeting Russia have fired its missiles over North America or 
Europe. 
By this logic, the only possible target of a NATO-Russia cooperative missile defense 
system would have been China. This raised the possibility that Russia might have been obliged to 
shoot down Chinese missiles aimed at Western countries. China, which was already concerned 
about the possibility that U.S. national and theater missile defense systems would undermine its 
nuclear deterrent, naturally would have objected strenuously to such an arrangement. Chinese 
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officials did not voice such concerns publicly, but in Arbatov’s view, they could not have failed to 
notice these implications of the NATO-Russia discussions.51 In any case, the failure of these talks 
removed these concerns from the agenda of China-Russia relations. 
During the period of the reset, Russia also moved closer to the U.S. position on Iran.52 In 
September 2009, U.S. National Security Advisor General James Jones showed his Russian 
counterpart, Sergei Prikhodko, satellite images of an underground uranium enrichment facility in 
Qom. Iran had previously maintained the secrecy of this facility’s existence, and Russian 
intelligence had failed to detect it. Afterward, Russia became increasingly willing to impose new 
sanctions on Iran.53 
In June 2010, the UN Security Council approved a fourth round of sanctions on the regime 
in Tehran. Although the sanctions were less severe than what the United States and EU countries 
had sought, they were the most stringent to date. They aimed primarily to restrict weapons 
purchases and financial transactions by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which controlled 
Iran’s nuclear program.54 Russia also agreed to cancel its $800 million contract to sell S-300 air 
defense systems to Iran. 55  Russia and China both voted for the UN sanctions after making 
successful efforts to weaken them. As in previous rounds of Security Council debate on Iran’s 
nuclear program, China allowed Russia to take the leading diplomatic role in softening the 
sanctions. Once Russia agreed to support the sanctions, China lost the diplomatic cover that Russia 
had provided and would have been diplomatically isolated if it had exercised its veto authority or 
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otherwise opposed the sanctions. 56  Despite voting for the sanctions, both Russia and China 
continued to maintain close economic ties with Iran and to oppose potential military action against 
the regime in Tehran.57 
The United States and Russia also achieved important cooperation on Afghanistan. Obama 
had pledged during his presidential campaign to devote increased resources to military efforts in 
that country. He dispatched 21,000 additional troops to Afghanistan in March 2009, then 
announced a surge of 30,000 more troops in December of that year.58 Since the beginning of 
military operations in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, the United States had supplied its forces 
primarily along routes passing through Pakistan. As insurgent activity in Pakistan increased, 
however, the United States sought alternative supply routes. 
In early 2009, NATO opened the Northern Distribution Network, which consisted of 
transport routes passing from Europe across Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus before 
reaching Afghanistan. When Obama and Medvedev met for the first time, in April 2009 ahead of 
a G-20 summit in London, the Russian president suggested expanding the Northern Distribution 
Network. When Obama visited Moscow in July 2009 for a summit meeting, he and Medvedev 
signed an agreement providing for the transportation of both lethal and nonlethal supplies across 
Russian territory. The United States and Russia also cooperated in efforts to combat the heroin 
trade, and the U.S. Department of Defense signed a contract to purchase 21 Mi-17 helicopters from 
Rosoboronexport, the Russian agency responsible for weapons exports, for use in Afghanistan. 
Despite Russia’s concerns about a potential long-term U.S. military presence in Central Asia, 
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Russian officials continued to perceive an interest in supporting U.S. efforts to stabilize 
Afghanistan.59 
The U.S.-Russia reset therefore achieved some important successes during Obama’s first 
term, especially the conclusion of New START and cooperation on Iran and Afghanistan. Within 
a few years, however, U.S.-Russia relations began to deteriorate once again. This process led 
Russia to pursue its own “pivot to Asia” and eventually to embrace a closer partnership with China. 
China was receptive to Russia’s diplomatic outreach, especially as U.S.-China tensions over the 
South China Sea and other issues continued to rise. 
 
Continued cooperation in China-Russia relations 
 
 If the U.S.-Russia reset caused concern in China, whether in general or on specific issues 
such as strategic stability and Iran, Chinese leaders did not voice these concerns publicly. During 
the period of the reset, China and Russia continued to cooperate on a range of issues. They built 
the Russia-China oil pipeline spur, continued to discuss cooperation in the natural gas sector, 
supported each other on issues concerning state sovereignty, and expressed similar views on a 
range of global issues. 
 Hu Jintao made an official visit to Russia in June 2010. During this visit, he traveled to 
Yekaterinburg, where he attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit of heads 
of state, as well as the inaugural summit of heads of state for the BRIC grouping, which consisted 
of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. South Africa joined the latter grouping in December 2010 to 
form BRICS. The first BRICS summit was held in Sanya on China’s Hainan Island in April 2011. 
China and Russia held largely convergent interests within BRICS, with both countries seeing the 
                                                          




group as a forum for the expression of the non-Western world’s interests. Their points of emphasis 
differed slightly, however. China viewed the organization primarily as a forum for expanding 
economic cooperation, while Russia was interested in expanding its agenda to include a broad 
range of issues, including security.60 For Russia, the inclusion of India was also a way to balance 
China’s influence in this organization. 
 China and Russia also cooperated on issues concerning state sovereignty, whether their 
own or that of other countries. In July 2009, Russia supported China’s response to the outbreak of 
ethnic violence between Uighurs and ethnic Han Chinese in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang. 
Russia, along with the other SCO countries, approved a declaration stating that the unrest was 
“purely China’s internal affair” and supporting China’s efforts to “restore order in the region.”61 
 China and Russia held common views on the revolutions that erupted in the Arab world 
starting in late 2010. Unlike Western leaders and media organizations, they did not refer to this 
wave of revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria as an Arab “spring.” They perceived these 
revolutions much as they had viewed the “color revolutions” a few years earlier, namely as threats 
to domestic stability within sovereign states that threatened to spill into the surrounding region. 
The convergence of their views toward the Arab Spring, which reflected overlap in their national 
identities, promoted a further strengthening of the China-Russia relationship.62 Russia worried 
about the international consequences and the potential loss of its own influence in the Middle East, 
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as well as the possibility that the turbulence could spread to its own Muslim regions. China was 
concerned about the wave of revolutions spreading to Xinjiang.63 During Chinese Foreign Minister 
Yang Jiechi’s visit to Russia in May 2011, he and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov agreed 
to coordinate their countries’ positions toward the revolutions. The basis of their common stance 
was the principle that each state should determine its own fate, without outside interference.64 
China and Russia worked out their common position over the next few weeks and voted together 
on a series of resolutions in the UN Security Council pertaining to the Arab revolutions.65  
 Prior to the meeting between the foreign ministers, China and Russia had already voted 
together on resolutions concerning Libya, but they eventually concluded that they were mistaken 
in their approach. On February 26, 2011, China and Russia both voted in favor of Resolution 1970, 
which imposed sanctions on Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. On March 17, they abstained on 
Resolution 1973, which established a no-fly zone. China and Russia later concluded that NATO’s 
subsequent air strikes in Libya overstepped the UN mandate. This experience influenced their 
approach toward Syria in the months that followed. As Syria’s civil war intensified, China and 
Russia cooperated to protect Bashar Al-Assad’s regime from Security Council sanctions.66 In 
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October, China and Russia vetoed a Security Council resolution that would have raised the 
possibility of sanctions on Syria but would not actually have imposed them.67 This was to be the 
first of several such votes on Syria. Disagreements over the Syrian civil war became one of the 
issues that contributed to the demise of the U.S.-Russia reset. 
 
The end of the U.S.-Russia reset 
 
 In September 2011, Medvedev and Putin announced that they intended to switch roles once 
again. Putin would stand as the United Russia party’s presidential candidate during the March 
2012 presidential election. Earlier, Russia had amended its constitution, extending each 
presidential term to six years. This meant that Putin, following his return to the presidency, could 
remain in office continuously until 2024. In the December 2011 parliamentary elections, United 
Russia lost dozens of seats but maintained a large majority in the Duma. After both domestic and 
international observers reported that the elections were tainted by fraud, large crowds gathered in 
central Moscow to protest both the election results and Putin’s plan to return to the presidency.68 
Putin accused Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of inciting the protests by criticizing the integrity 
of the elections. “She set the tone for some actors in our country and gave them a signal,” Putin 
said. “They heard the signal and with the support of the U.S. State Department began active 
work.”69 Putin also accused Clinton of paying the demonstrators, which she denied.70 Putin was 
determined to prevent the emergence in Russia of anything resembling the earlier “color 
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revolutions” or the Arab Spring. In March 2012, Putin won the presidential election with more 
than 63 percent of the vote. 
 From the time of the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Russia consistently sought 
to protect the Assad regime from international pressure. The Assad regime was Russia’s last 
remaining ally in the Arab world. Russia also maintained a naval base in Tartus, Syria, though its 
operations were of only minor significance. If the Assad regime were to collapse, then Russia 
might suffer a loss of its influence in the Middle East. Putin warned that if the Assad regime fell, 
its successor might be an Islamist regime that would spread radicalism throughout the region. This 
radicalism might even reach Russia’s own Muslim populations. Russia therefore blocked all 
proposals for sanctions, support for Syria’s opposition forces, and calls for international military 
intervention that arose in the UN Security Council.71 
 Other issues also contributed to the decline of the reset. In December 2012, Obama signed 
legislation repealing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, thereby enabling the establishment of 
permanent normal trading relations between the United States and Russia. At the same time, 
however, he signed into law the Magnitsky Act, which imposed penalties on Russia over alleged 
human rights violations.72 The act was named for Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer who had 
uncovered evidence of a large tax fraud scheme carried out by law enforcement and tax collection 
officials as part of an attack on Hermitage Capital, the brokerage firm for which he worked. 
Magnitsky later died in prison, allegedly after being denied medical care and beaten. The 
Magnitsky Act denied visas to Russians connected with Magnitsky’s death, froze their U.S. assets, 
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and allowed the names of other alleged human rights abusers to be added to the list in the future. 
Russia responded by banning U.S. adoptions of Russian children.73 
The next year, Russia agreed to accept Edward Snowden, a contractor for the U.S. National 
Security Agency who had leaked large troves of classified documents to WikiLeaks. After leaving 
the United States, Snowden first flew to Hong Kong. The Chinese authorities soon decided not to 
allow him to stay, but Snowden contacted Russian diplomats in Hong Kong and was soon on a 
plane to Moscow, where he arrived on June 23. After weeks of negotiations, Russia decided to 
grant temporary political asylum to Snowden. The United States responded by cancelling the U.S.-
Russia summit that was planned for Moscow in September and was to be held just before the G-8 
meeting in St. Petersburg. Obama called for a “pause” in U.S.-Russia relations.74 The downturn in 
U.S.-Russia relations during the summer of 2013, coming just after the June 2013 Sunnylands 
summit between Obama and Xi, may have rekindled Russian concerns about a G-2 world order 
that would marginalize Russia.75 
The United States and Russia quickly re-engaged diplomatically over Syria, however. In 
September 2013, Obama considered ordering air strikes against the Assad regime for its chemical 
weapons attack the previous month, which killed 1,400 people. Obama ultimately scrapped this 
plan, instead accepting a Russian proposal to ensure that Syria’s chemical weapons would be 
removed or destroyed by the middle of 2014.76 Despite this deal, U.S.-Russia tensions over Syria 
continued for many years afterwards. The bilateral relationship had soured considerably since the 
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early days of the reset. It was now on the verge of another crisis, this time in Ukraine, that would 
cause the relationship to plunge to yet another post-Cold War low. 
 
Managing turbulence in U.S.-China relations 
 
 As the U.S.-Russia reset lost momentum and tensions between Washington and Moscow 
began to rise, the U.S.-China relationship endured both friction and signs of promise. Although 
China appeared in late 2010 to pull back from its assertive foreign policy of the previous two years, 
signs of assertiveness soon returned. This tendency was apparent in both the South China Sea and 
the East China Sea. China also prepared for its leadership transition, with Xi Jinping set to be 
become Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012 and President of 
the People’s Republic of China in March 2013. Xi’s first foreign visit as China’s new leader, in 
March 2013, was to Russia, signaling the importance that China attached to this relationship. Just 
over two months later, however, Obama hosted Xi for wide-ranging talks at the Sunnylands estate 
in California. 
 China’s 2012 dispute with the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal signaled a continuation 
of China’s assertive diplomacy in the South China Sea. In April, the Philippines dispatched a naval 
vessel to arrest Chinese fishermen for hunting giant clams and other endangered species, in 
violation of Philippine law, in waters surrounding the disputed territory. China responding by 
sending its own maritime surveillance ships that were patrolling the area to prevent the fishermen’s 
arrest. The Chinese vessels sealed the mouth of the shoal’s lagoon and prevented further entry by 
ships from the Philippines. As the standoff grew more intense, the United States engaged both 
sides diplomatically. In June, the United States brokered a deal that was supposed to require both 




During that summer’s ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), China succeeded in preventing the body 
from taking a stand against China’s behavior. 
As part of its effort to divide ASEAN, China provided investment and assistance to 
Cambodia, the host of that summer’s AFR. Because of its divisions over the South China Sea, the 
ARF that year failed, for the first time in its history, to issue a joint communiqué. China’s victory 
in this episode seemed to offer a model for asserting its interests and territorial claims. Under this 
approach, China could mount challenges to rival claimants, often in response to their provocations, 
at a sufficiently low level of intensity that the United States was unlikely to respond militarily.77 
China used similar tactics in July 2012, when it announced the formation of Sansha City, a new 
city government structure in Hainan Province, to which it assigned jurisdiction over the Spratly 
Islands, Paracel Islands, and Macclesfield Bank, all of which are territories that China claims in 
the South China Sea.78  
 During the fall of 2012, China-Japan tensions once again rose over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands. In September, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda decided that the government would 
purchase the islands from the Japanese family that owned them privately. Noda’s intent was to 
prevent the purchase of the islands by right-wing organizations. China, however, accused Japan of 
trying to change the status quo by “nationalizing” the islands. Anti-Japanese protests erupted 
throughout China, and China-Japan relations deteriorated.79 
 During this period, China sought Russia’s firm backing in its maritime disputes but was 
largely disappointed in Russia’s stance. In seeking Russia’s support, China noted that both 
countries had territorial disputes with Japan. Nevertheless, Russia maintained neutrality on China’s 
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maritime and territorial disputes. Russian leaders did not wish to be drawn into these disputes, in 
which they perceived no vital interest. Dai Bingguo appealed for Russia’s support during a visit to 
Moscow in August 2012, but he failed to secure the desired support. Instead, Russia pursued a 
possible settlement of its territorial dispute with Japan and strengthened ties with Vietnam during 
this period, as discussed below.80 
 Despite these continued areas of tension in U.S.-China relations, the Obama administration 
hoped to forge a strong relationship with new Chinese President Xi Jinping. In June 2013, just 
three months after the National People’s Congress selected Xi as president, Obama hosted Xi at 
Sunnylands. During this summit, the two leaders agreed that they would seek to prevent the U.S.-
China relationship from descending into a new Cold War or a dangerous confrontation between 
an established superpower and a rising challenger. They disagreed on issues such as 
cyberespionage and China’s claims in the South China Sea but discussed ways to manage these 
disagreements. Xi suggested that China would seek to rein in the excessively provocative behavior 
of North Korea’s young leader, Kim Jong-un. Xi proposed that the United States and China attempt 
to forge a “new type of great-power relationship.”81 
 The Sunnylands summit offered grounds for optimism about the future of U.S.-China 
relations. However, Xi Jinping refused to back down on China’s maritime claims during this 
summit. Later in 2013, China declared an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China 
Sea. China’s policies toward its maritime territorial claims would grow increasingly assertive, 
especially when China began building and militarizing artificial islands in the South China Sea. 
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China-Russia Relations on the Eve of the Ukraine Crisis 
 
Russia debates its China policy 
 
 As the U.S.-Russia reset lost momentum and relations with the West began to sour, Russia 
considered its foreign policy options in Asia. Soon after the Obama administration announced its 
pivot to Asia, Russia began to explore its own pivot to the region. In September 2012, Russia 
hosted the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Vladivostok, a Pacific 
port city in the Russian Far East. This was the first time that Russia had hosted an APEC summit. 
In an op-ed published in advance, Putin wrote of his country’s intention to capitalize on the Asia-
Pacific’s dynamism in order to increase shipment of goods through Russian territory between 
Europe and Asia and to stimulate the development of Siberia and the Russian Far East.82 Putin 
praised the state of Russia’s relations with China, asserting that the bilateral relationship was at an 
“unprecedented high level.”83 At the same time, Russia sought to expand ties to other Asian 
countries. During the summit, Gazprom and Japan signed a contract to build a multibillion-dollar 
transfer station to increase Russian gas exports to Japan.84 The next year, during the June 2013 St. 
Petersburg International Economic Forum, Putin announced that Russia would seek to stimulate 
its economy by expanding economic ties with Asia.85 In 2013, Japan activated its diplomacy 
toward Russia, raising hopes that the two countries might be able to settle their territorial dispute 
over the Kuril Islands.86 
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 Russia’s plans for its own pivot to Asia provoked many questions, including whether or 
not Russia had the capacity to pursue such a policy successfully, as well as the proper balance that 
it should seek in its portfolio of relationships in Asia. These questions were directly related to the 
domestic debate on Russia’s policy toward China. Broadly speaking, the mainstream debate on 
Russia’s China policy fell into three main camps: a group wishing to strengthen relations with 
China in order to confront the West, a Western-oriented group favoring Russia’s participation in 
the international community, and a group favoring balanced relations featuring strong ties with 
China matched by good relations with other countries in Asia and around the world.87 Outside of 
the mainstream, some critics called for an alliance with China or, on the contrary, argued that 
Russia should reverse its recent strategic rapprochement with China and instead prepare to address 
an imminent Chinese threat. 
 The group favoring closer relations with China in order to confront the West centered on 
the Institute of the Far East and its longtime director, Mikhail Titarenko, who died in 2016.88 
Titarenko argued that Russia’s unique geography, history, and culture required the country to 
maintain balance in its relations between East and West. In his view, the “hegemonistic” actions 
of the United States, including NATO expansion and the Kosovo war, required Russia to enlist 
China’s support, not to form an “anti-American front,” but to resist such unilateralist tendencies 
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in U.S. foreign policy.89 Although Titarenko and most other advocates of this position stopped 
short of calling for a military alliance with China, some analysts in this camp argued that such an 
alliance was necessary. For example, Anatoly Klimenko, a retired general, argued that Russia and 
China should form an alliance within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization for the purpose of 
resisting the spread of Western influence in Central Asia.90  
 Representative of the group supporting Russia’s deep engagement in the international 
community were analysts such as Dmitri Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Center and Vasily 
Mikheev of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations.91 Trenin argued that 
Russia not only would have to abandon imperialism, but also lacked the capacity to pursue a 
foreign policy of multipolarity and strategic independence. Those advocating the latter course, 
who often considered themselves to be Eurasianists, argued that Russia should respond to 
humiliation at the hands of the West by re-establishing its leading role in post-Soviet territories, 
especially within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and form alliances with China, 
India, and Iran. In this way, Russia could establish itself as an independent center of power in a 
multipolar world. 
In Trenin’s view, however, Russia lacked the economic strength to play this role. Indeed, 
Russia’s most serious attempt to pursue such a course, which Yevgeny Primakov had led during 
his tenure as foreign minister and prime minister, demonstrated its futility. Trenin argued instead 
that Russia, while conducting a policy of openness in the Asia-Pacific region designed to 
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encourage the development of Siberia and the Russian Far East, should follow a pro-Europe course 
and aim to become part of Greater Europe.92 The largely pro-Western orientation of analysts such 
as Trenin and Mikheev grew increasingly marginalized over time. However, Trenin later argued 
that Russia’s status as a “Euro-Pacific power” still required careful attention to both the East and 
the West. The EU remained Russia’s most important resource for modernization, though Russia 
also had no choice but to maintain good relations with China.93 
 Another viewpoint, the one closest to Russia’s official policy in recent years, held that 
Russia should build close relations with China while attempting to maintain balance in its foreign 
policy, both at the global level and in the Asia-Pacific region. Two scholars advocating this view 
were Yevgeny Bazhanov and Alexander Lukin, the rector and vice-rector respectively of the 
Diplomatic Academy of Russia. Both are China specialists. 
 Bazhanov argued that Russia had grounds to view China as a long-term, reliable partner. 
Both countries required stability along their 2,600-mile border, and both sought to resist what they 
considered U.S. hegemony. 94  Russia should cooperate with China in seeking to establish a 
multipolar world, which would induce restraint in U.S. foreign policy, Bazhanov argued. At the 
same time, Russia should maintain balance in its foreign policy, both in the international system 
as a whole and in the Asia-Pacific region in particular. Russia had the opportunity to build close 
relations with all Asian countries. For example, because of Japan’s concerns about China’s rise, 
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Russia could improve relations with Japan even without resolving the territorial dispute over the 
Kuril Islands.95 
Bazhanov rejected several alternative policy options, including the formation of an alliance 
with China, attempts to balance against China, or efforts to instigate regional conflict. China would 
reject proposals for an alliance because its security and economic growth depended on continued 
cooperation with the United States, while an alliance would be perilous for Russia because the 
country would risk unnecessary involvement in China’s conflicts in Asia.96 Nor should Russia, 
which requires cooperation with its giant neighbor, respond favorably to any potential efforts by 
the United States to enlist Russia in a balancing coalition against China.97 Equally mistaken would 
be attempts, in the words of a Chinese expression, to “sit on the mountain and watch the tigers 
fight.”98 This strategy, in which Russia would seek advantage by waiting for other actors in the 
Asia-Pacific region to exhaust each other through conflict, would harm Russia’s interests by 
undermining regional security and economic prosperity.99 
 Lukin expressed similar views, arguing that Russia required good relations with China both 
for economic and strategic reasons, but should also seek balance in its foreign policy. In Lukin’s 
view, Russia could leverage its relations with China in order to strengthen its own position as an 
independent center of power in the international system.100 At the same time, Russia should seek 
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balance by strengthening relations with other global actors, including the United States, the 
European Union, and India, as well as with actors in the Asia-Pacific region, including Japan, 
South Korea, and the ASEAN countries.101 
In some cases, such a course could cause tension in China-Russia relations. For example, 
China reacted somewhat warily to improving relations between Russia and Vietnam during this 
period, which included the sale of Russian submarines to Vietnam and Russia-Vietnam energy 
cooperation. China was especially concerned about potential cooperation between Russian and 
Vietnamese companies in the development of offshore oil and gas resources, though Russia 
promised not to carry out any such activities in territories disputed by China and Vietnam. China 
also closely monitored the possibility of the Russian navy’s return to Cam Ranh Bay, which 
Medvedev discussed during his visit to Vietnam in November 2012. However, Lukin argued that 
China was likely to view a Russian naval presence at the base as preferable to the emerging U.S. 
naval presence there.102 He cited an editorial in China’s Global Times arguing that a potential 
Russian naval presence at Cam Ranh Bay would create complications but ultimately would 
increase China’s room for maneuver in the region.103  This issue, in Lukin’s view, helped to 
illustrate why the proper course for Russia was to develop constructive relations with all of the 
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countries of the Asia-Pacific region while refraining from taking a position on their territorial 
disputes.104 
 Lukin’s advocacy of a balanced portfolio of relations in the Asia-Pacific region stemmed 
partly from his long-term concerns about China’s trajectory. In particular, he expressed concern 
about the potential for growing nationalism in China. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, he 
noted, several books with strong nationalistic themes were published in China. Among the 
arguments made in these books were that the United States sought to encircle China and that China 
should increase its military presence overseas in order to secure natural resources.105 Although 
these arguments contradicted the official position of foreign policy restraint that China had adopted 
under Deng Xiaoping, they appeared to represent the opinions of many members of China’s elite, 
especially in the military. If such opinions were to gain ascendance in China’s future foreign policy, 
then many surrounding countries, including Russia, would have cause for grave concern. Although 
this scenario remained hypothetical, it suggested that Russia would be wise to cultivate other 
partners in Asia and around the world.106 The tension between efforts to maintain good relations 
with China and the desire to strengthen relations with other countries in Asia, which was apparent 
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both in Russia’s official policy and in the policy recommendations of analysts such as Bazhanov 
and Lukin, seemed unlikely to disappear in the near future.107 
Although their views were well outside of the mainstream, Russian analysts such as 
Alexander Khramchikhin believed that the China threat was already apparent and growing. 
Khramchikhin argued that China, beset by domestic problems including overpopulation, land 
shortage, and scarce resources, eventually would invade Russia and seize large swathes of land in 
Siberia and the Russian Far East.108 In 2009, China conducted military exercises simulating a 
large-scale land invasion, which in Khramchikhin’s view could only have been a dress rehearsal 
for an attack on Russia.109 Although Khramchikin considered a Chinese invasion of Russia to be 
virtually inevitable, he believed that it would occur only after the PRC had first regained de facto 
control of Taiwan. Khramchikhin acknowledged that his views were well outside of the 
mainstream in Russia, but he said that he expected them to gain support in the coming years.110 
Despite the lack of mainstream support in Russia for such views, Russian military planners 
appeared to devote increasing attention to the contingency of a Chinese land invasion.111 China’s 
2009 military exercise, called Stride-2009, stimulated a discussion in the Russian media of the 
potential threat from China. The Russian military also responded, both in doctrine and in 
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exercises.112 As mentioned previously in this chapter, Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine, for the first 
time in the post-Cold War era, hinted at a potential military threat from China.113 
In June and July of 2010, the Russian military conducted the biennial Vostok (East) 
military exercises in the Siberian and Far Eastern military districts. Army General Nikolai 
Makarov, the Chief of the General Staff and commander of the exercises, insisted that the exercises 
were not aimed at “any one country or bloc.” However, given the exercises’ geographical setting, 
participating forces, and simulated operations, outside experts argued that the true purpose was to 
test the Russian military’s ability to defend the country’s eastern regions against a potential 
Chinese invasion.114 On the final day of the exercises, the Russian military appeared to simulate a 
tactical nuclear strike against enemy forces. The exercise may have sought to determine how long 
Russian conventional forces could withstand an invasion by the PLA before resorting to the use of 
nuclear weapons.115 Given the rapid buildup of PLA capabilities and the sharp reductions in 
military power deployed in Russia’s eastern regions since the late Soviet era, the defense of Siberia 
and the Russian Far East ultimately depended on the large-scale use of nuclear weapons, which 
Russia would have to use in the early stages of military action.116 
Subsequent episodes also revealed Russia’s concerns about China’s growing power. 
During the summer of 2012, China sent a large icebreaker, the Snow Dragon, on an expedition to 
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the Arctic region. As the Snow Dragon sailed through the Sea of Okhotsk, Russia launched military 
exercises in the region, including tests of anti-ship missiles on nearby Sakhalin Island. The 
following summer, immediately following the conclusion of joint China-Russia naval exercises, 
five Chinese warships departed from the site of the exercises and entered the Sea of Okhotsk. They 
sailed south of Sakhalin, through the Kurils, and then in a circle around Japan before returning 
home. Although the Chinese ships remained in international waters throughout their journey, 
Russia responded swiftly. Just hours after the Chinese ships entered the Sea of Okhtosk, Putin 
called snap military exercises in the region. He flew to Chita, a city along the border with China, 
and to Sakhalin to observe the maneuvers, which were Russia’s largest land and sea exercise in 
the region since the end of the Cold War. The Chinese ships’ entry into the Sea of Okhotsk 
appeared to energize Russia-Japan diplomacy throughout the rest of 2013.117 
On the eve of the Ukraine crisis, therefore, Russia was attempting a delicate balancing act. 
The Russian leadership continued to cultivate China as a partner, especially as relations with the 
United States soured. At the same time, Russia worried about the implications of China’s growing 
power and tried to maintain a balanced portfolio of relations with other powers in Asia and around 
the world. When the Ukraine crisis arose, this balance became increasingly difficult to maintain. 
Meanwhile, on the eve of the Ukraine crisis, Chinese analysts also debated their country’s 
relationship with Russia. 
 
  
                                                          





China debates its Russia policy 
 
 Xi Jinping’s first trip abroad as president was to Moscow, underscoring the priority that 
China placed on relations with Russia. Xi made this visit in March 2013, just eight days after he 
ascended to the presidency of the PRC. During this visit, the two countries discussed the 
construction of a gas pipeline from Russia to China, as well as Russian sales of Su-35 fighter jets 
and Amur-class submarines to China. Xi proposed that China and Russia continue to cooperate in 
protecting “national sovereignty, security and development interests.”118 The desirability of close 
relations with Russia in the framework of a “strategic partnership,” rather than a military alliance, 
remained the consensus among China’s foreign policy elite. 
 With Russia and China both experiencing tension in their relations with the United States, 
however, a growing number of voices in China during this period called for an alliance with Russia. 
Zhang Wenmu, a scholar in Beijing, argued that China and Russia, both of which faced strategic 
pressure from the United States, should at least consider upgrading their relationship to an alliance. 
The purpose of such an alliance, he argued, would be to defend the postwar international structure 
established during the Yalta Conference. From China’s standpoint, the most important objective 
was to prevent Japan’s remilitarization.119 
The most prominent voice in China making a case for alliance with Russia was Yan 
Xuetong, a leading international relations scholar at Tsinghua University in Beijing.120 He argued 
that the structure of the international system was becoming bipolar, with the United States and 
                                                          
118 David M. Herszenhorn and Chris Buckley, “China’s New Leader, Visiting Russia, Promotes Nations’ Economic 
and Military Ties,” New York Times, March 22, 2013; David Lague, “China eyes $3.5 billion Russian arms deal 
despite ire over Sukhoi copy,” Reuters, March 27, 2013. 
119 张文木 ：《中俄结盟的限度，目标和意义》，《社会观察》，2012 年，第 3 期，第 84-87 页 [Zhang 
Wenmu, “The Limits, Objectives, and Meaning of a China-Russia Alliance,” Shehui Guancha, 2012 (3): 84-87]. 
120 The following section draws upon Brian G. Carlson, “China-Russia Relations and the Inertia of History,” 




China as the two poles. Under these circumstances, China needed allies, and it had no better 
strategic option than Russia. Yan laid out his case for an alliance with Russia in a 2012 article 
titled “Is Russia Reliable?”121 He fleshed out his view of the emerging world order, including the 
need for a China-Russia alliance, in his 2013 book Inertia of History: China and the World in the 
Next Ten Years.122 
As of 2013, Yan wrote, the structure of the international system was still unipolar.123 Yet 
the trend toward bipolarity was unmistakable, and by 2023, bipolarity most likely would be an 
established fact.124 In public statements, including joint declarations with Russia, Chinese leaders 
often expressed their desire for the formation of a multipolar world. The reasoning for this position, 
from China’s standpoint, was that in a world of several great powers, China would face less 
strategic pressure from the United States than if it were the sole challenger to the U.S. position.125 
Yan quoted Deng Xiaoping, who declared in 1990 that China would be satisfied with a world of 
three, four, or five great powers.126 
In Yan’s view, those in China who were expecting the emergence of multipolarity rather 
than a rapid transition to bipolarity were likely to be surprised. China was on track to become a 
major power, despite the inevitable slowdown in its rate of economic growth. By contrast, other 
candidates for great-power status, including Russia, Japan, and Europe, were all likely to be 
weaker in 2023 than they had been ten years earlier. Each would be reduced to the status of a 
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regional power, with little global influence.127  In the dying days of the Soviet Union, Deng 
predicted that Russia would always be one of the world’s leading powers, even if it were to lose 
the other Soviet republics.128 By 2013, Yan wrote, it was clear that this prediction was wrong.129 
In a bipolar world, Yan argued, China would have to abandon its policy of non-alignment. 
Deng originally proclaimed this strategy in 1982, when China began to pull away from a close 
alignment with the United States and to explore improved relations with the Soviet Union. The 
policy of non-alignment was rational during the late Cold War years, Yan writes, when China was 
not one of the superpowers in the bipolar structure.130 Under these circumstances, China could 
strengthen its bargaining position through non-alignment. It made sense to continue this policy in 
the era of unipolarity that followed the Soviet Union’s collapse, when China’s power lagged far 
behind that of the United States. In 1990, Deng also admonished China to “bide your time and 
hide your capabilities” (taoguang yanghui). 
In the emerging bipolar structure, however, the old logic would no longer hold. New 
circumstances would cause China to reconsider both the non-alignment strategy and the “bide your 
time and hide your capabilities” maxim.131 Two factors would force China to change its strategy, 
namely U.S. rebalancing toward Asia and the attitudes of neighboring countries toward China’s 
rise. These two factors were closely related. In the emerging U.S.-China competition, Yan argued, 
the United States would have a distinct advantage because it boasted dozens of allies, including 
several in Asia, whereas China lacked even one ally in the full sense of the term.132 
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In the coming U.S.-China strategic competition, friends would be especially important. 
This competition, Yan wrote, would not be a repeat of the Cold War, which was a struggle for 
world leadership featuring military buildups, proxy wars, ideological conflict, and severely 
restricted economic and cultural links. Instead, the United States and China would engage in a 
mixture of competition and cooperation. They would compete in the political and military spheres, 
but their competition was likely to be regional rather than global and was unlikely to erupt into 
war. Meanwhile, they would continue to seek economic cooperation, to enjoy strong cultural 
connections, and to avoid an overarching ideological dispute. In short, bipolarity would not 
automatically mean a new Cold War.133 
If the U.S.-Soviet confrontation was like a boxing match, with violence as a regular feature, 
Yan wrote, then the U.S.-China competition would be more like a soccer match, in which limbs 
would occasionally collide but violence would not be the main form of competition. U.S.-China 
relations would be primarily a team competition in which the objective was to win the support of 
other countries. China would have to win friends in order to ensure political support for its rise. 
This, in turn, would require China to consider forming alliances.134 
Under these circumstances, China had no better strategic option than alliance with Russia. 
China’s overtures to Russia were likely to receive a warm reception because Russia also had no 
better option than China. In the existing international environment, China and Russia had no 
possibility of joining the West because the United States could not accept China and Russia as 
allies. If the United States were to let Russia join NATO, then the European countries would no 
longer trust the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee. Likewise, if the United States were to 
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accept China as an ally, then U.S. allies in Asia would no longer believe that the United States 
would protect them. Both NATO and the U.S. alliance system in Asia would collapse.135 
Far from slackening, U.S. strategic pressure (zhanlue yali) on both China and Russia was 
likely to increase by 2023, Yan wrote. As the United States sought to reduce its commitments in 
the Middle East, it would attempt to strengthen its positions in Europe and Asia. U.S. opposition 
to the domestic and foreign policies of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who appeared likely to 
remain in office until 2024, would ensure continued tension in U.S.-Russia relations, while U.S. 
efforts to protect its position in Asia against a rising China would mean turbulence in U.S.-China 
relations as well. China and Russia both feared that the United States would attempt to arouse 
domestic opposition within their countries.136 
For China, alliance with Russia would become increasingly attractive as China assumed its 
No. 2 position in the world and expanded its global interests.137 Alliance with Russia would ensure 
the stability of China’s northern and western border regions, allowing China to focus on areas of 
strategic tension to the south and east. It would also prevent China from becoming isolated in the 
UN Security Council. Moreover, because China would be the stronger alliance partner, it would 
enjoy greater influence in the alliance than Russia.138 
For Russia, alliance with China also would have great value. Yan argued that Russia would 
continue to be more concerned about Western pressure than the growing power gap with China. 
The period during which Russian leaders and public opinion considered it unacceptable that 
China’s power should outstrip Russia’s had already passed. The “China threat theory” and fears 
of unrestrained Chinese immigration into the Russian Far East had also subsided. In the future, the 
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desire to harness China’s economic power in order to promote Russian domestic development 
would become a mainstream view.139 Alliance with China would allow Russia to strengthen its 
position in the Asia-Pacific region, though Russia would have to accept China’s growing influence 
in Central Asia.140 
Some Chinese critics, citing both the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance of the early Cold 
War era and Russia’s erratic behavior in recent years, argued that Russia would not be a reliable 
ally. Yet the nature of a China-Russia alliance in the present environment, Yan countered, would 
ensure Russia’s reliability. Relations among allies are different from relations among friends, he 
noted. Friendships are based on emotional connections, but alliances are based on interests. If the 
members of an alliance share significant mutual security interests, then they will be reliable allies, 
regardless of disagreements on other issues or their general feelings toward each other.141 
In some crucial respects, a new China-Russia alliance would be different from the Sino-
Soviet alliance of the 1950s. In the earlier alliance, the Soviet Union sought to play the role of “big 
brother” to China’s “little brother,” a relationship that China would not accept. At present, even 
though China’s comprehensive national power was rapidly outstripping Russia’s, Russia remained 
a first-rank military power, thus ensuring that a China-Russia alliance would be relatively equal in 
military terms.142 
During the period of Cold War alliance, the Soviet Union and China both sought to promote 
communism throughout the world. A new alliance, by contrast, would be a defensive alliance for 
the purpose of resisting outside strategic pressure and preventing the worsening of both countries’ 
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strategic environments. As Yan noted, studies in behavioral psychology had found that people 
were more determined to prevent loss than to increase gains. Therefore, a defensive alliance would 
be more reliable than an alliance devoted to worldwide ideological expansion.143 In addition to 
shared interests, Yan wrote, China and Russia had built a large reserve of strategic trust from their 
cooperation in recent years. They enjoyed greater strategic trust with each other than with other 
great powers. By 2023, he predicted, this would still be true.144 
Yan’s Chinese critics also argued that forming an alliance with Russia could stimulate a 
new U.S.-China Cold War or allow Russia to drag China into wars that were not in China’s 
interests. Yan argued, however, that the overall power positions of the United States and China, 
not outside factors such as Russia, would determine the nature of U.S.-China bipolarity. For 
example, the 2001 China-Russia treaty and the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization that same year did not heighten the structural contradictions between the United 
States and China, but the financial crisis that began in 2008 did. Moreover, Russia had fought a 
series of wars in the post-Soviet era, but none had required support from China or any other outside 
power. In the near future, Russia was unlikely to wage a war that would require military support 
from China.145 
Yan’s arguments aroused widespread opposition within the scholarly community, both 
among foreign policy generalists and among experts on Russia. Jiang Yi, an expert on Russia with 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, called the suggestion of forming an alliance 
with Russia “irresponsible.”  During the post-Soviet era, China and Russia had never based their 
relations primarily on opposing the United States, he argued. Rather, the main driving force was 
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the desire of both countries to become “good neighbors” in order to avoid the tensions of the past 
and to pursue mutual gain. The international environment was important, but only in a secondary 
role. Many of the common objectives that China and Russia pursued, including regional stability 
and increased economic exchange, had little connection with the United States. Even the aims of 
opposing hegemony and promoting multipolarity were not equivalent to opposing the United 
States. If China and Russia were to pursue an anti-U.S. alliance, they would risk the onset of a new 
Cold War and the loss of many benefits that their bilateral relationship produces.146 
Another powerful critique of Yan’s argument came from Zhao Huasheng, an expert on 
Russia and Central Asia at Fudan University in Shanghai.147 Zhao argued that Yan’s analysis 
contained several mistaken judgments about the nature of alliances, the costs and benefits of an 
alliance with Russia, and Russia’s own willingness to join an alliance. 
The formation of a military alliance entails a serious commitment. It requires the alliance 
partners to form a united position on security and to support each other militarily if war breaks out. 
China and Russia simply were not prepared for such a commitment, Zhao argued. The 2001 Treaty 
of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation included a clause that falls short of a mutual 
security guarantee but requires bilateral consultations in the event of a security crisis involving 
either country. China and Russia have never invoked this clause, neither in any of Russia’s wars 
in former Soviet territory nor during any of China’s crises with neighbors involving territorial 
disputes. After Russia’s war with Georgia in 2008, China declined to join Russia in recognizing 
the sovereignty of two breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. China traditionally has 
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made the preservation of state sovereignty a pillar of its foreign policy and has no desire to set a 
precedent that could encourage Taiwan’s independence or jeopardize Beijing’s rule over Xinjiang 
and Tibet. 
In any alliance, the members have two main worries, namely being abandoned or drawn 
into a war by their ally. In a potential China-Russia alliance, Zhao argued, both concerns would be 
acute. Yan’s assumption that Russia would not wage a war requiring China’s military support was 
imprudent, Zhao argued, because it would mean preparing from the outset not to honor a promise. 
If unforeseen circumstances were to lead either partner to break a promise of military support, the 
consequences could be tragic. 
Calls for an alliance with Russia also displayed a misunderstanding of Russia’s thinking, 
Zhao argued. Despite Yan’s insistence that Russia had no better strategic option than to form an 
alliance with China, Russia seemed not to think this way. Russia clearly sought increased 
cooperation with China. However, as discussed above, both the leadership and the scholarly 
community, including many scholars who are friendly toward China, consistently argued against 
alliance with China. The notion that Russia would be content to serve as the junior partner in an 
alliance that was increasingly lopsided in China’s favor misunderstood Russia’s mentality, Zhao 
argued. 
Russia also had good reason to avoid involvement in any U.S.-China confrontation, a point 
that both government officials and analysts reiterated regularly. The notion that Russia would “pull 
China’s chestnuts out of the fire” in the course of a U.S.-China confrontation, Zhao wrote, was 
unrealistic. Russia maintained neutrality on China’s territorial disputes in the South China Sea and 
the East China Sea. China had sought to form a united front with Russia in both countries’ island 




disputes are fundamentally different in structure, considering that Russia controls the disputed 
Kuril Islands, whereas Japan controls the Senkaku Islands. Even if China and Russia were to form 
an alliance, they would continue to act according to their own national interests. In practice, this 
would mean that China would stand aloof from Russia’s conflicts in Eastern Europe and the 
Caucasus, while Russia would maintain neutrality on China’s maritime disputes. 
Ultimately, Zhao argued, China and Russia could achieve all of the purported benefits of 
an alliance through their existing relationship, which they called a strategic partnership, without 
incurring the costs and risks of an alliance. Without forming an alliance, China and Russia could 
still maintain solidarity in the UN Security Council and provide mutual support in opposing what 
they viewed as undue U.S. strategic pressure. They could also avoid the inevitable disappointments 
and resentment that would result from an alliance in which aspirations for unity outstripped 
reality. 148  Despite the interest aroused by Yan Xuetong’s arguments, the Chinese leadership 
appeared unlikely to accept his recommendations for the foreseeable future, as Yan himself 
acknowledged.149 Soon, however, events would push Russia into a closer embrace, though still not 
an alliance, with China. 
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The Ukraine Crisis and Its Aftermath 
 
The Ukraine crisis 
 
 In late 2013, a dispute about the future orientation of Ukraine gathered force, developing 
into a crisis that exploded early the following year. As a result of this conflict, U.S.-Russia relations 
fell to yet another post-Cold War low. The crisis also led to a new stage in China-Russia relations. 
In the run-up to the crisis, competing visions for Ukraine’s orientation, whether toward 
Euro-Atlantic structures or toward Russia, became irreconcilable. Russia ultimately concluded that 
Ukraine’s attempts to build closer relations with the European Union were incompatible with 
Putin’s developing vision for Russian-led Eurasian integration. Putin introduced his plans on this 
subject during the fall of 2011, as he prepared for his return to the presidency. In 2010, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, and Belarus had formed a customs union. The following year, after announcing his 
intention to return to the Kremlin, Putin revived an older proposal by Nursultan Nazarbaev, the 
president of Kazakhstan, to create the Eurasian Economic Union.150 Putin sought to create a new 
center of power in Eurasia.151 His primary goal was to create a new Russian-led “pole” in a 
multipolar world.152 This would enable Russia to resist any further encroachments of Euro-Atlantic 
structures into the territories of the former Soviet Union. Putin hoped to strengthen the union by 
integrating Ukraine, which had the second-largest economy among post-Soviet countries, trailing 
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only Russia itself. Ukraine’s heavy industrial sector, which was centered in the eastern part of the 
country, was still closely integrated into Russia’s own military-industrial complex.153 
 Viktor Yanukovych, who had lost the 2004 presidential election that gave rise to the 
Orange Revolution, was elected president of Ukraine in 2010 following several years of ineffective 
governance by the victorious forces in that revolution. Two months after he was elected, 
Yanukovych extended Russia’s lease on the naval base at Sevastopol, Crimea, the home of 
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, until 2042. The lease had been set to expire in 2017. He also stated that 
Ukraine would remain neutral and not seek NATO membership.154 Although Russia had regarded 
him as its favored candidate, Yanukovych remained noncommittal about joining the Eurasian 
Economic Union. Meanwhile, he began negotiations on an Association Agreement and free trade 
agreement with the European Union. Previously, Russia had been most concerned about Ukraine’s 
potential membership in NATO and had taken a relaxed attitude toward the prospect of closer 
Ukrainian ties with the EU. In the fall of 2013, however, the Russian government concluded that 
the proposed upgrading of Ukraine’s relationship with the EU would have harmed Russia-Ukraine 
economic ties and precluded Ukrainian membership in the Eurasian Union.155 
 Russia soon began to impose economic pressure on Ukraine in an effort to deter the country 
from signing an agreement with the EU. Among other measures, it blocked the delivery of 
Ukrainian goods by truck to Russia. These efforts appeared to succeed. In November, Yanukovych 
announced the suspension of negotiations with the EU. Soon afterward, Russia announced that it 
would loan $15 billion to Ukraine, which was suffering a deep economic crisis and facing the 
possibility of default on government debt. Yanukovych’s decision to withdraw from negotiations 
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with the EU prompted mass protests in Kyiv’s Maidan Square. The protestors, most of whom came 
from the central and western parts of Ukraine, composed a diverse coalition of liberals, nationalists, 
and other forces. Through visits by Assistant Secretary of State for Europe Victoria Nuland and 
other U.S. officials, the United States demonstrated its support for the Maidan protesters. Russian 
officials accused the United States of masterminding the demonstrations. They also seized upon 
the presence of some far-right forces among the protesters to label the movement “fascist.” The 
protests continued from late 2013 into early 2014, punctuated by sporadic police violence against 
the demonstrators.156 
 After violence erupted on February 19 and 20, the foreign ministers of Germany, France, 
and Poland, as well as Vladimir Lukin, a former Russian ambassador to the United States, 
convened in Kyiv to negotiate an agreement among Yanukovych and Ukrainian opposition forces. 
On February 21, the Ukrainian president signed an agreement with the opposition leaders that was 
intended to resolve the crisis. The signatories agreed to move the presidential elections forward to 
December 2014, conduct constitutional reform, and commission an independent investigation into 
the violence on Maidan. That very night, however, Yanukovych fled Kyiv, possibly to avoid 
capture and harm at the hands of opposition forces. He eventually arrived in Rostov, Russia. The 
Ukrainian parliament, the Rada, quickly moved the presidential election forward to May 25 and 
granted amnesty to protestors whom Yanukovych’s government had accused of violence during 
the Maidan movement. Russia accused a “fascist junta” of the unconstitutional ouster of a 
democratically elected president.157 
Russia soon moved to exact a price for the overthrow of Yanukovych’s government. Putin 
ordered surprise military exercises along Ukraine’s border. Hundreds of troops bearing no insignia, 
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who became known as “little green men,” then poured into Crimea, occupying municipal buildings 
in Sevastopol, raising the Russian flag above them, and warning the Ukrainian government not to 
intervene. Russia quickly organized a referendum in Crimea, which was held on March 16. The 
Russian government claimed that 96 percent of voters cast their ballots in favor of Crimea’s 
unification with Russia. Putin announced Russia’s annexation of Crimea during a speech at the 
Kremlin on March 18.158 He justified the annexation as an effort to protect the population of 
Crimea, more 60 percent of which was ethnic Russian, from a hostile government in Kyiv. Putin 
also reportedly was concerned that the new Ukrainian government would evict the Russian Black 
Sea Fleet from Sevastopol. Russia quickly consolidated its control over the peninsula, and Ukraine 
stood little chance, for the foreseeable future, of regaining it.159 
Russia’s actions triggered strong international criticism, however. The annexation violated 
the 1994 Budapest memorandum, in which Ukraine had agreed to give up its nuclear weapons and 
the other signatories, namely Russia, the United States, and Britain, had agreed to recognize and 
uphold Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Most countries refused to recognize Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea, and the United Nations General Assembly voted to condemn it. The G-8 suspended 
Russia’s membership. The United States imposed sanctions on Russians who were involved in the 
annexation and barred several Russian government officials and businessmen, including chief of 
the presidential administration Sergei Ivanov and Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin, from entering the 
United States.160 In addition to their economic impact, the sanctions complicated Russia’s efforts 
to maintain balance in its foreign policy toward Asia. Japan, under pressure from the United States, 
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agreed to comply with the sanctions. Partly as a result, momentum toward a possible resolution of 
the Kuril Islands dispute stalled.161 
 During this period, as during the war in Georgia, China offered Russia only limited 
diplomatic support. In March 2014, China abstained from two votes in the United Nations that 
were critical of Russia’s actions, rather than joining Russia in vetoing them. On March 15, the day 
before the referendum in Crimea was held, the UN Security Council debated a resolution 
condemning the referendum. Russia’s veto ensured that the resolution would fail, but China 
declined to join Russia in vetoing the measure, instead opting to abstain. As in the case of Georgia, 
China was concerned about setting a precedent that would weaken the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of states and grant legitimacy to separatist movements. China remained concerned about 
the implications for Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. At the same time, China supported Russia’s 
position that outside forces had instigated the Maidan movement and that the overthrow of the 
Yanukovych government was illegitimate. “China has always respected the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of all states,” said Liu Jieyi, the Chinese ambassador to the UN. “At the same 
time, we have noticed foreign interference is also an important reason leading to violent clashes 
on the streets of Ukraine,” the ambassador said, adding that “we condemn and oppose all violent 
acts.”162 On March 27, China also abstained from a UN General Assembly resolution condemning 
the annexation of Crimea as illegal. This resolution passed with 100 votes in favor, 11 votes against, 
and 58 abstentions.163 
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 Soon after the annexation of Crimea, a separatist insurgency arose in eastern Ukraine. Once 
again, “little green men” entered the region and took over local government offices. The insurgents’ 
strongholds were in the cities and Donetsk and Lugansk, which they declared to be the “Donetsk 
People’s Republic” and the “Lugansk People’s Republic.” Despite Russia’s insistence that the 
insurgents were operating independently, they were in fact armed and financed by the Russian 
government. The insurgents sought to prevent the new government in Kyiv from gaining control 
of Ukraine’s eastern regions and to reunite these territories with Russia. Ukrainian military forces 
at times made advances against the insurgents, but Russia sent sufficient military equipment to 
prevent their defeat. On May 25, Petro Poroshenko was elected as Ukraine’s new president. Soon 
after his election, he signed the EU Association Agreement. The insurgency in the east, however, 
served Russia’s purpose of ensuring that Ukraine could not join NATO or become a full member 
of the EU.164 
 Fighting raged throughout the summer of 2014. In July, a passenger airliner traveling from 
the Netherlands to Malaysia was shot down in the skies over eastern Ukraine, killing all 298 people 
on board. U.S. officials offered evidence that the insurgents, most likely incorrectly identifying the 
airplane as a military craft, shot it down with a BUK anti-aircraft missile that Russia had supplied. 
Russian officials insisted that the Ukrainian military had shot down the plane. The United States 
responded by imposing additional, far-reaching sanctions. Capital flight from Russia accelerated, 
and the ruble lost about half of its value in 2014. In September, Russia and Ukraine agreed to a 
ceasefire during negotiations in Minsk, Belarus.165 Fighting continued in the years that followed, 
however, and even in the best-case scenario, the situation in Ukraine seemed likely to remain a 
“frozen conflict” for many years to come. 
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 In the wake of the Ukraine crisis, subsequent events caused a further deterioration in U.S.-
Russia relations. In September 2015, Russia launched a military intervention in Syria aiming to 
bolster the Assad regime. The competing objectives of the United States and Russia in Syria’s civil 
war caused ongoing tension, and the possibility that an accident or miscalculation could bring U.S. 
and Russian military forces into direct conflict was a major concern. Russia’s alleged interference 
in the 2016 U.S. presidential election caused a major scandal in the United States and made the 
prospect of improved U.S.-Russia relations seem exceedingly unlikely for the foreseeable future. 
All of this turbulence in U.S.-Russia relations occurred during a period in which China continued 
to increase its foreign policy assertiveness. 
 
China claims greater world role under Xi Jinping 
 
 Upon assuming the leadership of China, Xi Jinping made several moves in an effort to lay 
the groundwork for China to play an increasingly prominent role in the world. As with Putin’s 
return to the presidency of Russia, which heralded a period of renewed assertiveness in Russian 
foreign policy, Xi’s assumption of power in China was a factor that encouraged the strengthening 
of China-Russia ties.166 Under Xi’s leadership, China continued its recent pattern of foreign policy 
assertiveness in its maritime disputes, most notably by claiming an air defense identification zone 
(ADIZ) in the East China Sea, towing an oil rig into disputed waters off the coast of Vietnam, and 
by constructing artificial islands in the South China Sea and the installation of military 
infrastructure and equipment on some of them. Under Xi’s leadership, China also began to develop 
initiatives and to create institutions that could underpin China’s claim to world leadership in the 
future. These included the Belt and Road initiative to build infrastructure across the Eurasian 
                                                          




continent and in maritime domains, the Silk Road Fund to finance many of these projects, the 
creation of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, and participation in the BRICS Development 
Bank. 
 In November 2013, China announced the creation of an ADIZ in the East China Sea that 
covered sea and islands that Japan also claimed, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The 
Chinese ADIZ overlapped with an ADIZ that Japan had established in 1969. China’s 
implementation of the zone meant that aircraft entering the area would be required to identify 
themselves and provide their flights plans to Chinese authorities. China insisted that the zone 
would not impede commercial air traffic through the area, but the U.S. and Japanese governments 
protested China’s decision. They argued that the establishment of the zone could increase the risk 
of accidents or miscalculations leading to conflict.167 Days later, two U.S. B-52 bombers flew 
through the contested airspace, without following the procedures insisted upon by China, as a show 
of resolve.168 
 In May 2014, a dispute arose between China and Vietnam after the China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), a Chinese state-owned energy company, sent an oil drilling 
rig into waters that Vietnam claimed as its own. CNOOC stationed the rig 120 nautical miles off 
the Vietnamese coast and 17 nautical miles from the disputed Paracel Islands. Vietnam sent ships 
into the area to contest the Chinese oil rig’s presence. Both sides accused the other’s ships of 
ramming their own, and Chinese authorities acknowledged the use of water cannons in an effort 
to force the Vietnamese ships to disperse. Violent riots against China’s actions also broke out in 
Vietnam. The placement of the oil rig off Vietnam’s coast was among the most assertive steps that 
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China had taken to strengthen its maritime claims in the region.169 In July, China removed the rig 
from the region, perhaps having proven its point that it could make such moves with near impunity. 
 China also sought to bolster its territorial claims in the South China Sea by building 
artificial islands. In November 2014, satellite images showed that China had built an island about 
9,850 feet long and 985 feet wide on Fiery Cross Reef in the disputed Spratly Islands. This island, 
located 500 miles from the Chinese mainland, would be capable of hosting a runway for military 
aircraft and a harbor that would be large enough to dock warships.170 The next year, satellite 
images demonstrated that China, beginning in January 2015, dredged large volumes of sand and 
deposited it on top of Mischief Reef, thereby transforming this coral reef into an island. Pentagon 
officials accused China of attempting to strengthen its territorial claims in the region by creating 
“facts on the water.” Admiral Harry Harris, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, said that China 
was creating a “great wall of sand.”171 These efforts continued in the following years, as China 
calculated that it could proceed incrementally without encountering serious resistance. 
 In addition to its continued assertiveness in maritime disputes, China also advanced 
initiatives that could set the stage for a potentially enhanced world role in the near future. In 
September 2013, during a speech in Astana, Kazakhstan, Xi called for the creation of a Silk Road 
Economic Belt. Under this project, China would finance the construction of infrastructure from its 
own territory across the Eurasian continent to Europe and the Middle East.172 The following month, 
during a speech in Jakarta, Xi proposed the corresponding Maritime Silk Road for the 21st Century, 
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a concept under which China would fund construction of ports and other facilities in the maritime 
regions connecting China with South Asia and Africa.173 Together these two initiatives became 
known as One Belt, One Road, later shortened in the official translation to Belt and Road. In 
November 2014, China announced the creation of a $40 billion Silk Road Fund to finance 
infrastructure projects within the Belt and Road framework.174 
 China took other steps to lay the groundwork for a potential alternative financial order. 
Motivated by its belief that infrastructural financing in Asia was insufficient, as well as by 
frustration over not having a larger voice in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 
despite being the world’s second-largest economy, China established the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB). Xi discussed this initiative during his speech in Jakarta in October 2013, 
and he presided over the bank’s official launch in October 2014. The bank’s initial capitalization 
was to be $50 billion.175 The United States, concerned about China’s establishment of development 
banks that could rival established Washington-based institutions, lobbied its allies not to join. 
However, Britain decided in March 2015 to become a founding member of the AIIB, becoming 
the first G-7 country to do so and drawing a rebuke from the United States.176 France, Germany, 
and Italy soon followed Britain’s lead.177 Surprisingly for China, Russia delayed its decision on 
whether to become a founding member until after these European countries decided to join. Only 
in early April 2015 did Russia announce its decision to join. One Russian analyst attributed 
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Russia’s delay to bureaucratic roadblocks and preoccupation with the country’s economic 
difficulties in the wake of Western sanctions and a sharp drop in oil prices.178 Ultimately, China 
recognized 57 countries as founding members of the AIIB.179 
 Along with the formation of the AIIB, China also committed itself to become the biggest 
contributor to the newly formed BRICS Development Bank. China, Russia, and the other BRICS 
countries agreed to form the bank during their 2014 summit in Brazil and officially launched it the 
following year in Shanghai. The bank’s initial capitalization was to be $50 billion, an amount set 
to double in the following years.180 
 The simultaneous deterioration of U.S.-Russia relations and heightening of great-power 
tensions between the United States and China led to an increasing strategic convergence between 
China and Russia. This strategic convergence favored China, however. At a time when diplomatic 
isolation, Western sanctions, and plunging oil prices put heavy pressure on the Russian economy, 
China’s relative power was increasing, enabling China to negotiate increasingly favorable terms 
for its relations with Russia. 
 
A Strengthened China-Russia Partnership (2014-2016) 
 
 Following the onset of the Ukraine crisis, the strategic convergence of China and Russia 
accelerated. Both Russian and Chinese analysts argued that the increase in the strategic pressure 
that both countries faced from the United States drove them toward a closer partnership.181 In the 
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view of one Chinese analyst, U.S.-China relations developed smoothly during the first decade of 
the twenty-first century, but the United States became susceptible to the “Thucydides trap” during 
the 2010s. The announcement of the U.S. strategy of “rebalancing to Asia,” he argued, caused 
China’s relationships with the countries involved in its territorial disputes in the South and East 
China Seas to become increasingly tense. During this same period, the outbreak of the Ukraine 
conflict caused Russia’s tensions with the West to rise. 182  Under these circumstances, Putin 
traveled to China in May 2014 seeking China’s diplomatic and economic support. The joint 
declaration that Putin and Xi Jinping signed during this visit marked a “new depth and breadth of 
relations and the start of a new era in the relationship.”183 Progress in the relationship was apparent 
at the bilateral, regional, and global levels. 
 
Bilateral level: energy and arms sales 
 
 At the bilateral level, China and Russia struck important deals in energy and arms sales. In 
both cases, Russia’s diplomatic and economic isolation increased China’s bargaining leverage, 
allowing the Chinese government to conclude these deals on favorable terms. During Putin’s visit 
to China in May 2014, China and Russia signed a 30-year, $400 billion gas deal.184 The two leaders 
hailed the deal as a sign of their countries’ growing partnership, though in some ways the deal 
demonstrated the growing power imbalance in China’s favor. For example, news reports on the 
gas deal suggested that its terms were highly favorable to China. During more than a decade of 
negotiations, China drove a hard bargain. Even before the Ukraine crisis, Russia faced a narrowing 
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window of opportunity to enter China’s market for natural gas, as China’s options expanded 
rapidly. In 2009, China opened a gas pipeline originating in Turkmenistan and passing through 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, thus breaking Russia’s monopoly on Central Asian gas exports. 
Liquefied natural gas imports were increasingly available from the Middle East, North Africa, and 
Australia via maritime trade to LNG terminals in China, and potentially transported from LNG 
terminals in Myanmar to China by way of an overland pipeline. China also possesses potentially 
large domestic reserves of shale gas. The crisis in Ukraine merely added to the pressure on Russia 
to strike a deal. The protracted talks that led to the gas deal, like the similarly tortuous negotiations 
to build a Russia-China oil pipeline spur that opened in 2011, partly reflected Russia’s concerns 
about becoming an energy appendage of China. 
 During the following years, China-Russia military-technical cooperation revived after 
many years of declining sales. Russia agreed to sell China some of its most advanced systems, 
including the S-400 air defense system and 24 Su-35 fighter jets.185 Russia was willing to sell these 
weapons to China because they would be more useful against the United States and its Asian allies 
in a potential scenario of maritime conflict than in a potential invasion of Russia. This would have 
the benefit, for Russia, of shifting U.S. strategic attention away from Europe and toward the Asia-
Pacific theater.186 Although Russian officials continued to be concerned about potential Chinese 
copying of Russian weapons designs, they calculated that Russia would maintain its technological 
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lead for some time to come. For example, by the time China succeeded in producing its own 
version of the S-400, Russia might have moved on to the next-generation system, the S-500.187 
 
Regional level: mutual accommodation in Central Asia 
 
At the regional level, China and Russia took important steps to reach an understanding 
regarding their interests in Central Asia.188 Xi Jinping’s call for the creation of the Silk Road 
Economic Belt, which came during his speech in Astana in September 2013, aroused some anxiety 
in Russia. Xi’s proposal envisioned Chinese financing of infrastructure throughout Central Asia 
as a means of connecting China to Europe and the Middle East. Conceivably, therefore, the plan 
could significantly increase China’s influence in Central Asia, which had already grown rapidly. 
This prospect was potentially worrying for Russia, which ruled over Central Asia for more than a 
century during tsarist and Soviet times and continued to regard the region as its backyard. Russia’s 
concerns centered on uncertainty about China’s intentions and about Russia’s place in China’s 
plans. Russian officials refrained from criticizing the proposal publicly, but such concerns did 
appear in the Russian media.189 
The Russian and Chinese governments, meanwhile, embarked on a diplomatic effort to 
reach an understanding about the relationship between their Central Asian projects. An important 
first step came in February 2014, when Xi attended the Winter Olympics in Sochi. During his 
                                                          
187 Кашин. Поставка С-400 в Китай – новый фронт холодной войны? [Kashin, “The Delivery of the S-400 to 
China—A New Front in a Cold War?” 
188 This section draws upon Brian G. Carlson, “Don’t Wake Up Evil While It’s Quiet: Russia’s Response to China’s 
Growing Influence in Central Asia,” paper presented at International Studies Association Conference, Hong Kong, 
June 15-17, 2017. 
189 Панфилова В. “Центральная Азия становится китайской.” Независимая Газета. 3 сентября 2013 г. 
[Viktoria Panfilova, “Central Asia becomes Chinese,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Sept. 3, 2013.], 
http://www.ng.ru/cis/2013-09-03/6_asia.html; Тавровский Ю. “Пекин собирает горы и моря.” Независимая 





meeting with Putin, the two leaders discussed “joint construction of the Silk Road economic 
corridor.” By the time of Putin’s visit to China in May of that year, the two sides issued a joint 
declaration in which Russia expressed its positive appraisal of the Silk Road Economic Belt and 
of China’s willingness to consider Russia’s interests. These efforts culminated in the joint 
declaration issued during Xi’s visit to Moscow in May 2015, in which Russia and China pledged 
to link the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt.190 
Several factors helped to explain Russia’s willingness to accommodate China’s growing 
influence in Central Asia. One important factor was the value that Russia placed on the overall 
strategic relationship with China. At a time of diplomatic isolation and economic hardship, Russia 
could not afford to introduce tension into its relationship with China by aggressively challenging 
China’s moves in Central Asia. 
Within the context of an overall friendly relationship, China sought to reassure Russia 
about its intentions in Central Asia. In his speech in Astana, Xi articulated China’s “three no’s” in 
the region: China does not interfere in the region’s domestic politics, does not seek the right of 
leadership in the region’s affairs, and does not seek a sphere of influence in the region.191 Xi’s 
message, in the view of Chinese scholars, was intended to offer reassurance not only to the Central 
Asian countries themselves, but also to Russia.192 As China pursued its ambitious aims in the Belt 
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and Road, it recognized the importance of winning Russia’s support.193 If China were to implement 
the Silk Road Economic Belt in a way that damaged relations with Russia, wrote Zhao Huasheng, 
then China would risk “for the sake of a little, losing a lot.”194 
Officials and analysts in both countries emphasized that their interests in Central Asia 
converged to a significant degree. Zhao Huasheng argued that Russia and China shared common 
interests in support for the security of existing borders, the struggle against terrorism, support for 
regional stability, the effort to limit U.S. and NATO military presence in the region, and opposition 
to “color revolutions.”195 This hierarchy of Chinese interests, Alexander Lukin argued, should be 
acceptable to Russia.196 This hierarchy also established the preconditions for a potential “division 
of labor” in which China would serve as an engine of economic development, with special focus 
on infrastructural investment, while Russia would continue to play the main regional security role 
through the CSTO.197 Whether such an arrangement would be viable over the long run remained 
unclear, however. The possibility loomed that China, as its investments in Central Asia expanded, 
might increasingly perceive the need to increase its regional security role in order to protect these 
investments. 
 Whether or not such a division of labor could serve as the basis for a long-term 
accommodation of Russian and Chinese interests in Central Asia, the two countries continued to 
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confound expectations that they would fall into a heated strategic rivalry in the region. To the 
extent that a great game was being played in Central Asia, Zhao Huasheng wrote, the players were 
Russia and the United States, whose geopolitical interests in the region clashed. The lack of a 
strategic rivalry in Central Asia between China and Russia, he wrote, was a function of both the 
positive state of their overall relationship and their lack of competing geopolitical interests. 
Because China was focused on economic development rather than expanding its geopolitical 
influence in Central Asia, Russia did not perceive China’s regional policies as threatening.198 
Influential Russian scholars affiliated with the Valdai Discussion Club endorsed this view, arguing 
that Russia-China relations in Central Asia could develop a positive-sum character, in contrast to 
the zero-sum nature of Russia’s interactions with the West in this region.199 In the long term, 
however, geopolitical influence seemed likely to follow economic influence. If China were to shift 
to a policy of more overtly seeking an enhanced geopolitical position in Central Asia, then Russia 
might be forced to adjust its strategy. 
Even if Russia were determined to block China’s growing economic influence in Central 
Asia, it had few options for doing so, at least in terms of normal economic competition. Russia 
was simply unable to compete with China, the world’s second-largest economy, in the economic 
sphere. It could not match China’s ability to provide capital for investments in infrastructure, 
consumer goods for import, or markets for export of hydrocarbons and other goods. Any effort to 
thwart these advantages would be futile and counterproductive, in the view of many Russian 
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officials and scholars.200 One Russian scholar, resigned to China’s growing influence, cited the 
Russian proverb Ne budi likho, poka ono tikho or “Don’t wake up evil while it’s quiet”.201 
Unable to resist China’s growing regional influence, and unwilling to run the risks 
associated with attempting to do so, Russia increasingly sought to benefit from China’s presence. 
Russian leaders hoped that Chinese leaders would include Russia in their plans to build 
infrastructural connections to Europe. In particular, they hoped that China’s ambitious plans for 
highways, railroads, and possibly high-speed rail lines would involve connections through 
Russia.202 Russia had an incentive to take a pragmatic approach, focusing on the concrete gains 
that it could make from individual projects.203 It did so, however, as part of an overall strategic 
calculation that it had more to gain from accommodating China’s efforts than from resisting them, 
especially considering that resistance might be futile anyway. 
 
Global level: increased coordination 
 
 China-Russia relations also appeared to gain momentum at the global level.204 During the 
summer of 2016, Russia joined China in condemning the decision to deploy the Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea. The United States and South Korea had 
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discussed the system’s potential deployment for years, and talks accelerated after North Korea 
conducted its fourth nuclear test in January 2016. Formal talks on THAAD deployment began in 
March, and South Korea announced in early July that it had agreed to the system’s deployment. 
South Korea’s announcement followed two years of intense diplomatic efforts by Xi to cultivate 
ties with South Korea and to weaken the U.S.-South Korea alliance. During a visit to Beijing in 
June, just prior to South Korea’s announcement, Putin joined Xi in denouncing the THAAD 
system. China argued that the system’s capabilities exceeded South Korea’s defense needs and 
that THAAD radar systems would threaten China’s nuclear deterrent by enhancing the U.S. ability 
to track missiles launched from China. Putin compared THAAD to the Aegis Ashore ballistic 
missile defense system deployed in some NATO countries, suggesting that the United States was 
attempting to encircle China in the same way that it had, in his view, done to Russia.205  China and 
Russia also accused the United States of provoking North Korea by holding regular joint military 
exercises with South Korea.206 
Furthermore, while officially maintaining neutrality on China’s territorial disputes in the 
South China Sea, Russia seemed to edge closer to China’s position. In July 2016, the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled that China’s sweeping claims to control over waters 
encompassing around 90 percent of the South China Sea were in violation of the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), of which China was a signatory. The court ruled that China’s 
construction of artificial islands, as well as its actions that had caused environmental damage, also 
violated international law. On every significant point, the court sided with the Philippines, which 
had filed the case in 2013. China rejected the court’s ruling, which had no means of enforcement, 
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and vowed not to abide by it.207 A few weeks later, while attending the G-20 conference in 
Hangzhou, China, in early September, Putin declared his support for China’s rejection of the ruling. 
He also backed China’s position that outside powers such as the United States should stay out of 
these disputes.208 That same month, Russia and China held joint naval exercises in the South China 
Sea. Through these joint exercises, China appeared determined to signal both its defiance of the 
court’s ruling and its ability to turn to Russia for diplomatic support.209 
Analysts in both China and Russia recognized that the two countries’ coordination at the 
global level had intensified following the onset of the Ukraine crisis. They insisted, however, that 
the relationship continued to fall within the rubric of the “strategic partnership” and had not 
become an alliance. A think tank report published in 2016, co-authored by Russian and Chinese 
experts, argued that, in the security sphere, “both states have closely approached the line that 
separates strategic partnership from military-political alliance,” though neither state wished to 
cross this line.210 The prospect of a geopolitically significant China-Russia bloc, possibly one that 
could be considered a quasi-alliance involving close political coordination, seemed more plausible 
than it had even a few years earlier.211 “Both sides can carefully avoid the word ‘alliance’,” wrote 
Vasily Kashin, a Russian expert on China, “but this is already something much bigger than ‘good-
neighborliness’ or even ‘strategic partnership’.”212 
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Some Russian critics argued that Russia’s pivot to the East, including its outreach to China, 
had failed to garner the promised rewards, especially in the economic sphere.213 Other experts 
acknowledged that results in the economic sphere had been slow in coming. They argued, however, 
that the expansion of bilateral economic ties between China and Russia would be a long-term 
process, and any expectation that China could quickly replace the West as a source of foreign 
direct investment was unrealistic. More importantly, it was a convergence of political interests, 
not economics, that provided a solid foundation for the China-Russia relationship.214 
In articles published during 2016 in both English and Chinese, Chinese Vice Foreign 
Minister Fu Ying attempted to clarify the nature of the China-Russia relationship.215 She disputed 
two common outside views. One view was that China-Russia relations were weak, fragile, and 
likely to deteriorate. The other was that China and Russia were likely to form an anti-Western 
alliance.216 
The relationship was unlikely to fray, she argued, because China and Russia had common 
interests that were likely to endure. Both countries had a strong interest in ensuring that their long 
border remained a stable, friendly zone. The Sino-Soviet split had created tension and upheaval 
along the border, posing a big security risk to both countries. China and Russia had every incentive 
to prevent a recurrence of such tensions. In Central Asia, the two countries had common interests 
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in preventing “color revolutions” and resisting the “three evil forces” of terrorism, separatism, and 
extremism. In the economic sphere, the two countries possessed natural complementarities. They 
had cooperated in the military and energy spheres and could expand this cooperation in a variety 
of other sectors. Finally, China and Russia held convergent views on many international issues. 
All of these factors, combined with increasing reserves of mutual trust, were likely to ensure that 
the relationship would remain strong, the vice foreign minister argued.217 
At the same time, she argued, China rejected the option of an alliance with Russia. 
Alliances would be a continuation of bloc politics from the Cold War era and were not suited to 
present realities, she argued. Alliance politics could stimulate conflict while also constraining the 
policy options that were open to allied countries. China’s historical experience showed the 
potential pitfalls of alliances. Historically, China and Russia had formed three alliances: between 
the Qing Dynasty and tsarist Russia following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, between 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government and the Soviet Union at the end of World War II, and 
between the newly formed People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union during the early Cold 
War era. Each of these alliances were short-lived, demonstrating that alliances not only failed to 
guarantee China’s security, but posed significant potential risks.218 
In Fu Ying’s view, the U.S.-Russia-China triangle had become scalene, that is, with no 
congruent sides.219 A report by U.S. analysts in 2017, picking up on this point, argued that the U.S. 
position in the triangle had deteriorated, giving China the hinge position.220 From the perspective 
of realism, the deterioration of U.S.-Russia relations might be expected to lead to a China-Russia 
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alliance. In Fu Ying’s view, however, the realities of interdependence in the world politics of fthe 
twenty-first century meant that older notions of a triangle, in which two sides would unite and 
either oppose or ignore the third, were no longer suitable. Under these circumstances, the formation 
of a China-Russia alliance was not the only unlikely outcome. The G-2 proposal for shared world 
leadership between the United States and China, proposed in the wake of the financial crisis, never 
gained traction. Nor was a proposed U.S. strategy of uniting with Russia to balance against China 
likely to work.221 In January 2017, the Donald J. Trump administration came to office indicating 
that it was interested in the latter strategy. Given the strong foundations of the current China-Russia 
relationship, the administration was likely to have difficulty pursuing this strategy. The last quarter 
century of China-Russia interactions had revealed some inherent limitations in the relationship, 
but it had also proven more resilient than many had predicted. 
  
                                                          








 This study has argued that both systemic and domestic factors help to explain the 
development of China-Russia relations during the period from 1991 to 2016. Neoclassical realism 
offers a framework that allows the incorporation of both sets of factors. This study modifies the 
neoclassical realist framework to account for crucial variables, including changes in relative power 
in the international system and the formation of national identities, that exerted important influence 
on the evolution of the relationship. 
 The steady improvement of China-Russia relations during this period was in important 
respects a continuation of the process that began with the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations 
during the second half of the 1980s. However, the breakup of the Soviet Union, which resulted in 
a new unipolar structure of the international system, represented a point of discontinuity. It 
temporarily disrupted the warming of ties between Moscow and Beijing. When this process 
resumed, the context had changed. The new unipolarity’s influence was apparent in several 
respects. 
The breakup of the Soviet Union removed some of the rationale for close U.S.-China 
relations. Combined with tensions over the Tiananmen Square crackdown, ongoing disagreements 
over Taiwan, and other issues, this contributed to increased friction in U.S.-China relations during 
the 1990s. This friction, in turn, encouraged China to cultivate relations with Russia as a partial 
counterweight to U.S. power. At the same time, Chinese leaders recognized that the U.S. power 
advantage made confrontation with the United States undesirable. As a result, they largely adhered 
to Deng Xiaoping’s advice to “bide your time and hide your capabilities,” pursuing a mostly 





Russia was initially unreceptive to China’s diplomatic outreach, as the country’s new 
leadership sought to integrate their country into the West. In the following years, however, as 
Russia endured disappointment in its relations with the United States, President Boris Yeltsin 
increasingly turned to China. Under domestic political pressure, Yeltsin gradually sought closer 
ties with China, largely as a way to play the “China card” in relations with the United States. In 
the new unipolar world, Russia found itself in a greatly weakened position and could not oppose 
the United States effectively on its own. Russia found itself unable to stop U.S. policies that it 
opposed, especially NATO expansion. It was natural that Yeltsin would turn to China, an 
increasingly powerful country that shared many of Russia’s misgivings about the new international 
order. Unipolarity therefore eventually encouraged Russia to respond to China’s requests for a 
closer partnership. 
In all of these ways, the unipolar structure of the international system helped to shape the 
development of China-Russia relations during the post-Soviet era. Throughout the period under 
study, the U.S. advantage in power encouraged China and Russia to cooperate in order to establish 
at least a modest counterweight. At the same time, the preponderance of U.S. power limited the 
two countries’ ability to balance the United States, effectively ruling out the possibility of an 
alliance. In any case, neither country perceived a direct threat to their security from the United 
States, giving them little incentive to pursue such an arrangement. 
 Despite these constants in the China-Russia relationship, the international environment was 
not static. Changes in relative power enabled adjustments in both country’s foreign policies, which 
in turn held implications for their own bilateral relationship. Throughout this period, China 
maintained high levels of economic growth, paving the way for its rise to power. Russia, 




suffering a severe decline in power during the 1990s. By 2008, important changes in relative power 
were occurring, which can be expressed in terms of Charles Doran’s power cycle theory. China, 
after experiencing decades of accelerating growth in relative power, was approaching a point at 
which its growth would begin to slow. Russia was attempting to cross the lower turning point on 
its power cycle and enter a period of accelerating growth, though structural weaknesses in its 
economy cast doubt on its long-term prospects. The United States, whose relative power had been 
in a long but steady decline since the late 1960s, suddenly appeared weaker than at any point in 
the post-Cold War era, first because of its inconclusive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and later 
because of the global financial crisis. 
 As a result of these changes in relative power, both countries sought to claim greater foreign 
policy roles, as power cycle theory would expect. Both became increasingly assertive in their 
foreign policies. Russian President Vladimir Putin harshly denounced the United States in a speech 
in Munich in 2007. The following year, Russia waged a brief and decisive war in Georgia, 
signaling that it would tolerate no further expansion of Euro-Atlantic institutions into former 
Soviet territory. In the years following the financial crisis, China advanced its territorial claims in 
the South and East China Seas more assertively than in the recent past. Under the leadership of 
President Xi Jinping, who assumed power in late 2012 and early 2013, China continued this new 
regional assertiveness and also began to lay the institutional groundwork for a greater role in the 
international system in the future. 
 The manner in which both countries pursued enhanced foreign policy roles, however, owed 
much to their national identities, with important implications for their own bilateral relationship. 
The governing regimes in both countries perceived U.S. efforts to promote democracy, human 




ground, therefore, in opposing U.S. claims to leadership of an international community 
proclaiming universal validity for liberal values. Both countries bristled at U.S. criticism of their 
domestic governance, opposed the “color revolutions” and the Arab Spring, and took measures to 
ensure that U.S. influence would not undermine the security of their own domestic regimes. The 
leadership of both countries viewed the United States principally as a threat to their own regimes’ 
security, rather than as a physical threat to their countries’ national security. 
 China and Russia also frequently declared their support for multipolarity. They asserted 
that the world was already becoming multipolarity, and that this trend would naturally limit U.S. 
power. Their declarations of support for multipolarity concealed some differences in outlook. 
Russia sought multipolarity because it wanted to avoid marginalization on the international scene. 
Ideally, it would establish itself as a swing power between the United States and China in a tripolar 
world. As China grew increasingly powerful, however, this prospect seemed increasingly elusive. 
Chinese leaders declared their support for multipolarity, hoping that the existence of other power 
centers would dilute U.S. pressure on their own country. Yet they increasingly prepared for the 
potential formation of a bipolar world, with the United States and China as the two superpowers. 
 For both countries, multipolarity also meant a world in which they would establish spheres 
of influence in their own regions. This outlook also reflected their own convergent national 
identities. The establishment of regional spheres of influence would be merely the extension of 
their own authoritarian domestic governance into adjoining regions. The attempt to establish 
regional spheres of influence gathered momentum in both countries starting around 2008. Such 
attempts threatened to bring both countries into conflict with the United States, and were also 
inimical to principles of a liberal international order. As a result, both countries proceeded 




maintained official neutrality on each other’s regional disputes, but at times they provided a 
measure of diplomatic support. The existence of tensions in both countries’ relations with the 
United States, as long as these remained under control, stretched U.S. resources and provided both 
countries with some strategic room for maneuver in their own regions. 
 Convergent national identities were a major factor in strengthening the China-Russia 
relationship. As China grew increasingly powerful relative to Russia, the two countries’ national 
interests threatened to diverge. China’s growing power posed a potential threat to Russia’s sparsely 
populated and underdeveloped regions of Siberia and the Russian Far East. Russia’s efforts to 
strengthen ties with some of China’s rivals in Asia, including Japan, Vietnam, and India, were a 
source of possible tension. Perhaps most strikingly, China’s growing influence in Central Asia, 
which the Belt and Road Initiative underscored, threatened a clash between Chinese and Russian 
interests in Central Asia. Despite these potential conflicts of national interests, the two countries 
consistently found ways to manage their differences. They set aside these possible disputes in favor 
of cooperation to minimize the perceived threat that the United States posed to their national 
identities. 
 China-Russia cooperation during the period from 1991 to 2016 achieved important results, 
but also remained limited in important respects. By resolving their border dispute and removing 
the mutual security threat that had existed during the Cold War, both countries greatly enhanced 
their national security. They would have had strong incentives to achieve this progress even in the 
absence of unipolarity and concerns about the United States. However, these agreements were also 
a necessary prerequisite to increased cooperation on the international stage. The two countries also 
reaped important material benefits from their cooperation. China gained access to Russian 




After protracted negotiations, China also enhanced its energy security by tapping into Russian oil 
and gas resources. Russia reaped its own economic awards from these deals. In the case of military-
technical cooperation, China’s purchases of Russian weapons played an important role in 
sustaining Russia’s domestic defense industry during a difficult stage following the breakup of the 
Soviet Union. 
 Higher levels of cooperation proved difficult to achieve, however. China and Russia 
expressed opposition to the United States on a series of issues, including plans for missile defense, 
the Kosovo war, the war in Iraq, and efforts to increase pressure on Iran and North Korea over 
their nuclear weapons programs. Some scholars argued that these efforts constituted “soft 
balancing.” In several cases, notably on missile defense, Kosovo, and Iraq, China and Russia were 
unable to influence U.S. policy. Their cooperation imposed some constraints on the United States 
in its dealings with Iran and North Korea. In both cases, however, the United States faced serious 
obstacles to the imposition of effective pressure, military or otherwise, that were intrinsic to the 
situation itself and separate from the influence exerted by cooperation between China and Russia. 
Triangular diplomacy also failed, for the most part, to achieve significant results. Russia’s 
efforts to play the “China card” were largely unsuccessful, mostly because of Russia’s own 
weakness. China claimed the former U.S. pivot position in the triangle, but attempts to exploit its 
relations with Russia to gain leverage in relations with the United States were not a major part of 
its strategy. For China, the benefits of holding the pivot position chiefly consisted in its ability to 
reap the gains of relations with Russia, especially the establishment of a secure strategic rear and 
the acquisition of weapons and energy resources, without causing serious damage in relations with 
the United States. The highest potential form of cooperation, namely the formation of a military-




United States as a direct threat to its national security and because even such an alliance would 
have failed to produce the aggregate capability needed to balance U.S. power effectively. 
 Despite its limitations, the post-Soviet China-Russia relationship has proven more resilient 
than many analysts anticipated. Although the prospects for the formation of a military-political 
alliance remain remote, the relationship probably has sufficiently firm foundations to remain 
relatively stable for the near future. For now, the two states share enough commonality in their 
national identities to ensure continued partnership. Much of this commonality centers on overlap 
in their views of the United States. Although neither country desires a rupture in this relationship, 
the leadership of both countries views the United States as both a potential threat to their domestic 
governance and an obstacle to their international ambitions. As long as these points remain major 
concerns for both countries, they are likely to maintain or incrementally increase their current 
levels of cooperation at the international level. 
 If the current arrangement were to break down, a change in Russia’s perception of China’s 
rise would be the most likely cause. To date, Russian leaders have set aside their fears about the 
implications of China’s growing power for the sake of maintaining good relations. This could 
change if Russian leaders begin to view China’s rise as a much more imminent threat than they 
now perceive it. China could eventually pose a threat to the Russian Far East or to Russian interests 
in Central Asia. If so, Russia could be forced to recalibrate its strategy, possibly by seeking to 
improve relations with the West as a counterbalance against Chinese ambitions. China, however, 
would have strong incentives to avoid such an outcome. Chinese leaders perceive that their 
growing power could eventually give rise to counterbalancing efforts by neighboring states. Such 
tendencies are already visible in increased quadrilateral coordination among the United States, 




then China could lose is secure strategic rear and risk encirclement. The rise of a fiercely 
nationalistic Chinese leadership could give rise to such a scenario. In the absence of a Chinese 
leadership willing to take such risks, however, China and Russia will continue to have strong 
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